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 The study of Thomas Aquinas generally focuses on theological questions in his work, and 
ignores certain aspects of what might be called his “spiritual life.”  Though there are exceptions 
to this rule, there are numerous themes in the writings of Thomas Aquinas which have not been 
given their due.  In light of this fact, this dissertation seeks to provide an extended treatment of 
two components of the work of Thomas Aquinas which receive little attention: the role of 
spiritual exercises in his writing, and the form of reflexivity—one’s understanding of and 
relation to one’s self—he recommends.  As a way of approaching these issues, I draw from the 
work of two historical philosophers, Pierre Hadot and Michel Foucault, using the methodological 
questions they employ in their writings on the classical world. 
 Both Hadot and Foucault argued that there was something different about the way 
philosophy was accomplished in the antique world, something which was lost as philosophy 
shifted in the modern period.  Hadot’s work focuses, in particular, on the use of spiritual 
exercises in the formation of the person—that is, how a person becomes the ideal form they 
ought to be.  Foucault, on the other hand, focused on the alternative form of reflexivity as found 
in the work of classical philosophers, and used it for fruitful comparison and critique of the 
contemporary forms of reflexivity found in the modern world.  Both of these thinkers, however, 
never included in their study the medieval period, or at least not in an extended and meaningful 
 
 
way.  Their questions, however, are particularly relevant to the work of Thomas Aquinas, as he 
offers both an extended treatment of spiritual exercises, as well as a form of reflexivity similar in 
many ways to classical forms.   
 As a way of highlighting these two topics in Thomas Aquinas, I first provide an overview 
of the work of Pierre Hadot and Michel Foucault as it relates to these topics.  I then move onto a 
discussion of the current state of scholarship on “spirituality” in Thomas Aquinas, and suggest 
the ways in which this dissertation can improve on this current state.  In the subsequent chapters, 
I begin a discussion of the concept of virtue as found in Thomas Aquinas, and its relation to both 
spiritual exercises and reflexivity, the description of which in Thomas forms the basis for the 
next two chapters.  Finally, I turn to an in depth application of these methodological questions by 
turning to two different works of Thomas; first, I turn to his De perfectione spiritualis vitae, a 
short and rarely read work in which Thomas explains the practices which accompany the 
formation of a person in charity.  Second, I turn to the Summa Theologiae and the cardinal 
virtues, drawing attention to the presence of spiritual exercises in a work typically treated as 
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Chapter 1  - Survey of Literature, Method and Argument  
 
This is a dissertation on the work of Thomas Aquinas, one which intends to 
supplement the understanding of his spirituality.  Though there are studies of the spiritual 
life in Thomas, the methodology of this study will be different.  In particular, through 
engagement with the work of Pierre Hadot and Michel Foucault, I hope to bring to light 
aspects of the work of Aquinas previously uninvestigated.  The principal interests of 
Hadot and Foucault’s later work is on the nature of ancient philosophy, and in particular 
the spiritual exercises and reflexive notion of the self that accompanied these 
philosophies.  The work of Foucault and Hadot, though it has been applied to figures 
from early Christianity, has yet to be applied in a full length study to medieval thinkers.  
This provides the rationale for this dissertation, to study Thomas Aquinas’s spiritual 
exercises and his understanding of the relationship of self to self. 
 For those not familiar with the entirety of Thomas’s oeuvre, it may be surprising to 
discover that Thomas wrote on anything other than academic questions.  Aquinas is, 
however, concerned with the entire range of the spiritual life, which can be seen in his 
short work De perfectione spiritualis vitae.  This text, written in response to negative 
judgments of the religious orders from secular clergy, explains how a Christian can 
pursue perfection as far as possible in this life, and the practices that aid in attaining this 
perfection. 
 Before moving on to the particulars of my argument, it will be helpful to first provide 
an overview of the work of Pierre Hadot and Michel Foucault, and to briefly describe 
how their work will influence this study of Aquinas.  I will then provide an overview of 
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the literature on Aquinas, and the few instances where the study of Hadot and Aquinas 
has overlapped.   
Hadot and Philosophy 
The work of the French historical philosopher Pierre Hadot identified a component 
missing from the world of modern philosophy.  His great innovation came in the 
identification of philosophy as a “way of life,” and the accompaniment of this way of life 
by certain “spiritual exercises,” an insight derived from his study of ancient philosophy.  
In this understanding, only when a person lived their philosophy could they properly be 
called a philosopher.  One of his most repeated quotations comes from Henry David 
Thoreau’s book Walden: “Nowadays, there are philosophy professors, but no 
philosophers.”1  Thoreau’s point, which is one Hadot heartily endorses, is that there is a 
difference between thinking and living, and in the modern world the great majority of our 
philosophical undertakings are concerned only with speculative knowledge or theoretical 
matters, and not with changing one’s way of life.  Hadot argues that, in the ancient world, 
while knowledge is important to the philosopher, it is only a part of a far more important 
project: the task of total self-cultivation.  In this project, the philosopher is deeply 
concerned with working on his self, and only along with the conversion into something 
different can that philosopher come to “know” something about the universe.   
Hadot, therefore, draws a sharp contrast between two types of thought.  One, he will 
suggest, can properly be called philosophy, while the other, drawing from the Stoics, is 
                                                 
1 Epigraph of What is Ancient Philosophy. Hadot, Pierre. 2002. What is Ancient Philosophy? [Qu'est-ce que 
la philosophie antique?]. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
1-3 
 
better labeled “logos kata philosophian,” discourse about philosophical matters.2  It is a 
recurring theme or criticism among philosophers that some are not actually 
accomplishing philosophy, but only talking about it—think, for example, of Plato’s 
criticism of the Sophists.  This specific criticism, that there are those who do not do 
philosophy but only speak it, is also directed at the medieval Scholastics.  Hadot, in 
particular, sees the development of the university methods of learning in the 13th century 
as one instance of philosophy losing its practical core: 
If ancient philosophy established such an intimate link between philosophical 
discourse and the form of life, why is it that today, given the way the history of 
philosophy is usually taught, philosophy is presented as above all a discourse, 
which may be theoretical and systematic, or critical, but in any case lacks a direct 
relationship to the philosopher’s way of life? 
The causes of this transformation are primarily historical: it is due to the 
flourishing of Christianity.  As we have seen, Christianity presented itself very 
early as a “philosophy” in the ancient sense of the term....Gradually, however, and 
for reasons we shall explore later, Christianity, particularly in the Middle Ages, 
was marked by a divorce between philosophical discourse and way of life....All 
that persisted was the philosophical discourse of certain ancient schools, in 
particular the discourses of Platonism and Aristotelianism.  Yet, separated from 
                                                 
2 Reference to What is Ancient Philosophy? 25 and to Hadot Interior Citadel 94-98.  Hadot, Pierre and 
Marcus Aurelius. 1998. The Inner Citadel: The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius [Citadelle intérieure.]. 




the ways of life which inspired them, they were reduced to the status of mere 
conceptual material, which could be used in theological controversies.3 
This is a rather intriguing argument, and Hadot is certainly not the first to point to 
Scholasticism as problematic in a number of ways.  As will be discussed later in this 
chapter, there are several difficulties with Hadot’s understanding of Scholastic thought.  
Most importantly, Hadot overlooks the spiritual and philosophical life of academic 
thinkers from this period.  Hadot is not necessarily to blame for his lack of awareness of 
this aspect; it appears to be the standard reading of Scholastics to focus only on their 
academic work, to dismiss their biblical commentaries and sermons as hobbies, and 
finally to critique them for having a deficient spiritual life.   
 For Hadot, the problems of Scholastic thought did not end in the middle Ages, but 
continue up to the present day.  Given the connection of the rise of the university with the 
rise of scholasticism, and the endurance of university structures from that earlier period, 
it is inevitable that one would find a continuation of many of the same forms and methods 
of teaching from that earlier period.  This means, to Hadot, that the university system is 
generally predicated on a faulty concept of philosophy.  Beyond the university, certain 
philosophical systems continue this division, as Hadot explains: “The partisans of neo-
scholastic or Thomist philosophy have continued, as in the middle ages, to view 
philosophy as a purely theoretical activity.”  This is not necessarily a bold claim, and is 
                                                 
3 What is ancient philosophy? 253 
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certainly in line with the standard perception of scholastic thought over the centuries.  
But is it correct?4 
  For Scholasticism in general, and for the work of Thomas Aquinas in particular, I 
argue that it is not.  Aquinas does not approach philosophy or theology as a purely 
theoretical activity, nor does he lack a concern for the transformation of the person 
through education and training.  Hadot’s argument overlooks several of the key features 
of Scholasticism in the 13th century in favor of his original characterization.  In reality, 
Thomas is concerned with the whole person and their development, and though he does 
not identify the work of the Christian as the “philosophical life” as other thinkers from 
around this period do,5 he is devoted to the concept of the vita spiritualis, the spiritual 
life. 
Hadot is certainly aware of the concept of the spiritual life, and he does not believe 
that all of Christianity lacks the understanding of philosophy held by Greek and Roman 
philosophers.  Instead, he is making a specific argument about the nature of Scholastic 
thought, and suggesting that it lost some of the values that Christianity once held.  It is in 
fact from Christianity, and from scholarship on Christian theologians, that Hadot draws 
some of the more important concepts in his work.  In “Ancient Spiritual Exercises and 
‘Christian Philosophy’” Hadot cites Paul Rabbow’s work Antike Schriften uber 
                                                 
4 Speaking of neo-Scholasticism and neo-Thomism in general, it seems as if an argument can be made that 
this is not the case for all parties involved.  One can look, for example, to the efforts of Reginald Garrigou-
Lagrange, called the “Sacred Monster of Thomism,” and see a number of works on the “Spiritual Life.”  
These works, while they may continue to treat philosophy as a “handmaiden” as Thomas in some sense 
does, do view Christianity as a way of life, and seek to integrate theoretical material into a practical 
existence.  They also employ spiritual exercises.  This is not the main subject of this thesis, however. Cf., 
Perfection chretienne et contemplation: selon S. Thomas d’Aquin et S. Jean de la Croix. 
5 Most notably Bernard of Clairvaux, but also Meister Eckhart and others.  Bernard of Clairvaux is one 
figure who is critical of “university” learning, though at the time the universities were not fully established.   
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Seelenheilung und Seelenleitung auf ihre Quellen untersucht, as a key source of 
inspiration.  In this work, Rabbow describes the ancient practice of a “moral exercise,”6 
something which is then developed in Christianity into a “spiritual exercise.”  Rabbow 
writes: 
Spiritual exercises, then, which resemble moral exercises like a twin, both in 
essence and structure, were raised to their classical rigor and perfection in the 
Exercitia Spiritualia of Ignatius of Loyola.  Spiritual exercises thus belong 
primarily to the religious sphere, since their goal is to fortify, maintain, and renew 
life “in the Spirit,” the vita spiritualis.7   
Admittedly, if one were to turn to the work of Thomas Aquinas, as well as those 
commentators on his work, the vast majority is not focused on explicit matters of the 
“spiritual life.”  Instead, one finds a strong emphasis placed on disputation about 
theological quandaries and issues that appear to have no bearing on quotidian realities.  
But, as Hadot will emphasize about ancient authors, our approach to earlier texts often 
misses key aspects of the writer’s thought because of the differences in our context.  This 
lack of perspective, I argue, is true of the work of Thomas Aquinas, and Hadot and others 
have missed certain aspects of Thomas’ work.   
 Thomas does in fact care about the spiritual life, and does view Christianity as a way 
of life.  In addition to this, he offers a variety of spiritual exercises that aid in the 
                                                 
6 Rabbow used “moral exercise” to distinguish non-Christian practices of philosophers from Christian 
exercises.  As Hadot will note, “moral exercise” is an inadequate term and is rightly replaced by “spiritual 
exercise,” as the practices referred to alter the whole person, and not just the ethical aspect. 
7 Philosophy as a Way of Life 127.  Hadot, Pierre and Arnold I. Davidson. 1995. Philosophy as a Way of 
Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault [Exercices spirituels et philosophie antique.]. Malden, 




formation of a person, in order that the person may approach the world, other persons, 
and God in a different way.  The primary source for my argument is his short work, De 
perfectione spiritualis vitae, which offers an explanation of the spiritual life and 
examples of exercises that aid in its advancement.  From this first source, we are 
provided with a lens to approach the Summa Theologiae and works of Thomas, one 
which highlights Thomas’ understanding of the life of Christians as taking a specific 
form, accompanied by a process of self-formation.   
The development of Hadot’s thought 
 The direction of Pierre Hadot’s work has taken a number of interesting turns over the 
course of his career.  A summary of his interests can be found in interviews with Hadot 
himself8 and in an article by Wayne Hankey.9  Hankey portrays Hadot’s academic 
pursuits as at first a product of Hadot’s interest in mysticism and his personal desire for 
religious experience: 
Early in his scholarly career, Hadot labored at the Plotinian and Porphyrian 
neoplatonisms and their fruits in Victorinus and Augustine. He had had mystical 
experiences as a youth which were not associated with his practice of 
Catholicism. After reading some of the classic Christian mystical authors while at 
seminary, he ardently attempted union, but was discouraged by his spiritual 
                                                 
8 Philosophy as a way of life, “Postscript: an interview with Pierre Hadot,” 277-286. 
9 “Philosophy as a way of life for Christians? Iamblichian and Porphyrian reflections on religion, virtue and 
philosophy in Thomas Aquinas.” Volume 59, numéro 2, 2003, p. 193-224 Le néoplatonisme 
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directors. Indeed, he was brought to the point of questioning whether “le message 
Chrétien est compatible finalement avec la mystique.”10 
Hadot then began work on Plotinus with his text Plotin ou la simplicite de regard.  Hadot 
describes his changing opinions on the matter: 
To sum up my inner evolution, I would say the following: in 1946, I naively 
believed that I, too, could relive the Plotinian mystical experience.  But I later 
realized this was an illusion.  The conclusion of my book Plotinus already hinted 
that the idea of the “purely spiritual” is untenable.11 
Not long after this, however, Hadot began to focus his work on Stoic thought, 
culminating in his 1977 article “Exercices Spirituales.”12  This transition is once more 
explained as the product of a changing opinion regarding the “best” variety of 
philosophy: 
Yet, as I grow older, Plotinus speaks to me less and less, if I may say so.  I have 
become considerably detached from him.  From 1970 on, I have felt very strongly 
that it was Epicureanism and Stoicism which could nourish the spiritual life of 
men and women of our times, as well as my own.  That was how I came to write 
my book on spiritual exercises.13 
Hadot’s work is thus built upon a valuation of certain types of philosophy over others, 
something which Hadot acknowledges without reserve.  His work is therefore intended 
                                                 
10 Ibid., with references to Hadot, La philosophie comme manière de vivre, p. 25-32 ; see p. 128-129. Ibid., 
p. 126 ; see p. 32 
11 Philosophy as a Way of Life 281 
12 Hadot, Pierre. “Exercices spirituels,” Annuaire : Résumé des conférences et travaux, École pratique des 
hautes études, Section des sciences religieuses, 84 (1975-1976), Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1977, p. 68-
69. 
13 Philosophy as a Way of Life 280-281 
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not only to bring to the surface a manner of life lost in the course of history, but to 
critique contemporary philosophy in general and reinvigorate philosophy as a way of life.   
As mentioned above, Hadot’s work points to Christianity as the source of this 
problem in western thought, and specifically the Christian Scholasticism of the middle 
Ages.  The details of this argument will be discussed in greater detail at the end of this 
chapter, but it is important to note that Hadot had softened his stance on a number of 
these arguments by the end of his life.  Instead of arguing for the almost complete 
absence of philosophy as a way of life from the modern world, Hadot started to turn his 
focus to those appearances in authors from the modern period of the use of spiritual 
exercises.  His final text, N’oublie pas de Vivre, is a study of Johann Wolfgang von 
Goethe’s writings, and an examination of his use of antique sources and the perspectives 
found therein, including a detailed explanation of his use of spiritual exercises.14  He also 
wrote on Nietzsche and Spinoza, and Michel de Montaigne.15 
Philosophy as a way of life 
Philosophy as a “way of life” is a concept offered by Hadot to describe the 
differences between theoretical philosophy and philosophy as practiced by some in the 
ancient world.  Hadot writes, “Philosophy then appears in its original aspect: not as a 
theoretical construct, but as a method for training people to live and to look at the world 
in a new way.”16  This does not mean that philosophy is limited to the ethical; instead, all 
aspects of philosophical thought are integrated into what is traditionally considered the 
                                                 
14 Hadot, Pierre. N'Oublie Pas De Vivre: Goethe Et La Tradition Des Exercices Spirituels. Bibliothèque 
Albin Michel. Idées. 2008, Paris: Albin Michel. 
15 What is Ancient Philosophy?, et al. 
16 Philosophy as a Way of Life 107 
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ethical.  Arnold Davidson writes that for Hadot, in his description of ancient philosophy, 
“the distinction between theory and practice is located within each of the parts of 
philosophy; there is a theoretical discourse concerning logic, physics, and ethics, but 
there is also a practical or lived logic, a lived physics, and a lived ethics.”17  These three 
aspects also lead to three areas of concern for cultivation of the self: judgments, desires, 
and inclinations.18  The activity of philosophical discourse related to logic actually 
provides a foundation for the functional implementation of logic in one’s life: practicing 
logical thinking at a theoretical level forms one to be capable of thinking logically in the 
every day, and thus one is able to develop sound judgment.  The same is true for physics 
and ethics: physics in this account relates to a tempering of desires and inclinations, as if 
one understands the nature of the world, its status as temporary and one’s part in it as a 
human, then one does not cling to the same desires or foster the same inclinations.   
The theoretical practice of ethics also relates to the actual practice of ethics. To the 
many persons who have made the claim that they did not become ethical by reading 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Hadot would have two responses: 1. We are not reading 
the text correctly; ancient texts must be read differently, and if the expectation is 
transformation, then one must be willing to engage in the practices recommended by the 
text.  2. We have lost the oral accompaniment to ancient philosophy: ancient philosophy 
took place most often in the setting of a school; the everyday discourse of that school, 
                                                 
17 Philosophy as a Way of Life 24: referring to “la philosophie antique: une ethique ou une pratique” pp.18-
29 and “Philosophie, discours philosophique, et divisions de la philosophie chez les stoiciens”; and Hadot, 
La Citadelle Interieure, ch. 5. 
18 This is an account of Stoic thought. 
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which was almost never written down, is an interpretive key to understanding the 
implementation of that way of life.   
Spiritual Exercises 
In order to form oneself to live as a philosopher, Hadot identifies certain activities 
which he calls “spiritual exercises,” with the precedent for the term coming from Ignatius 
of Loyola.  Once more, these exercises are a defining feature of early philosophy and are, 
according to Hadot’s judgment, mostly lost from the world with the rise of Scholastic 
thought.  Hadot, again in describing the philosophical schools of the first millennium, 
writes: 
All schools agree that man, before his philosophical conversion, is in a state of 
unhappy disquiet.  Consumed by passions, torn by worries, he does not live a 
genuine life, nor is he truly himself. All schools agree that man can be delivered 
from this state.  He can accede to genuine life, improve himself, transform 
himself, and attain a state of perfection.  It is precisely for this that spiritual 
exercises are intended.  Their goal is a kind of self-formation, or paideia, which is 
to teach us to live, not in conformity with human prejudices and social 
conventions—for social life is itself a product of the passions—but in conformity 
with the nature of man, which is none other than reason.19  
Spiritual exercises take a number of forms, a brief list of which might include: research, 
investigation, reading, listening, attention, meditations, therapies of the passions, 
remembrance of good things, self mastery, and the accomplishment of duties.20  The 
                                                 
19 What is Ancient Philosophy?102 
20 Ibid., 84 
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common thread of these exercises is that they have an effect on the self, and the soul in 
particular (hence, spiritual), and are a key component of moral training.  Even when 
taking the form of a bodily action, like occupying a certain location or practices of 
generosity, the importance is secondarily upon the action, and primarily the impact that 
action has on the soul.  Through repetition of these exercises, and the formation of habits 
of thought and practice, one is aided in the formation of virtues. 
 Spiritual exercises take a variety of forms, as Hadot will note.  Important to this thesis 
is the fact that the practices of logic, disputation, and speculative thought all fall under 
the umbrella of spiritual exercise in Hadot’s understanding.  Hadot argues this because he 
recognizes that philosophers of the ancient world were not concerned only with 
developing answers from their speculation; instead, the point of philosophical thought is 
that a person can not only provide an explanation of “justice,” for example, but rather that 
they become persons who are capable of complex thought, prudent implementation and 
effective action in facing difficult issues. 
Attention to oneself 
 According to Hadot, “attention (prosoche) is the fundamental Stoic spiritual 
attitude,”21 and is one of the principal spiritual exercises of the Ancient world.  
Attention22 takes several different forms in different philosophical or religious settings, 
                                                 
21 Philosophy as a Way of Life 84 
22 As will be developed in the second chapter, attention is a form of the reflexive relation of the self to 
itself.  Modern attention to the self and self-awareness differs in several key ways from the classical format, 
most importantly in that modern form of attention approaches the self as an object of knowledge.  Attention 
is discussed in this dissertation as a way of highlighting the continued presence of classical tropes in 
Thomas Aquinas’s work, and to emphasize this specific, understudied aspect of his spirituality. 
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and is one of the best ways of differentiating these philosophies.  Hadot describes this 
attention in Stoics: 
It is a continuous vigilance and presence of mind, self consciousness which never 
sleeps, and a constant tension of the spirit.  Thanks to this attitude, the 
philosopher is fully aware of what he does at each instant, and wills his actions 
fully.  Thanks to his spiritual vigilance, the Stoic always has “at hand” 
(procheiron) the fundamental rule of life: that is, the distinction between what 
depends on us and what does not.23 
On the other side of this is the example of Epicurean attention: 
By the same token, the spiritual exercise of trying to live in the present moment is 
very different for Stoics and Epicureans.  For the former, it means mental tension 
and constant wakefulness of the moral conscience; for the latter, it is, as we have 
seen, an invitation to relaxation and serenity.  Worry, which tears us in the 
direction of the future, hides us from the incomparable value of the simple fact of 
existing.24 
At work here are different definitions of happiness and different conceptions of the 
philosophical life.  And yet, it is clear that there is a fair amount of overlap in the spiritual 
exercises employed by these distinct groups of philosophers, as well as the emphasis on 
maintaining the control of reason in the pursuit of either wakefulness or serenity.   
The varying modes of attention are a product of varying first principles.  Stoics, 
according to Hadot, are focused on the idea of holding concern over only what it is 
                                                 
23 Philosophy as a Way of Life 84 
24 Ibid., 88 
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possible to control, and attention to one’s self aids in the observation of this principle 
because it is concerned only with the present moment.  He writes, speaking generally of 
ancient philosophy:  
Attention to the present moment is, in a sense, the key to the spiritual exercises.  It 
frees us from the passions, which are always caused by the past or the future—
two areas which do not depend on us.  By encouraging concentration on the 
miniscule present moment, which, in its exiguity, is always bearable and 
controllable, attention increases our vigilance.  Finally, attention to the present 
moment allows us to accede to cosmic consciousness, by making us attentive to 
the infinite value of each instant, and causing us to accept each moment of 
existence from the viewpoint of the universal law of the cosmos.25 
The move to pay attention to the self is the crucial step to beginning the life of the 
philosopher.  Without first paying attention to one’s self in minute detail, there is no 
possibility of moral growth, as it is in part through the examination of actions and the 
habits they represent that the person learns what is good and what is bad.  Hadot finds 
this emphasis on attention to oneself in the early Christian authors as well.  He writes of 
prosoche: “Such is the philosophical attitude par excellence.  It is also the attitude of the 
Christian philosopher.”26  The emphasis on attention to oneself is found in Clement of 
Alexandria, in the Cappadocians, Origen, Athanasius’ Life of Antony, Dorotheus of Gaza 
and several others.  In large part, Hadot suggests, the spiritual exercises and the emphasis 
on prosoche found in these thinkers is not something original to Christianity, but is 
                                                 
25 Philosophy as a Way of Life 85 
26 Ibid., 130 
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instead a product of these writers’ philosophical educations in Greek philosophy.  Seeing 
the usefulness of these exercises, these writers then “Christianized” the exercises; that is, 
appropriated the exercise and incorporated it within the practice of Christian growth in 
the likeness of God, and further, justified and explained the practices with reference to 
scriptural passages.  And yet, as Hadot and Foucault will both suggest, the spiritual 
exercises of ancient philosophy do not remain entirely the same once they are employed 
in Christianity. Michel Foucault especially will focus on the different form of attention to 
oneself as found in Christian writers from the antique period. 
The development of Michel Foucault’s thought 
 Foucault’s interests, much like Hadot’s, changed dramatically over time.  To give a 
much too brief summary, his early work was interested in the concepts of madness and 
medicine, in particular the “archaeology” of these concepts and their development over 
time.  In the 1970s, his work shifted slightly in focus to questions of discourse and truth, 
before shifting again with his work Discipline and Punish.  In this latest work, the project 
that would become his principal interest for the rest of his life (d. 1984) comes to the 
center.  At this time, Foucault begins to study the person, the subject, in greater detail, a 
pursuit continued in his next work, identified in English as the three part series The 
History of Sexuality.   
Though Foucault never acknowledged any sharp break27 with his early work in 
interviews or writings of his own, he did acknowledge that his interests had shifted.  In 
one interview from the early 1980s, he said: 
                                                 
27 See Eric Paras’ Foucault 2.0, which suggests that Foucault’s thought takes a radical turn later in his 
career.  This suggestion is considered rather contentious.   
1-16 
 
I would say that if now I am interested, in fact, in the way in which the subject 
constitutes himself in an active fashion, by the practices of the self, these practices 
are nevertheless not something that the individual invents by himself.  They are 
patterns that he finds in his culture and which are proposed, suggested, and 
imposed on him by his culture, his society, and his social group.28 
Foucault, therefore, sought to maintain a connection underlying all his work, and not 
acknowledge a major shift.  It is important, however, that Foucault even would speak 
about studying how the “subject constitutes himself in an active fashion,” something 
which is not particularly possible or of interest to the structuralist.   
 The first volume of The History of Sexuality, originally published in France in 1976, 
was interested primarily in the 18th and 19th centuries.  In this work, Foucault identified 
the concept of the reflexive self, and from that point on attempted to locate the origin of 
this concept.  The reflexive self is the idea that a person is capable of, in various ways, of 
watching one’s self, that is, their thoughts, actions, and intentions, evaluating them, and 
then renouncing or encouraging those activities.  The notion of reflexivity is deeply 
connected with the philosophic use of the Delphic precept “Know thyself.”  This phrase 
comes to occupy a central place in philosophic texts, in that, in order to become an ethical 
person, one must have awareness of all one’s actions, and be able to direct them towards 
the proper end.  In his subsequent work, Foucault worked back through history in an 
attempt to find the origins of the reflexive self in Christian and then Greek cultures.  This 
led to the subject matter of the latter two volumes in the series, entitled The Use of 
                                                 
28 Qtd in Strozier, Robert M. Foucault, Subjectivity, and Identity: Historical Constructions of Subject and 
Self. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2002. 141 
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Pleasure and The Care of the Self, both published before Foucault died in 1984.  Foucault 
also commented extensively on the Greek and early Christian world in his lectures at the 
College de France, including his The Government of the Living, The Hermeneutics of the 
Subject, The Government of Self and Others, and The Courage of Truth, all given 
between 1980 and 1984.  These lectures, and the later volumes of the The History of 
Sexuality, are all concerned with reflexivity and the practices of the self, the arts of living 
that were employed by figures from the past to develop themselves into ethical subjects, 
the details of which will be explained below. 
 The later interests of Foucault are in part a product of his interactions with several 
thinkers.  His affection for Hadot is well known, and he cites Hadot’s article “Exercices 
Spirituels” in The Care of the Self and The Use of Pleasure.  Another important French 
figure was Paul Veyne, whose work was focused on Ancient Greek and Roman society 
and religion.  Eric Paras identifies several other influences, especially those with whom 
Foucault lectured at UC Berkeley, where he split his time from 1978 onward, and in 
particular, Peter Brown’s The Making of Late Antiquity is cited as a key source of 
inspiration for Foucault’s interests. 
 It is important to note that Foucault’s work was never completed due to his death in 
1984.  The greatest gap left is also the one that is most relevant for this thesis, namely the 
history of Christianity in terms of self-relation and techniques of the self from the first 
few centuries through Descartes.  Though Foucault planned a fourth volume in The 
History of Sexuality, one which was to cover at least a portion of Christian history, it was 
never completed, and will not be published, under the terms of his will.   
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Michel Foucault: the arts of living 
 Two key terms for Foucault are the concepts of the “the art of living” and “practices 
of the self.”  The art of living is a theme identified by Foucault from its origins in Ancient 
Greek philosophy.  He writes: 
This “cultivation of the self” can be briefly characterized by the fact that in this 
case the art of existence—the techne tou biou [art of living] in its different 
forms—is dominated by the principle that says one must “take care of oneself.”  It 
is this principle of the care of the self that establishes its necessity, presides over 
its development, and organizes its practice.29   
Foucault’s conception of ethics and the cultivation of the self are in direct relation to his 
concept of the aesthetics of existence or an aesthetic ethics.  Though this argument is 
difficult to make concisely without oversimplifying, there is a sense in which Foucault is 
intrigued by the idea of living a “beautiful life,” and the implications a concept of beauty 
has for ethical decision making.  Ancient thinkers, Foucault suggests, in pursuit of such a 
life, would undertake activities to make their lives and their selves as good, true and 
beautiful as possible.  This idea leads to a further important distinction identified by 
Foucault, given as the distinction between “philosophy” and “spirituality.”  He writes: 
We will call, if you like, “philosophy” the form of thought that asks, not of course 
what is true and what is false, but what determines that there is and can be truth 
and falsehood and that one can or cannot separate the true and the false.  We will 
call “philosophy” the form of thought that asks what it is that allows the subject to 
                                                 
29 Foucault, Michel. The History of Sexuality Volume 3: The Care of the Self. Vintage Books ed. New 
York: Vintage Books, 1988. 43 
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have access to the truth and which attempts to determine the conditions and limits 
of the subject’s access to the truth.  If we call this “philosophy,” then I think we 
would call “spirituality” the pursuit, practice, and experience through which the 
subject carries out the necessary transformations on himself in order to have 
access to the truth.  We will call “spirituality” the set of these pursuits, practices, 
and experiences, which may be purifications, ascetic exercises, renunciations, 
conversions of looking, modifications of existence, etcetera, which are not for 
knowledge but for the subject, for the subject’s very being, the price to be paid for 
access to the truth.30 
At stake here, among many other claims, is one of Foucault’s most important distinctions, 
namely the concept of the person’s access to knowledge.  Foucault argues that prior to 
Descartes,31 the expectation was that a person would have to be transformed in order to 
gain access to truth or knowledge; that is, an untransformed person cannot simply learn a 
given thing, but must be transformed in order to first prepare oneself to receive this 
knowledge.  This is one of the major distinctions between antique and modern philosophy 
in Foucault’s mind, and leads to three hallmarks of “spirituality,” as explained by 
Davidson: 
                                                 
30 Foucault, Michel, Frédéric Gros, François Ewald, and Alessandro Fontana. 2005. The Hermeneutics of 
the Subject: Lectures at the Collège De France, 1981-1982 [Herméneutique du sujet.]. New York: 
Palgrave-Macmillan., 15 
31 Foucault recognizes that the claim that the “spirituality” based concept of transformation as a 
requirement of accessing truth is also found in Descartes, something also pointed out by Hadot.  But, as 
Davidson explains, “it is nevertheless clear that Foucault understands the ‘Cartesian moment’ not primarily 
as a chronological moment but as a conceptual moment in the history of thought, the moment in which 
philosophy is disconnected from spirituality.”  Hermeneutics xxv 
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1) “Spirituality postulates that the subject as such is not capable of having access to the 
truth, and, more specifically, that truth is not given to the subject by a simple act of 
knowledge founded on his status as subject; 
2) In order to have access to the truth, the subject has to undergo a conversion or 
transformation, and therefore his very being is at stake;  
3) Once the subject has access to the truth, the effects of spirituality on the subject are 
such that his very being is fulfilled, transfigured, or saved.32   
It is thus possible to read Foucault as in many ways making an argument similar to 
Hadot: philosophy as it is accomplished in the modern world, generally speaking, is 
fundamentally different than pre-Cartesian thought.  It is marked by the concept of 
transformation, and is not simply a matter of right knowledge. 
 Another distinction is found in the difference between “morals” and “ethics.”  
Though the linguistic difference is one of different roots in Latin and Greek, Foucault 
identifies a functional difference between the two.  Xavier Pavie explains: 
Michel Foucault, dans “Usage de Plaisirs, techniques de soi,” va differencier la 
notion de morale de celle d’ethique.  Le premier terme signifie l’ensemble de 
“valeurs et de regles d’action proposees aux individus et aux groupes par 
l’intermediare d’appareils prescriptifs” comme la familie, l’ecole, 
l’Eglise...L’individu va ainsi se soumettre plu ou moins a cette morale, a ce code 
qui lui est propose, et va devoir adapter une conduite. 
This is contrasted with the concept of “ethics:” 
                                                 
32 Hermeneutics xxiv 
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Foucault determine l'ethique en considerant que c'est la "facon dont l'individu doit 
constituer telle ou telle part de lui-meme comme matiere principale de sa conduite 
morale."  Le travail ethique est celui que l'on va effectuer sur soi-meme, et non 
pour rendre son comportment en phase avec un code moral.33 
The distinction between “morals” as a code or set of rules and ethics is also identified by 
Davidson, though it is explained as the distinction between “practices of the self and 
moral codes of behavior, or between a tekhne and form of life and a corpus of rules.”34  
Eric Paras identifies this distinction as well, writing: 
Arts of living [tekhne tou biou] as they existed in the ancient world, Foucault told 
his audience in January of 1981, were less concerned with teaching one what to 
do than with teaching one how to be.  Rather than providing a model of behavior 
or choreographing a set of gestures, ancient arts of living aided individuals to 
modify and model their being itself.35 
Much as Hadot’s work illustrated, Foucault’s efforts leave us with a conception of the 
work of ancient philosophers that differs rather sharply from modern notions of ethics 
and philosophy.   
Foucault identified that an art of living is accompanied by several practices that 
aid in the accomplishment of this transformation and change in one’s way of being.  He 
writes that these included: 
                                                 
33 Xavier Pavie, 2009. Apprentisage de Soi: Exercices Spirituels de Socrate a Foucault. Paris: Eyrolles. 
115-116 
34 Hermeneutics xxvii 
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“intentional and voluntary practices by which men not only fix rules of conduct 
for themselves, but seek to transform themselves, to modify themselves in their 
singular being, and to make of their life a work that bears certain aesthetic values 
and responds to certain criteria of style.”36 
The means by which persons attempted to “transform” or “modify” themselves took the 
form of what Foucault calls “practices of the self.”  These are quite similar to Hadot’s 
“spiritual exercises,” though again there are different points of emphasis.   
Practices of the self 
 Foucault is particularly interested in three main groups of practices of the self: 
mathesis, melete, askesis; learning, meditation, exercise.37  Learning is, of course, the 
growth in knowledge of a person within the teachings of a philosophy.  But, Foucault 
writes, the form of knowledge in the thinkers under examination, or at least the areas of 
interest which these thinkers sought to obtain knowledge, can be contrasted with the 
views of the modern world.  He writes: 
In sum, knowledge involving these four conditions (the subject’s change in 
position, the evaluation of things on the basis of their reality within the kosmos, 
the possibility of the subject seeing himself, and finally the subject’s 
transfiguration through the effect of knowledge), constitutes, I believe, what 
would be called spiritual knowledge.38 
                                                 
36 Foucault, Michel. 1988. The History of Sexuality, vol. 2: The use of pleasure. [Histoire de la sexualité.]. 2 
Vintage Books ed. New York: Vintage Books., 18 – qtd. in Paras 127 
37 Ibid. 
38 Hermeneutics 308 
1-23 
 
Later in this lecture, Foucault identifies this mode of knowledge in relation to the modern 
world, referencing a quotation from Goethe: “I think we have here the last nostalgic 
expression of a knowledge of spirituality which disappeared with the Enlightenment, and 
the sad greeting of the birth of a knowledge of intellectual knowledge.”39  In analyzing 
the four aspects of spiritual knowledge, one cannot help but notice their intimate 
connection with the person doing the thinking, with the sole exception being the 
observation of things in the kosmos.  And yet, even this form of knowledge has a direct 
impact on the person, as understanding of the kosmos as a whole involves an 
understanding of where the human fits in among all the other things and activities of the 
universe.   
 The form of knowledge described above does not, in itself, represent an overriding 
shift from enlightenment forms of thought, though certainly there are differences.  
Instead, the main points of departure are found in the two succeeding practices, 
meditation and exercise.  For Foucault, meditation (melete) is an exercise or activity that 
represents a sort of implementation or internalization of various types of knowledge, 
whether sayings or metaphysical understandings.  He identifies two key aspects of 
meditation in Greek and Roman thinkers: “The meditatio involves, rather, appropriating 
[a thought] and being so profoundly convinced of it that we both believe it to be true and 
can also repeat it constantly and immediately whenever the need or opportunity to do so 
arises.”40  The second aspect is also dependent on the concept of implementation: 
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What I mean is that the meditatio involves not so much thinking about the thing 
itself as practicing the thing we are thinking about.  Obviously the most famous 
example is the meditation of death.  Meditating death (meditari, meletan), in the 
sense that the Greeks and Latins understand this, does not mean thinking that you 
are going to die.  It does not even mean convincing yourself that you really are 
going to die....Meditating death is placing yourself, in thought, in the situation of 
someone who is in the process of dying, or who is about to die, or who is living 
his last days....It is becoming, through thought, the person who is dying or whose 
death is imminent.41 
When approaching the concept of meditation in ancient thought, therefore, one should 
consider the close relation of thinking about something to cultivating oneself.  Of 
particular importance for this thesis is the concept of repeated meditation for the sake of 
keeping something “at hand,” something which will appear in the work of Thomas 
Aquinas. 
 Finally, the term “askesis” is of particular importance in Foucault’s work.  Askesis 
refers, in Greek, to exercise or repeated practices, and is particularly connected with the 
acquisition of virtue in ancient writers.  Foucault, however, gives the term a slightly 
different emphasis: “The askesis is a set of practices by means of which the individual is 
able to acquire, to assimilate the truth, and to transform it into a permanent principle of 
action: aletheia becomes ethos.”42  The mention of aletheia, truth, is particularly 
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of the Subject and the Reception of Plato in Lacan, Derrida, and Foucault. Columbus: Ohio State 
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important in this discussion, as Foucault will elsewhere contrast “truth” and “law” in his 
discussion of ethics.  He writes, “Askesis is not established and does not deploy its 
techniques by reference to an authority like the law.”43  “Law,” conceptually speaking, 
refers to something similar to “morals” in Foucault’s mind.  Thus, Foucault is making the 
point that askesis in the cultivation of the self is not a matter of preparing oneself for the 
observation of a set of rules, but rather the cultivation of oneself into the type of person 
who is aligned with truth, and thus can make decisions about moral activity.   
The self and the subject in Hadot and Foucault 
Foucault’s understanding of the self and subjectivity is one of his most important 
contributions to contemporary thought, and providing a complete treatment of Foucault’s 
thoughts on these matters is too expansive a task for this work.  At the same time, 
however, the work of Pierre Hadot is not nearly as interested in the “subject” or self, and 
as such does not provide nearly the same amount of discussion.  In fact, it is hard to find 
instances where Hadot can be compared to Foucault’s conclusions on the self, other than 
the instance described above.  Foucault’s understanding of self and subject is tied to his 
work on the modern world.  Paras writes:  
In Discipline and Punish, The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, and elsewhere, he 
challenged the self-evidence of the individual, and flatly denied that individuality 
could be opposed to authority as if the two were somehow antithetical.  Rather, he 
argued, individuals were the product of highly rationalized discursive systems; 
they were the effect of a modern configuration of power.44 
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Foucault’s understanding of self and subject, therefore, are intended to complicate the 
modern notion of self in use from the rise of the enlightenment onwards.45  We are not 
“individuals” blessed with a rational mind and given the option of “self-creation.”  
Instead, the “self” is a product of processes of power, which leads to the development of 
different varieties of selves in different periods of history.  In particular, Foucault, as 
mentioned above, draws a distinction between the self of the ancient world and the self of 
the modern world, something which Hadot will do, as well.  This distinction is found 
principally in the relation of the soul to knowledge, especially self-knowledge.  Foucault 
is committed to tracing this development backwards in time to its origins, which he 
eventually will place in early Christianity.  Paras explains: 
From the time of Plato, the soul’s accession to truth was a matter of conversion or 
metanoya: it was a unitary movement in which the soul pivoted upon itself and 
turned from the darkness to the light.  This discovery of truth and light was 
simultaneously the discovery of the soul’s own truth, because the soul was 
necessarily of the same nature as the being that illuminated it. It was with 
Tertullian, Foucault argued clearly and unambiguously, that this pedagogically 
oriented path to truth—a truth which was out there—began to come apart.  
Thereafter, Christian thought started along a new path: one in which the soul must 
turn within, must constitute itself as the protagonist of a procedure in which it will 
constantly be an object of knowledge.46 
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In this sense, Foucault's project is one that seeks to define the different ways of being a 
subject, the primary difference in these forms lying in the nature of reflexive self-relation.  
In Foucault’s argument, the post enlightenment self becomes an object of knowledge; 
that is, one can approach oneself as an object of knowledge, as something to be studied 
via scientific scrutiny.  In Greek and Roman thinkers, on the other hand, the self is not 
approached as an object of knowledge to be described, but as a locus of thought and 
action to be sculpted into an ideal form.  In this earlier understanding of self, therefore, it 
is difficult to properly speak of a “self,” because this self lacks most of the defining 
characteristics of the modern self. 
 This leads to one of the important differences between the work of Foucault and 
Hadot.  Hadot is critical of Foucault for offering a version of the “self” that is “precisely 
focused far too much on the ‘self,’ or at least a particular conception of one.”47  After first 
explaining his criticism of Foucault’s conception of taking pleasure in the self, he writes,  
Secondly, and most importantly, it is not the case that the Stoic finds his joy in his 
“self;” rather, as Seneca says, he finds it “in the best portion of the self,” in “the 
true good.”48....The “best portion of oneself,” then, is, in the last analysis, a 
transcendent self.  Seneca does not find his joy in “Seneca,” but by transcending 
Seneca;” by discovering that there is within him—within all human beings, that 
is, and within the cosmos itself—a reason which is part of universal reason.49 
Foucault, however, is not necessarily in disagreement with Hadot in all cases.  In his 
explanation of Stoic thinkers, he writes:  
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So, the spiritual exercise of Marcus Aurelius tends towards a sort of dissolution of 
individuality, whereas the function of Seneca’s spiritual exercise—with the 
subject’s move to the world’s summit from where he can grasp himself in his 
singularity—was, rather, to found and establish the subject’s identity, its 
singularity and the stable being of the self it constitutes.50 
Foucault, as seen in the description of Marcus Aurelius, is comfortable using the term 
“self” even in instances where the self being discussed is a non-individualized self.  
Likewise, when Foucault speaks of Seneca establishing a singularity or a “self,” he is not 
necessarily arguing that Seneca’s notion of self is the modern definition, understood as 
the whole person, body, soul, memories, experiences, and ongoing activities, and that 
Seneca is therefore participating in a contemporary understanding of self realization.  
Hadot’s reading of Foucault on this subject, then, can be called into question, as it 
appears that Hadot is attributing a contemporary notion of selfhood into Foucault’s work, 
which is precisely what Foucault is working against.   
 There still remains the question of how to approach the term “self” in work completed 
on the ancient world.  It appears best, at least in this instance, to follow the lead of these 
two thinkers, and the use the term “self” as a sort of placeholder which requires definition 
for each particular thinker it refers to.  It is also essential to differentiate between the self 
considered wholly, perhaps better called the “person,” and the self considered essentially, 
better called the “true self.”  Even when a thinker like Marcus Aurelius advocates a form 
of selfhood which stresses identity with universal reason, they do not deny responsibility 
for the actions taken by that person which are outside reason.  Nonetheless, the true self 
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which that person should identify as, or understand themselves to be, is that universal 
reason.  In most thinkers, however, the distinction between self and true self is not made, 
or at least not made frequently.  Furthermore, the term “self” is mainly found in reflexive 
form of language (se), and not as a noun as in modern language. 
 All of these factors complicate the straightforward use of the term “self;” it remains, 
however, essential to use the term, if for no other reason than the difficulties of talking 
about practices of one’s own person without using the word.  Whenever the term self 
appears, therefore, it should be understood in immediate reference to the figure under 
study, and the definition of self or true self offered by that thinker.  This dissertation will 
seek to avoid the encroachment of a contemporary understanding of self51 into the study 
of Aquinas and earlier thinkers, while at the same time using the term.  The use of the 
term, therefore, is as a placeholder of sorts, either to a person as a whole, or as that aspect 
of the person which they are to identify themselves as according to the practices and 
teachings of their system of thought. 
Further differences between Foucault and Hadot 
A second difference between Foucault and Hadot is found in their interest, or lack 
thereof, in the varying branches of philosophy.  As mentioned above, Hadot places a 
great deal of emphasis on explaining the entirety of the philosophical project including 
the three branches, logic, physics, and ethics.  Foucault, on the other hand, was less 
enthused about anything that fell outside of ethics.  Arnold Davidson mentions a 
conversation Foucault had with Paul Veyne: “One day, when I [Veyne] asked Foucault: 
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so on, each of which can be discovered and held as an article of knowledge, the discovery of which 
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‘The care of the self, that is very nice, but what do you do with logic, what do you with 
physics?’, he responded: ‘Oh, these are enormous excrescences!’” Davidson explains 
further: 
One way of describing Hadot’s misgivings about Foucault’s interpretation of 
ancient spiritual exercises is to say that Foucault not only gave a too narrow 
construal of ancient ethics, but that he limited the “care of the self” to ethics 
alone.  Foucault made no place for that cosmic consciousness, for physics as a 
spiritual exercise, that was so important to the way in which the ancient 
philosopher viewed his relation to the world.52 
Hadot also critiques Foucault’s project as appearing to try to create an “a culture of the 
self which is too aesthetic,”53 a result of his presentation of the care of the self being 
solely about ethical self-fashioning. 
 This difference points to a distinction in the overall projects of Hadot and Foucault.  
Hadot is quite vocal about the end of his project: he believes that modern humanity can 
employ the spiritual exercises he writes about from the ancient world to aid in the living 
of the best possible life, regardless of our acceptance of all the points of dogma that 
accompanied these spiritual exercises.  He writes, “I believe firmly—albeit perhaps 
naively—that it is possible for modern man to live, not as a sage (sophos)—most of the 
ancients did not hold this to be possible—but as a practitioner of the ever-fragile exercise 
of wisdom.”54 
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 Foucault’s project, on the other hand, is far more difficult to describe.  Foucault 
would never give a simple endorsement of any philosophical system, and as many critics 
of Foucault have suggested, it is sometimes difficult to identify what, if any, positive 
content his work has.  It appears to many eyes that his work simply has a critical function 
to highlight oppression or the appropriation of truth by institutions and groups.  It is, 
however, possible to interpret Foucault’s work as recommending something similar to 
what Hadot recognized above, namely a philosophical mode of living, one which is made 
possible through resistance to societal power by the practice of certain spiritual exercises.  
In this way, Foucault can be said to recommend, in a qualified sense, that people take on 
the activity of self-fashioning, while at the same time not recommending any specific 
content or ideal form as an end to that activity.  What is clear about Foucault’s work is 
that his historical project, at least in his later work, does have a clear focus: reflexivity.  
Davidson characterizes Foucault’s work as “an analysis of the forms of reflexivity.”55  
Paul Allen Miller, likewise, writes of Foucault’s work that “the goal is to study the 
relationship of the self to itself.”56  More importantly, Foucault was particularly interested 
in determining how the “Christian” form of reflexivity came about.  Robert Strozier 
writes: 
Foucault generally speaks of self-relation in Christian Europe as taking the form 
of self-decipherment and self-purification.  This means that the individual was 
obliged to examine its own desires, inclinations, and impulses to apply a 
hermeneutics to consciousness and its hidden recesses.  The results of these 
                                                 
55 Hermeneutics of the Subject, xxii (Davidson Introduction) 
56 Miller 205 
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discovery procedures were then to be matched to a licit/illicit index of thoughts 
and behaviors.57 
For Foucault, the Christian form of self-relation is distinguished from the ancient forms 
in a number of key ways.  First, Foucault will suggest that the Stoic or Epicurean does 
not want to “decipher” the self, as if to arrive at an “objective” knowledge, but to know 
the self, meaning to be aware of one’s present activities and setting in the cosmos.  
Likewise, the philosophers did not intend to “purify” themselves by ferreting out hidden 
sins from their consciousness.  Finally, they did not employ a code of morals, as Foucault 
suggests that Christians would often do; instead, the system of morality was based on the 
right action of the virtuous person.  The issue of reflexivity for the purposes of this 
dissertation will be discussed in more detail at the end of this introduction, and in the 
second chapter.58   
Aquinas and Spirituality 
 Shifting the discussion to the subject of this dissertation, I will now provide an 
overview of scholarship on Thomas Aquinas and the spiritual life.  One of the important 
distinctions between the work of Foucault and Hadot and scholarship on Scholastic 
spirituality is the differing definition of spirituality.  As will be shown below, the 
terminology of spirituality or “spiritual life” has not been formalized, and the definitions 
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58 Another figure bearing mention is Martha Nussbaum, whose work on virtue, reason and emotion in ancient 
philosophy has held an influential place in contemporary ethics.  Though the focus of her work falls out of the 
immediate focus of this dissertation, it is worth mentioning my awareness of her efforts, as well as her 
disagreements with Foucault and Hadot.  In her work The Therapy of Desire, she acknowledges Foucault and 
Hadot, while suggesting their work is incomplete, in part from its lack of emphasis on the work of reason.  I 
have selected Foucault and Hadot precisely because of their emphasis on practices, and a fuller treatment than I 




offered are rather diverse.  For this dissertation, I will be using Foucault’s definition, but I 
will also provide an overview of the various understandings of the term.59   
Scholarship on the Spiritual Life of Thomas Aquinas 
A number of classic works approach the question of spirituality (variously 
defined) in Thomas, including, most notably, chapters in Etienne Gilson’s The Christian 
Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas.  In chapters entitled “The personal life” and “the 
religious life,” Gilson provides an overview of what the Summa, in particular, 
recommends for the life of the Christian.  It is important to note, however, that Gilson’s 
argument presumes that, “the world he [Thomas] is thinking about is not the world of 
monks,” in reference to the secunda pars of the Summa.  This judgment also informs 
Gilson’s chapter on the “religious life” in Thomas, which does not substantively engage 
with the fact that Thomas was a Dominican friar, nor with the fact that Thomas held any 
interest in the professed religious life, despite the inclusion of the question on the vows 
(II-II.188).   
Gilson’s presentation of Thomas is one that is repeated up through the present era, as 
most scholars are eager to present Thomas’s potential relevance to people from all walks 
of life, rather than understanding Thomas within the milieu of medieval Dominicans.  
That said, Gilson does offer a succinct description of what the spiritual life is for Thomas: 
                                                 
59 To return to Foucault’s definition, he writes: “We will call ‘spirituality’ the set of these pursuits, 
practices, and experiences, which may be purifications, ascetic exercises, renunciations, conversions of 
looking, modifications of existence, etcetera, which are not for knowledge but for the subject, for the 
subject’s very being, the price to be paid for access to the truth.”  I find this definition of spirituality to be 
more robust than traditional understandings of spirituality as practices of prayer or devotions to God in that 
it is concerned with the whole person in relation to their beliefs and to their world.  Furthermore, it 
emphasizes the significance of a change in perspective, something which is central to medieval thinkers, as 
well.   
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When grace divinizes the human soul it not only re-establishes the balance which 
had once been destroyed, but causes a new life to spring up, a life freely given to 
nature.  This life participates in the divine and so, by reason of its source, will 
move spontaneously into the order of the eternal.  It is called the “spiritual life,” a 
term which implies that absolute transcendence of body and time which is 
characteristic of divine things.  And since it is by charity that man’s participation 
in the divine is accomplished, the spiritual life is the supernatural life of a soul 
divinized by charity.60 
The key elements of the spiritual life are present in Gilson’s description, but there are a 
few issues, as well.  Grace, charity, and the creation of a “new life” are all present in 
Thomas, but Gilson, I would argue, moves too far in suggesting that the “spiritual life” 
somehow transcends “body and time.”  In fact, Thomas’s description of the “spiritual 
life” as found in the De Perfectione Spiritualis Vitae, as well as in the Summa, is rather 
concerned with mundane things, such as the daily activities of the professed religious 
person, and is very much concerned with the body and our proper relation to it.   
 Other forms of presentation include W.H. Principe’s short work Thomas Aquinas’ 
Spirituality, which focuses on Aquinas’s practices of prayer and contemplation.  Principe 
argues that Thomas’s spirituality is not an “interior-oriented” but a “God-oriented 
spirituality.”  While it is perhaps the case that Thomas’s understanding of interiority is 
different than other thinkers on the subject, it seems clear from his writings on the virtues 
that he is very much concerned with the interior life, defined as the thoughts, intentions, 
                                                 
60 Gilson, Etienne. 1983; 1956. The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas [Thomisme.]. New York: 
Octagon Books. 347 
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emotions, and attitudes of a person.  Principe makes reference to the virtue of prudence as 
an example of his argument that Thomas is not “interior-oriented;” in the second and 
fourth chapter of this dissertation, however, I will make an opposing argument, and 
suggest that Thomas’s writings on prudence demonstrate his specific form of interiority.   
Gilson’s manner of presentation is to a great extent continued in subsequent 
writings on the spirituality of Thomas.  Robert Barron’s Thomas Aquinas, Spiritual 
Master is intended as a response to works like Principe’s, which he thinks focus too much 
on the stereotypical notion of spirituality, namely worship, prayer, and contemplation.  
Instead, Barron identifies the central themes of Thomas’s work, like “creation” or 
“trinity,” (not unlike Gilson) and then offers an explanation as to how these theological 
statements relate to a person’s spiritual life.  Nicholas Healy’s work Thomas Aquinas: 
Theologian of the Christian Life, is structured in a manner similar to Barron’s, but 
provides more information about the Dominican order, and the influence the Dominican 
concept of formation had on Thomas.   
Torrell 
Neither of these works approaches J.P. Torrell’s writings on the spirituality of 
Thomas.  In an article written to recount his major work on spirituality in Aquinas, 
Thomas Aquinas: Spiritual Master, Torrell writes: 
If we could disengage the major elements that would sum up the principal 
characteristics of a spirituality inspired by Thomas, it seems to me that we could 
focus everything around six dominant ideas.  I have already said that it was a [1] 
Trinitarian spirituality, as well as an [2] “objective” spirituality (as distinct from 
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“subjective”)....It should be added, however, that it is a [3] “realistic” spirituality 
(in the sense that it makes room for the whole person, body and soul) and a 
spirituality of [4] human flourishing (for beatitude does indeed complete the quest 
for happiness anchored in the human heart).  If one were to fear that these words 
smack too much of naturalism, it was enough for me to recall that I was also 
dealing with a spirituality of [5] divinization (Thomas uses the word), and a 
spirituality of [6] “communion,” for the human being’s social dimension only 
reaches its definitive state through communion with the Triune God.61 
Torrell’s work represents a monumental achievement in advancing the understanding of 
Thomas Aquinas the theologian as it considerably deepens our appreciation of his 
thought outside of either theological subtleties or questions of theoretical ethics, whether 
in the natural law or the virtues.  And in large part, I do not disagree with Torrell’s 
findings on the spirituality of Thomas. 
And yet, while the aim of this thesis is not to quibble with Torrell on his findings 
or dispute his presentation, nonetheless, there is a key point in his characterization of 
Thomas’s work that I would take issue with.  The area of concern is the identification of 
his “spiritual attitude” as being an “objective” rather than “subjective” mode.  Torrell 
explains this distinction: 
                                                 
61 Torrell, Jean-Pierre.  2011. Christ and Spirituality in St. Thomas Aquinas. Thomistic Ressourcement 
Series. Vol. 2. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press. 183.  Torrell explains what he 
means by “spirituality” in Thomas in the same chapter, p. 175: “...but I did not seek to reconstruct, more or 
less artificially, a spiritual theology that Thomas himself did not leave us.  It is in this sense that “spiritual 
master” is a bit too strong in characterizing what I wanted to do, but it remains true that the exercise of 
theology in his school allows us to acquire a certain number of basic philosophical and theological 
positions by which we arrive at a certain way of perceiving God and the world, and by which we develop a 
certain spiritual attitude—an attitude that a modern historian could qualify as a mindset, which seems to me 
to correspond rather well with what we also call ‘spirituality.’”  This dissertation argues that Torrell is 
mistaken in his hesitance to find a ‘spiritual theology’ in the work of Thomas Aquinas. 
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In the modern age of reflexive thought, books of spirituality have emphasized the 
second actor: the human being engaged in a spiritual adventure.  Therefore, they 
describe the states of his soul, his progress, his failures, the paths he traverses, the 
methods of prayer he should use.  Obviously there is nothing of the kind in 
Aquinas (although one can certainly find aspects of these themes in Aquinas, 
which I have gathered together in chapter 14 of Thomas Aquinas: Spiritual 
Master).  On the other hand, it is God who is at the forefront of Thomas’s 
theology.  This is evident to anyone who studies the outline of the Summa: not 
only is God the main subject of the first pages, but he utterly dominates the 
synthesis itself.  According to the schema exitus-reditus, which is well known, 
everything proceeds from God and everything returns to him.  The outcome is a 
radically different way of seeing things and, in my opinion, it is the first 
characteristic of a spirituality that wants to be inspired by Aquinas: instead of 
being centered on preoccupations that are “subjective” (even in the best sense of 
the word), it is resolutely “objective,” that is, centered on God.62 
The problem with this characterization is that it repeats one of the most common issues 
found in readers of Thomas, namely the overemphasis on speculative or philosophical 
matters.  Torrell is in fact well aware of this issue, and in the above mentioned chapter 14 
cites what he considers the oft overlooked explanation of the Secunda Pars as the 
“movement of the rational creature towards God.”63  If we were to look at the list 
                                                 
62 Christ and Spirituality 177 
63 Torrell, Jean-Pierre. 1996; 2003. Saint Thomas Aquinas: Spiritual master [Initiation à Saint Thomas 
d'Aquin.]. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press. 341. 
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provided by Torrell and examine where these things appear in the Summa Theologiae 
alone, and not even in other works, we actually find all of them.   
1. The states of the soul – Thomas writes rather expansively on this subject, whether one 
is speaking of the ultimate state of our soul in terms of eternal destination, or the 
variations we experience as wayfarers.  For example, we can turn to the discussion of 
faith, and in particular whether some have more faith than others (II-II.5.4) or the 
possibility of lifeless faith (II-II4.4).  This continues with charity, including the 
questions of by what means a person gains or loses the virtue of charity  
2. Progress – Thomas is equally expansive on this topic, and we could include under this 
heading the virtues, development in virtue, practice in the virtues as recommended in 
the principal parts of prudence, the way of acquiring virtue through study and 
exercise, the spiritual life, the life of the religious, and the vows.  Thomas also 
indicates the importance of rightly ordered control of the passions by reason. 
3. Failures - the vices – the passions controlling reason, the failure to choose the proper 
end, the decision to lavish oneself in pleasure, wealth, external objects, and so on.64 
4. The paths one traverses – Thomas describes a variety of paths in the Summa 
Theologiae, but is drawn in particular to the religious life and, I would argue, 
recommends the Dominican lifestyle as the ideal form of life for the Christian.  He 
                                                 
64 The extent to which the vices and virtues are personal to Thomas, that is, are actually his vices and 
virtues, is an impossible question.  Though I would argue that his own experience influences his 
construction of the account of the virtues and vices, and especially his description of subjectivity, it is not 
necessary to hold this conclusion to accept the premise that Thomas does provide an extremely robust 
description of the process whereby the formation of the human takes place, and that it is an integral aspect 
of his “objectively” oriented project as a whole.  That is, though the project is focused on God, it is 
essential that the human be formed by God and his or her own efforts in attaining to the end, even if God’s 
grace accounts for all of our efforts.   
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covers this in the acts which “pertain especially to certain men” (II-II.179-189), but 
also in the section on the virtue of religion (II-II.81-100). 
5. The methods of prayer one should use – This is actually one of the most important 
issues for Thomas, as he establishes with the first question of the Summa the 
significance of the practice of contemplation.  Contemplation, which is a form of 
prayer, is returned to throughout the Summa, but is discussed specifically in II-II.180, 
including a discussion of Richard of St. Victor’s stages of contemplation.  Thomas 
also discusses intercessory prayer in II-II.83. 
For Torrell to state, therefore, that “obviously, there is nothing of the kind in Aquinas,” 
seems strange.  I would argue instead that the Summa Theologiae as a whole, but 
especially the secunda pars, is a book of moral formation, intended to teach Christians, 
and in particular, young Dominican friars, the way humans return to God, including the 
practices, exercises, internal states, and forms of prayer that accompany the person on 
this path.  I do not think that Torrell would necessarily disagree with this characterization, 
so perhaps what Torrell is intending by “subjective” is something other than my 
interpretation.  Nonetheless, it seems that Thomas is preoccupied with the “subjective” to 
a great extent, especially because the spiritual life and the work of theology are not 
simply about obtaining the right knowledge, but precisely about becoming a person 
renewed through grace and exercise, a process which requires the observation of one’s 
actions, thoughts, and intentions, and taking steps to correct them, in addition to the 
efforts of God. 
Academic formation in Aquinas 
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 One of the most salient themes in the work of Thomas Aquinas is that of the 
importance of intellectual formation.  In particular works by M. Michele Mulchahey,65 
Fainche Ryan,66 and Mark Jordan67 describe in detail the importance of academic training 
for Thomas, and the specifics of his methods in the context of the Dominican order.  
Jordan’s Rewritten Theology describes how the structure of the secunda pars is intended 
to aid in the practices of moral formation, but also details the role of the Summa 
Theologiae as a whole.  Much as was the case with Torrell, my intention is not to revise 
the arguments made in these works, but instead to focus on aspects that are either treated 
lightly or overlooked by these authors.   
 Mulchahey’s First the Bow is Bent in Study: Dominican Education before 1350 is an 
imposing masterpiece which provides a thorough overview of the writings and practices 
related to the development of the specifically Dominican spirituality.  In one sub-chapter, 
“the cultivation of a new interior life,” Mulchahey discusses some manuals of 
contemplation and practices of prayer offered by early Dominicans.  Notably, for the 
purposes of this dissertation at least, she does not discuss Aquinas’s contributions to this 
area in this chapter.  Instead, when Aquinas does appear, it is in the context of his work 
developing academic curriculums for the Dominican order, and in particular his work at 
Santa Sabina. 
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 The work offered by Fainche Ryan and Mark Jordan is committed to describing the 
pedagogical orientation of the Summa Theologiae.  While Jordan’s work describes the 
efforts of the secunda pars, Ryan’s work suggests that the Summa as a whole can be 
understood as a pedagogy of formation in holiness.  As he writes: 
The project of the entire Summa is to lead the Christian partaking in its narrative 
to God.  Thomas the Christian had two central questions occupying his intellect.  
The first, ‘what is God?’ lead him to try and name God, while the second ‘how do 
human persons become holy?’ might be said to be the question of the Summa.68 
Ryan’s work is another excellent contribution to academic formation in Aquinas, but 
does not spend much time on the spiritual and ethical formation that accompanied it.  
Jordan’s work, on the other hand, is interested in discussing the structure of the secunda 
pars, as well as the fact that Thomas had no conception of “moral theology” as 
understood today.  In this work, Jordan does not discuss the habits and formation that 
lead to the acquisition of the virtues, only the connection of Aquinas’s teaching on ethics 
with the rest of the Summa as a theological whole.   
Poverty and other virtues in Aquinas 
A number of studies recently undertaken describe Aquinas’s understanding of the 
religious life through his teachings on poverty.  The three main works are Christopher 
Franks’ He Became Poor: The Poverty of Christ and Aquinas’s Economic Teachings, Jan 
van den Eijnden’s Poverty on the Way to God: Thomas Aquinas on Evangelical Poverty, 
                                                 
68 Ryan 107 – in a footnote to the last sentence, Ryan adds “’How do human persons becomes holy’ is the 
question of this work; that it might also be the question of the Summa is less obvious, and some might 
suggest too anthropocentric a claim.”  Although I would not be inclined to reduce the Summa to a question, 
I would agree with Ryan’s indication of that question’s importance.  At the very least, if Thomas did not 
think the Summa would help to form good Christians, he would not have written it. 
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and Ulrich Horst’s Evangelische Armut und Kirche.  Each of these works intends to 
provide a more complete understanding of Aquinas’s ethics.  If we take seriously the 
claim of Jordan and others69 that Aquinas does not consider moral theology a separate 
sphere, then it appears strange that Aquinas’s religious life as a member of the 
Dominican order is rarely discussed in treatments of his ethics.  As Franks writes, 
“Despite growing appreciation for Thomas Aquinas as a theologian, and despite broad 
recognition of his perfectionism, his works on religious life remain largely unremarked 
on in scholarship on his ethics.”70  Franks’ work is explicitly oriented towards correcting 
this omission in contemporary ethics, while van den Eijnden’s work is more historical in 
nature, as is Horst’s.  Each of these works will be essential to discussing the vow of 
poverty in this dissertation, though they are less concerned with the practices 
accompanying poverty.   
Work on Thomas and Hadot 
Though I have not been able to find any scholars who have analyzed the potential 
application of Foucault’s work to medieval thought,71 at least in written form, several 
writers have begun to include the work of Hadot in their studies of Thomas.  Gilles 
Emery and Matthew Levering are two important figures in this emerging area.  Their 
work, however, does not represent a substantive engagement with Hadot’s work; instead, 
                                                 
69 Stephen Pope’s introduction to Aquinas’s ethics mentions this as well.  Pope, Stephen J. The Ethics of 
Aquinas. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002. 
70 Franks, Christopher A. 2009. He Became Poor: The Poverty of Christ and Aquinas's Economic 
Teachings. The Eerdmans Ekklesia Series. Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans Pub. Co 10 
71 Philipp Rosemann’s book is the exception to this statement.  Rosemann, Philipp. 1999. Understanding 
Scholastic Thought with Foucault. The New Middle Ages. 1st ed. New York: St. Martin's Press.  It is not, 
however, interested in the work of late-career Foucault, that is, questions of reflexivity and techniques of 
the self.  
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themes from Hadot’s work are employed in the study of Aquinas in order to provide a 
different perspective.  
 As the work of Levering and Emery has illustrated, Thomas’s theoretical work 
has practical concerns.  This means that, for example, the explanation of and meditation 
on a doctrine like the Trinity is not simply an exercise about the increase of knowledge, 
but also has an impact on the way a person lives.  Emery’s article “Trinitarian Theology 
as a Spiritual Exercise”72 discusses the purpose of Trinitarian theology in Thomas, as 
well as the purpose of speculative theology in general.  He cites from the Summa Contra 
Gentilium: 
In order to manifest this kind of truth, one must provide likely, probably reasons 
(rationes aliquae verisimiles) for the exercise and comfort of the faithful (ad 
fidelium quidem exercitium et solatium) and not in order to convince opponents; 
for the insufficiency of these reasons would rather confirm them in their error if 
they thought that we adhered to the faith for such weak reasons.73 
For Emery, the two most important words in this passage are “exercise and comfort.”  
Comfort, solatium, has a whole range of meaning in Thomas that is lost in our English 
word “comfort.”  Emery summarizes these meanings by writing: 
The search for “reasons” in order to manifest the faith procures for believers 
support, remedy, defense, and spiritual consolation by giving them a grasp of the 
                                                 
72 Emery, Gilles. 2007. Trinity, Church, and the Human Person : Thomistic Essays. Faith & Reason : 
Studies in Catholic Theology & Philosophy. Naples, FL: Sapientia Press of Ave Maria University. 
73 Ibid., 58 
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intelligibility of their faith and showing them that this faith resists the objections 
(heresies and rational arguments) that are posed to it.74 
This is one important aspect of establishing the theme of theology as a way of life in 
Thomas, as theology thus provides a person confidence in their beliefs, freeing them to 
live accordingly.  Hadot will also point to a similar argument among Stoic thinkers of the 
Hellenistic period, who sought to provide a rationale for following their way of life while 
recognizing that the only conclusive demonstration of its authenticity came from the full 
experience of living their manner of life.  Solace and confidence in one’s way of life is 
one part, but it is secondary in Hadot’s and Emery’s understanding to the practice of 
exercise. 
 The use of the term “exercise” is central to this dissertation, and the concept plays a 
key role in the thought of Thomas Aquinas.  Emery explains: 
As for the word “exercise” (exercitium), it indicates the nature and purpose of the 
theologian’s study.  St Thomas often applies this theme of exercise (exercitatio 
and exercitium) to study and teaching sustained by perseverance, training, and 
frequent practice.  The study and teaching of wisdom are counted among the 
“spiritual exercises” (spiritualia exercitia) that lead one to know God and to love 
him.75 
Thus, for Thomas, even “speculative” activity is involved in the formation of persons.  
This scheme of exercise fits into Thomas’ work as a whole, as well.  For the intellectual 
                                                 
74 Ibid., 59 
75 Ibid., 60. Referring to SCG III.132 “studium sapientiae, et doctrina, et alia huiusmodi spiritualia 
exercitia.”  See also ST II-II.122.4 ad 3.  Also important is the fact that to grow in the love of God, the 
virtue of charity, is the purpose of the spiritual life.   
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aspect of the person, the study of sacred doctrine and Trinitarian theology contributes to 
the development of the mind and increases its ability to understand divine things.  Emery 
continues: “The exercise consists in passing from corporeal realities to spiritual realities, 
from light things to those that are more arduous, from a simple teaching to a more subtle 
teaching, from faith to a spiritual understanding of the faith.”76  Emery and Levering have 
shown, therefore, that even when discussing aspects of speculative theology, Thomas is 
still interested in the formation of the human person, and thus have shown the benefit of 
employing Hadot’s method to improve our understanding of Thomas. 
 An article by Wayne Hankey has also offered an encounter between Hadot and 
Thomas, though Hankey is more interested in Hadot’s reading of neo-Platonism than his 
reading of Scholastic theology.77  Hankey does argue, however, that Hadot offers a 
misreading of the Scholastics in general and Aquinas in particular, one that appears to be 
rooted in a preference for “non-religious” or “less religious” philosophy, exemplified by 
the Stoics in contrast to figures like Porphyry or Plotinus.78  
Defining important terms 
 Before moving to the main argument of this work, it will also be helpful to define 
some key terms that will be found throughout.  In particular, the terms spirituality, 
spiritual exercises, and reflexivity will now be defined.  For spirituality, I am drawn to 
the definition offered by Foucault: 
                                                 
76 Ibid., 60 
77 “Philosophy as a way of life for Christians? Iamblichian and Porphyrian reflections on religion, virtue 
and philosophy in Thomas Aquinas.” Volume 59, numéro 2, 2003, p. 193-224 Le néoplatonisme 
78 The work of Thomas Hibbs also acknowledges the potential application of Hadot to Thomas Aquinas, 
although his engagement with Hadot is not overly substantial. 
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We will call “spirituality” the set of these pursuits, practices, and experiences, 
which may be purifications, ascetic exercises, renunciations, conversions of 
looking, modifications of existence, etcetera, which are not for knowledge but for 
the subject, for the subject’s very being, the price to be paid for access to the 
truth.79 
This definition is a step removed from Christianity, of course, but still applies to Thomas.  
It also represents an improvement over the common understanding of the term, which is 
often concerned only with practices of prayer or relationship with God.  Instead, 
Foucault’s definition emphasizes the importance of the fundamental change to the soul’s 
perspective and understanding that is a requirement in ancient philosophy and in 
Christianity.  To speak of Thomas’s spirituality and discuss only his understandings of 
prayer or God as found in his academic works is clearly inadequate.  To this end, my 
study of the spirituality of Thomas will be focused on the exercises Thomas recommends 
for a person to increase their virtue and change their being such that they have access to 
the truth, which is found specifically in the increase of charity and the eventual 
experience of the beatific vision.   
 Another important term is “spiritual exercises.”  The term is in fact used by Thomas 
Aquinas, as will be discussed in the next chapter.  In this dissertation it refers to repeated 
actions that serve to improve the soul and render it more capable of moral and intellectual 
virtue.  These exercises include: research, investigation, reading, listening, attention, 
meditations, therapies of the passions, remembrance of good things, self mastery, and the 
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accomplishment of duties.80  Thomas cites things like religious poverty, forms of prayer, 
and exercises related to the virtue of religion.  Thomas will also cite sacraments or prayer 
as spiritual exercises as, through the reception of grace, the soul is formed by God for 
right action.  In this situation, the exercise is the person’s commitment to participating in 
the sacrament, while the resulting moral change is gratuitous.   
 The term “reflexivity” refers to the practice of the self in relationship to the self.  For 
Foucault, there are multiple forms of reflexivity, with the key distinction lying in the 
difference between an objective and subjective reflexivity.  Objective reflexivity is 
identified by Foucault with Christian practices: Christian thinkers, he suggests, analyze 
the self in order to provide an objective account of who they are, of their “true self,” 
understood as a description of one’s qualities.  This is distinct from Foucault’s 
characterization of pre-Christian reflexivity, which he suggests is a “subjective” account.  
The subjective form of reflexivity is not intended to provide an account of a “true self,” 
but rather is an activity oriented towards improving ethical action.  In subjective 
reflexivity, the self watches the self actively in order to improve one’s virtue, instead of 
being able to identify one’s past errors as a part of the self.  Foucault explains:  
It seems to me that in this Christian askesis there is, therefore, a movement of 
self-renunciation which proceeds by way of, and whose essential moment is the 
objectification of the self in a true discourse.  It seems to me that pagan askesis, 
the philosophical askesis of the practice of the self in the period I am talking 
about, involves rejoining oneself as the end and object of a technique of life, an 
art of living.  It involves coming together with oneself, the essential moment of 
                                                 
80 Philosophy as a Way of Life 84 
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which is not the objectification of the self in a true discourse, but the 
subjectivation of a true discourse in a practice and exercise of oneself on 
oneself.81   
Regardless of whether Foucault’s characterization of reflexivity is accurate82 in its 
distinction between Christian and Greek and Latin forms, the concept is identified by 
both Foucault and Hadot as central to the development of an ethical subject.  Moral 
improvement is contingent on the self’s ability to watch itself, both in the moment to aid 
decision making, and after the fact through reflection to identify errors and places for 
future improvement.  This is the basis for Foucault’s identification of subjective 
reflexivity with the art of living, in that this form of reflexivity is about creating or 
cultivating a new self, not explaining the current “true” self. 
The Argument 
 There are several arguments being made in this dissertation, or rather one primary 
argument with a variety of implications.  First, I argue that Thomas is an inheritor and 
participant in the variety of philosophy described by Hadot and Foucault, though, of 
course, his thought contains several differences from earlier writers.  This means that 
Thomas can be read as recommending and describing a certain way of life that not only 
accompanies our theological endeavors, but is actually the purpose of and reason for 
those intellectual efforts.  To advance in the spiritual life requires a conversion of 
understanding, a change in habits of thought and outward practices, and the maintenance 
of a specific form of life in order to attain to what he describes in a qualified way as 
                                                 
81 Hermeneutics of the Subject 331-332 
82 I intend to demonstrate later in this dissertation why it is not by showing that Aquinas’s understanding of 
reflexivity is best understood as a “subjective” form by this definition. 
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“perfection.”  The description of these aspects forms the bulk of this thesis, and it can be 
broken into three main questions: 
1) What are the spiritual exercises of Thomas Aquinas?  What is the ideal person these 
exercises aid in the realization of?  How do these exercises interact with his theology 
of grace? 
2) What is the nature of reflexivity in Thomas?  How does the self watch the self?  Is the 
person approached as an object of knowledge?  Is there a “true self”? 
3) What is the nature of attention in Thomas? What are the practices associated with self 
knowledge?  What are the repeated apothegms that are maintained at hand (e.g. “Do 
good and avoid evil)? 
These three questions lead to three arguments for this dissertation.  First is the argument 
that Thomas Aquinas is in fact committed to spiritual exercises, and describes them 
throughout his work.  In particular, I will argue that Thomas viewed the religious orders 
as “schools” for “spiritual exercise” and training in perfection.  Thomas repeatedly 
affirms our dependence on grace, but will also state that man “must do what he can.”83  
Furthermore, these spiritual exercises are devoted to two specific ends, namely the 
development of the governance and capacity of reason and the ordering of our interior 
affections.   
 For the second and third question, I argue that, for Aquinas, what is found is best 
described, in Foucault’s terms, as a subjective form of reflexivity.  For one, Thomas 
limits self-knowledge as a formal question to knowledge of the soul as it is in action.  
                                                 
83 Aquinas, Saint Thomas. 2012. Commentary on the Letter of Saint Paul to the Hebrews. Commentaria 
Biblica. Lander, MD: Aquinas Institute. ch. 12, v. 13.  The commentaries on all of Paul’s epistles are dated 
to the later period of Thomas’s career, from 1270-1272. 
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Thus, Foucault’s description of the Christian practice of deciphering “hidden” aspects of 
the self does not properly apply.  Additionally, Thomas is not interested in the 
construction of a “self” in the modern sense; instead, Thomas employs Pauline language 
to develop the concept of the “old self” and “new self,” where the old self is identified as 
the sensitive aspect of the person, in conjunction with its sinful desires and mistaken 
judgment, while the new self is the mind84 renewed by grace with the directing of the 
soul by reason.  Thomas identifies this movement towards the new self as a process of 
increasing in likeness to God, and not as a question of coming to a unique or authentic 
“selfhood.”  This self is not approached as an object to be described, but is instead 
watched by oneself only for the purpose of ensuring correct thought and action in the 
moment.  It is a deified self, one which grows in likeness to Christ as it increases its 
perfection.  As part of this spirituality, and for the purpose of moral flourishing, the 
human being should consider themselves to be their mind (where this includes the 
intellect and will, but is identified primarily as the chief power), not their sensitive aspect, 
something which results in a sort of withdrawal of concern from things external to the 
mind, namely external things (poverty), external relations and the body (chastity), and the 
directing of one’s body and will (obedience). 
 This form of reflexivity is rather different from a modern understanding of the self.  It 
is dependent entirely on the action of the individual; if we are to speak of a “self” in 
                                                 
84 Thomas acknowledges different definitions for the term “mind,” including Augustine who will describe 
the mind as “reason, will, and memory” (ST 1.79.6 sed contra) and “spirit and essence” (ST 1.79.1 ad 1).  
Thomas will also indicate that the term “mind” is used interchangeably with intellect, a term which can 
refer at once to the entire soul, as well to the specific power of the soul as “intellect.”  Furthermore, 
intellect and reason are identified as the same power (ST 1.79.8).  This makes it difficult to know precisely 
what Thomas is indicating when he uses any of these terms without qualification. 
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Thomas, it is a transitional self, formed by whatever action that person is currently 
undertaking.  Knowledge of this self,85 furthermore, is not directed towards describing or 
enumerating its qualities, nor even understanding or uncovering habits.  Habits are only 
known as they are in action, and can only be modified as they are enacted or refused.  
The decision making process, for Thomas, resides in the intellect or reason, which is the 
aspect of the human capable of deriving conclusions to present to the will.  The intellect 
must, therefore, be preserved such that it is able to better direct those actions, such that 
the continued growth in the likeness of the divine is continued.  The emphasis on intellect 
in the decision making process is necessary when discussing the practical aspects of the 
work of Thomas Aquinas, and is not intended to rewrite our understanding of the role of 
the will and other aspects of the human as developed by scholars of Thomas Aquinas.  
Thomas does have a more positive view of the body and the sensitive nature, and a less 
autocratic understanding of the reasoning mind, than many of his contemporaries.  
Nevertheless, as this dissertation will show, the intellect plays a central role in the living 
of a moral life for Thomas Aquinas, and he employs numerous spiritual exercises and 
practices for the sake of developing the influence of the reason over the body, such that 
are actions are always approvable by reason.  
 This leads to an overall argument about the nature of spirituality in Thomas.  I argue 
that Thomas’s spirituality, the set of practices he recommends for preparing the person to 
access truth, are focused on freeing the mind from encumbrance for the sake of God.  As 
Thomas writes in the Summa Contra Gentiles, “Now, the perfection to which these three 
counsels give a disposition consists in detachment of the mind for God” (in vacatione 
                                                 
85 Speaking of a particular self, and not of humans in general, as seen in ST 1.75-89. 
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mentis circa Deum consistit).86  The sum of exercises in Thomas, therefore, looks for the 
development and maintenance of the ability of the intellect, such that it is capable at most 
all times of ensuring that all human thoughts and actions are in alignment with reason.  
As Diana Fritz Cates suggests, the potential negative influence of emotions is a concern 
in Thomas, and provides the reason “why it is crucial to cultivate virtuous habits of 
emotion, so that one’s emotions arise and persist in ways that are inherently reasonable or 
consistent with good judgment, and one retains the ability to transcend, examine 
critically, and affect deliberately...”87 the motions of the sensitive appetite.   This does not 
mean that reason is an autocratic tyrant over the rest of the person; instead, the goal is 
that all human actions be reasonable, that is, be approvable by the processes of rational 
thought. 
Towards a composite picture of the spirituality of Thomas Aquinas 
 This dissertation will serve in developing our understanding of the spiritual life 
recommended by Thomas Aquinas, but it will not be an exhaustive treatment of this 
topic.  Instead, it will be focused on two aspects of Thomas’s thought, namely the 
exercises and subjectivity recommended by Thomas in the pursuit of perfection.  In 
focusing on these aspects, what will not be treated in an extensive manner is the area of 
Thomas which receives the most attention: his speculative thought and understanding of 
academic formation.  As the above has suggested, there are already in existence several 
works on these subjects, many of which provide substantial contributions towards 
understanding spirituality in Thomas.  Instead, the focus will be on, as Foucault writes, 
                                                 
86 SCG 3.130.6. 
87 See Cates, Diana Fritz. 2009. Aquinas on the Emotions: A Religious-Ethical Inquiry. Moral Traditions 
Series. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press. 
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“the set of these pursuits, practices, and experiences...which are not for knowledge but for 
the subject, for the subject’s very being, the price to be paid for access to the truth.”88  
These sets of exercises can, I argue, be fruitfully broken into three categories: 
1. A notion of the self – Thomas recommends a specific form of subjectivity, one 
reminiscent of descriptions of classical thinkers.  The higher powers of the soul are 
considered the proper source of direction or action, not the desiring aspect of the 
person; the self is also separated from outward attachment, even to one’s own will.   
2. A notion of virtue – That is, virtue in the general sense of a concept of excellence.  
Thomas is committed to the idea of limited human perfection possible in this life, and 
the worthiness of its pursuit.  Virtue is in part a product of grace, and certainly the 
most important variety is a result of grace, but Thomas never indicates a laissez-faire 
attitude to such things.  He recommends spiritual exercises and constant attention to 
self and rational analysis of thought and action as ways of preventing the person from 
falling into sin.  Though humans may not merit an increase in grace and therefore 
virtue through action, they can lose grace by acting sinfully, which acts of sin are 
preventable through action.  Thus, the rationale for the religious life, which most 
preserves the person from sinful behavior, increasing the possibility of a further gift 
of grace.   
3. A notion of the primary action of reason – This final point is essential to 
understanding the entirety of Thomas’s project.  The fundamental task of reason is 
twofold: when speculative, it is to choose the truth, and reject falsehood.  When 
practical, it is to choose the good, and reject evil.  These simple statements can be 
                                                 
88 Hermeneutics of the subject 15 
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understood as providing the rationale for Thomas’s work in the Summa Theologiae, 
which contains statements of falsehood, then rebutted by the statement of truth, 
followed by a rejection of each of the false statements.  Thomas expects this 
capability to be fundamental to a person engaged in the Dominican mission and 
following the footsteps of Christ. 
Overview of Chapters 
In the second chapter, I will provide an account of virtue, grace, and spiritual 
exercises in Thomas.  This chapter is focused on defining virtue ethics in Thomas 
according to a standard offered by Thomas Hibbs, namely that a virtue ethic should offer 
some description of “(a) some conception of the ideal person (b) some list of the virtues 
necessary to become a person of that type, and (c) some view of how persons come to 
possess the relevant virtues.”89  This ideal person, I argue, can only be Jesus Christ for 
Thomas, and the virtues necessary for this emulation can only be acquired through grace.  
This does not lead to quiet prayer for grace, however; instead, Thomas provides an 
expansive account of spiritual exercises which aid in the acquisition of virtue, and 
identifies the religious orders as schools for spiritual exercise.  Though the virtues of 
Christ are not acquired except through grace, the spiritual life of one in the religious 
orders helps a person to avoid sin; and sin, as mentioned above, prevents the reception of 
future grace. 
In the third chapter, my focus moves to the question of reflexivity in Thomas.  After 
providing a further discussion of the concept of reflexivity in Foucault, my argument will 
                                                 
89 Hibbs, Thomas S. Aquinas, Ethics, and Philosophy of Religion: Metaphysics and Practice. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2007. 14 
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center on the prime indicator of reflexive understanding of the self, which is the mode of 
attention to one’s self that is recommended.  Attention as a concept in Aquinas will also 
be discussed, first in relation to solicitude in the virtue of prudence, as well as the 
importance of the love of God and the love of neighbor as referent of all thoughts and 
actions.   
 These two chapters establish a foundation for a further engagement with the primary 
texts of Aquinas.  In the fourth chapter, I will focus on the De perfectione spiritualis 
vitae, describing the spiritual exercises found within this text, and how this text provides 
us with a further insight into the reflexive understanding of the person found in Aquinas.   
In the fifth chapter, I will provide a description of the spiritual exercises found in the 
Summa Theologiae, and the reflexive understanding of self suggested in this text.  I 
accomplish this by providing a discussion of different aspects or virtues which form the 
components of the cardinal virtues.  In discussing how spiritual exercises related to the 
fear of death aid one in the formation of the virtue of fortitude, the structure and practices 
associated with the cardinal virtues are highlighted.   
Finally, in the conclusion, I will provide an overview of the findings of this work 
before turning to the potential implications for contemporary ethics.  The employment of 
Foucault and Hadot as sources for methodological questions implies a certain conclusion, 
namely that there is something amiss, to a certain extent, with the way contemporary 
philosophy and theology are accomplished.  As this dissertation will highlight, Thomas 
Aquinas has a robust set of practices, and provides a foundational mode of understanding 
the self, both of which hold implications for the way a person lives.  In contemporary 
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ethics, practices and understandings of the self are not often described, something which 




Chapter 2 - Progress, Virtue, and Spiritual Exercises 
 
 Thomas Aquinas would, according to contemporary categories, be considered a virtue 
ethicist.  Beyond the regular use of the word “virtue,” an ethics of virtue is one that 
focuses on the development of character instead of adherence to a code of rules.  The 
simplest explanation, and one often repeated, is that in virtue ethics, a good person does 
what is right, whereas in other ethical systems, a person who does what is right is good.  
The focus, therefore, is on the development of a certain type of person, from whom 
proceed virtuous actions.  A virtue ethics is an ethics of cultivation, an ethics of progress, 
and is thus a system that speaks of a beginning, middle, and end goal for humans.  
Thomas Hibbs offers this explanation: 
By contrast with its chief competitors, a normative virtue theory would treat the 
assessment of character and the virtues and vices constitutive of character as more 
fundamental than either the assessment of action and duty, which is basic in 
Kantian deontology, or the assessment of the value of the consequences of action, 
which is basic in utilitarianism.  Thus understood, virtue ethics would have the 
task of developing and defending (a) some conception of the ideal person (b) 
some list of the virtues necessary to become a person of that type, and (c) some 
view of how persons come to possess the relevant virtues.90 
The goal of this chapter is to answer these three points (ideal person, their virtues, and 
how they got them) from the work of Thomas Aquinas.  This would represent a greater 
effort than might be covered in a single chapter, however, and to that end, I will be 
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focusing on certain aspects of Thomas’s conception of virtue.  First, it would appear 
accurate to say that the entire secunda pars, and in particular the secunda secundae, serve 
as a description of these three points.  There is an extensive listing of virtues and vices, 
both moral and theological, and explanations of the methods of acquiring virtue, 
specifically through imitation of persons, study, and exercise.  Finally, there is the 
conception of the ideal person, one which is more subtly contained in Thomas’s work.  
The ideal person and moral exemplar for all people is Jesus Christ, and, as Thomas 
argues, we should learn our behavior from his example, and from the saints, insofar as 
they imitated Christ. 
 These questions determine the structure of this chapter: what are the virtues?  How 
are they acquired?  From whom do we learn them?  For the first question, I will offer a 
brief overview of Thomas’s understandings of habit and virtue, including an explanation 
of the varieties of virtues.  After this, I will move to a discussion of the growing of habits.  
In particular, I will argue for the importance of “practice” or “exercise” in relation to 
growth in acquired virtue.  For Thomas, a virtue is acquired either by means of repeatedly 
performing virtuous actions which produces a habit, or through an infusion of grace.  
Without God’s action, it is only possible for a person to become virtuous by acting 
virtuously, and not simply by learning on a theoretical level the proper action to take 
(though proper reasoning plays an important role in deciding the correct action).  It is also 
possible to supplement the development of the virtues by indirect means; as in the case of 
the virtue of prudence, which can be aided by the increase in one’s ability for memory.  
Thus, a person who has developed numerous experiences over the course of time, reflects 
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on these experiences, and from them derives knowledge based on the circumstances and 
outcomes of those experiences, which then inform that person’s prudent decision making 
in future actions.  This leads to a discussion of the spiritual exercises that are found in 
Thomas, and his use of the term. 
 For Thomas, it is important to note that acquired virtues are not the only form of 
virtues.  Thomas also offers the concept of infused virtues, that is, virtues infused within 
the human person by God.  The primary discussion of infusion is found in his description 
of the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity, but also in the context of moral or 
intellectual virtue.  In the case of moral and intellectual virtue, though these virtues are 
typically thought of as acquired, they also can benefit from the infusion of grace by God.  
Thus there are infused and acquired versions of most all virtues, including prudence, 
justice, temperance and fortitude, though there is not much agreement among scholars 
about the specific nature of the relationship between the two of these.91  The concept of 
infusion plays a significant role in his theology and ethical perspective, and an 
understanding of the importance of infusion is central to understanding Aquinas’s 
conception of ideal form of life.  For a person to process in virtue, they must be disposed 
to practice virtue and avoid vice.  Further, they must maintain and grow in relationship 
with God through the practice of prayer, contemplation, and the sacraments.   
The ideal form of life is possible for all persons, therefore, in that no person is 
technically prevented from relationship with God or growth in virtue.  Thomas, however, 
will repeatedly state that the person who is fully committed to growth in the likeness of 
                                                 




God should choose the religious life, that is, membership in a religious order with 
professed vows.  He identifies life as a professed religious person to be the form of life 
that grants the person the greatest opportunity for an increase in charity and grace from 
God through the avoidance of sin.  Thomas is careful not to be Pelagian in his insistence 
on the work of the religious orders, but it is clear that he views the professed religious life 
as a place of “spiritual training,” one that best prepares the human for devotion to God 
and service to their neighbor.92  This does not mean that persons outside of religious 
orders have no chance for sainthood or spiritual greatness; on the contrary, one example 
Thomas repeatedly cites and returns to is the figure of Abraham, someone who appears 
consistently in the De perfectione spiritualis vitae.  Abraham is cited as an example of a 
non-celibate and wealthy person who is obedient only to God, who at the same time is 
deemed righteous.  Thomas, therefore, acknowledges that it is possible to live a full 
Christian life according to the counsels outside of a religious order, without celibacy or 
poverty;93 still, he repeats that life outside of a religious order is far more difficult and 
less secure, and thus life in the religious order is ideal for those seeking perfection. 
 Finally, I will offer a discussion of Thomas’s conception of the ideal person, which I 
will argue is found in the religious state following the counsels of Christ in imitation of 
Christ.  Thomas particularly identifies the religious orders as places of exercise, 
unmatched by any other place in the world for their ability to aid people in the movement 
                                                 
92 Thomas is in fact critical of diocesan priests for not taking vows related to poverty, chastity, and 
obedience, and puts them below monks and bishops in his ranking of members of the clergy. 
93 Strictly interpreted – Abraham is still, poor, chaste and obedient in that he has ordered affection for his 
possessions and does not covet that of others, he is chaste in that he only engages in appropriate relations 
with his wife, and he is obedient in that he obeys God, which is actually the main point of the vow of 
obedience.   
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towards perfection, through growth in the virtues, and preservation from sin.  Again, 
religious orders are not the only possible place for humans to grow in grace, but they are 
identified as an ideal place for this to occur.  Thomas views the ideal religious order as a 
combination of the contemplative and active life, where the fruits of the contemplative 
life are shared through the undertaking of an active life, a description applicable in most 
ways to his own Dominican order.94  For Thomas, this hybrid form of life is in fact 
modeled upon the life of Christ, and a person who seeks to lead this form of life should 
model their actions and habits on those seen in Christ.  This leads to a description of the 
concepts of the imago dei, and the exemplar dei and other key terms that for Thomas 
guide humans in the development of virtue.   
The Argument 
 Presenting Thomas from the perspective of virtue ethics does not suggest much of 
anything new about Thomas.95  Instead, the goal of this chapter is to offer something 
different.  While Thomas will recognize that there are many valid forms of life, the 
professed religious life is the one he identifies as the safest and surest form of devoting 
one’s life to God.  Furthermore, Thomas, in the fashion of the early philosophical schools 
and monastic thinkers from early Christianity, identifies religious orders as a school for 
spiritual exercise and growth.  Their purpose is to help persons become better conformed 
to the image of God, and to do this through teaching and practicing exercises which aid in 
                                                 
94 Thomas does not often refer to the “Dominican” order, or generally name religious orders in his writings 
on the matter. 
95 As will be mentioned, Thomas does not abide by the modern distinctions of varieties of ethics, and thus 
would not self-identify as a virtue ethicist.  I have chosen a virtue ethics approach for the reason that it 
highlights the practical aspect of moral living, in that virtue requires study, exercise, and infusion, and is 
not simply a matter of rational choice.  
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the avoidance of sin and growth in acquired virtue.  And, by the avoidance of sin, one 
does not lose the opportunity for added grace, nor sacrifice the graces already given, thus 
placing them in the best possible position for an increase in grace to be given by God.  
This provides us with an image of the ideal person for Thomas; they are chaste, poor, and 
obedient, with a life modeled after Christ, engaging in contemplation of God always and 
sharing those fruits, and practicing spiritual exercises to aid in their conformity with 
Christ.   
Virtue 
Aquinas does not abide by the modern distinctions between ethics and spirituality, 
and it can be easily demonstrated that for Thomas to be a virtuous person involves what 
we now call “religion” and the spiritual life.  This section will serve as a brief 
introduction to Thomas’s ethics, focusing specifically on how the person develops into a 
moral person through the acquisition and infusion of moral and theological virtue. 
 For Thomas, ethics and spirituality are about progress (profectus) and growth 
(crescere).  As he writes in the prologue to his commentary on Philippians: 
In this text the life of the saints is described under three aspects: first, its 
narrowness, when it is called a path: “For the gate is narrow and the way is hard, 
that leads to life” (Matt 7:14); “That path no bird of prey knows, and the falcon’s 
eye has not seen it” (Job 28:7); secondly, its splendor when he says, the light of 
dawn: “For once you were darkness, but now you are light in the Lord” (Eph. 
5:8).  For the just shine, and as a result, their life shines.  Thirdly, its progress 
(profectu), because it is always growing (crescit): “Long for the pure spiritual 
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milk, that by it you may grow up to salvation” (1 Pet 2:2); and even this until the 
full day of glory; “When the perfect comes, the imperfect will pass away” (1 Cor 
13:10).96   
The life of the just, for Thomas, is about always becoming better.  The saint is always 
seeking after perfection, and always working to make that perfection a reality.  Thus, the 
person is always trying to increase in virtue and increase in the love of God and neighbor.  
This perspective underlies all of Thomas’s thought on the question of how one ought to 
live.   
a) The virtues one must acquire 
 Thomas argued that the human is a composite of body and soul.  The soul serves as 
the form of the body, and in distinction from Platonists and others, the soul is not truly 
complete without the body, though it can exist separately.  The soul is the principle of our 
movement, our knowledge, our willing, and our living, and thus is the source of our 
moral action.  To that end, the soul holds qualities, certain of which are particularly 
important for ethics: habits.  Thomas defines a habit as a “disposition of a subject which 
is in a state of potentiality either to form or to operation.”97  There are various forms of 
habits in Thomas, ranging from the habit of health to the virtue of prudence.  Health, in 
                                                 
96 Commentary on Philippians – The commentaries on all of Paul’s letters date from 1270-1272.  See 
Keenan, James.  Ex eorum arctitudine, ibi semita, quia Matt. VII, 14: arcta est via, etc.; Iob XXVIII, 7: 
semitam ignoravit avis, et cetera.  Ex claritate, ibi, lux splendens. Eph. V, 8: eratis aliquando tenebrae, et 
cetera. Iusti enim sunt lucentes, et ideo eorum via est lucida.  Ex profectu, quia semper crescit. I Pet. II, 2: 
in eo crescatis, et cetera.  Et hoc usque ad perfectum diem, scilicet gloriae. I Cor. XIII, 10: cum venerit 
quod perfectum est, evacuabitur, et cetera.  Aquinas, Saint Thomas. Commentary on the Letters of Saint 
Paul to the Philippians, Colossians, Thessalonians, Timothy, Titus, and Philemon Author. Lander, MD: 
Aquinas Institute, 2012. 
97 ST I-II.50.1 - Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, habitus est quaedam dispositio alicuius 




this instance, refers to the disposition of the body and soul to be healthy, and, further, the 
habitual choosing of the means for preserving health.  A person in good health has the 
habit of health brought into action from its status in potentiality, so long as those things 
which negatively affect health are prevented.  Likewise prudence, a cardinal virtue, is a 
type of habit, in this case a virtue.  The habit of prudence disposes one to right reason 
about things to be done, as will be explained in further detail in the coming chapters.   
 As mentioned above, virtues are a specific variety of habit.  Thomas defines a virtue 
as “a good quality of the soul, by which we live righteously, of which no one can make 
bad use, which God works in us, without us.”98  This definition is actually from 
Augustine, and Thomas accepts it with qualifications, modifying the definition when 
referring to the non-theological virtues by taking away the “which God works in us, 
without us” clause.  The non-theological virtues are either moral or intellectual, giving us 
three types of virtue: moral, intellectual, and theological. 
 The distinction between the three types of virtues results from the difference in the 
faculty they perfect and in what they dispose the person to do.  Thomas explains that the 
intellectual virtues, or the virtues of the “speculative intellect,” are “those which perfect 
the speculative intellect for the consideration of truth,” the result of which is 
“understanding.”99  Understanding, however, dwelling as it does in the speculative 
intellect, is not sufficient for a person to act virtuously.  As Thomas writes: 
Accordingly, for a man to do a good deed, it is requisite not only that his reason 
be well disposed by means of a habit of intellectual virtue; but also that his 
                                                 
98 ST I-II.55.4 obj.1 and following.   
99 ST I-II.57.2 
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appetite be well disposed by means of a habit of moral virtue.  And so moral 
differs from intellectual virtue, even as the appetite differs from the reason.100   
Intellectual virtues, therefore, refer to the consideration of right reason, while moral 
virtues refer to the habit and practice of right action.  Thomas identifies four cardinal 
virtues: prudence, justice, temperance and fortitude.  Prudence is understood to be a 
hybrid virtue, both moral and intellectual, in that it is located in the intellect, but it is 
concerned with matters of action.  The moral virtues, on the other hand, are located in the 
will, properly speaking, though temperance, properly speaking concerns the regulation of 
the sensitive appetite.  Thomas describes the cardinal virtues as follows: “prudence is the 
virtue that commands; justice, the virtue which is about due action between equals; 
temperance, the virtue which suppresses desires for the pleasures of touch; and fortitude, 
which strengthens against the dangers of death.”101 
 The final variety of virtue is the theological.  As Thomas notes, Aristotle only 
identifies two forms of virtue, moral and intellectual.102  The reason for the addition of 
the third is a different understanding of the final goal for human life in Thomas, namely 
our eternal beatitude in God, beyond our natural end.  The moral and intellectual virtues, 
therefore, are capable of directing us only to our natural end, and not towards 
supernatural happiness.  Thomas explains: 
                                                 
100 ST I-II.58.2 - Sic igitur ad hoc quod homo bene agat, requiritur quod non solum ratio sit bene disposita 
per habitum virtutis intellectualis; sed etiam quod vis appetitive sit bene disposita per habitum virtutis 
moralis.  Sicut igitur appetites distinguitur a ratione, ita virtus moralis distinguitur ab intellectuali.  
 
101 ST I-II.61.3 - Et secundum hoc, dicuntur principales, quasi generals ad omnes virtutes, utputa quod 
omnis virtus quae facit bonum in consideration rationis, dicatur prudential; et quod omnis virtus quae facit 
bonum debiti et recti in operationibus, dicatur iustitia; et omnis virtus quae cohibet passions et deprimit, 
dicatur temperantia; et omnis virtus quae facit firmitatem animi contra quascumque passions, dicatur 
fortitudo.   
102 ST I-II.58.2 sed contra 
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And because such happiness surpasses the capacity of human nature, man’s 
natural principles which enable him to act well according to his capacity do not 
suffice to direct man to this same happiness.  Hence it is necessary for man to 
receive from God some additional principles, whereby he may be directed to 
supernatural happiness, even as he is directed to his connatural end, by means of 
his natural principles, albeit not without divine assistance.  Such like principles 
are called “theological virtues”: first, because their object is God, inasmuch as 
they direct us aright to God: secondly, because they are infused in us by God 
alone: thirdly, because these virtues are not made known to us, save by Divine 
revelation, contained in Holy Writ.103   
In this explanation, Thomas gives us two important points about the theological virtues: 
1. “they direct us to God aright” and 2. “they are infused in us by God alone.”  Both of 
these points distinguish the theological virtues from the moral and intellectual virtues.  
Also, because these virtues are infused by God alone, it would seem this might 
complicate our understanding of spiritual relationship with God: if we are entirely 
dependent on God for being rightly directed to God and for achieving our end in God, 
what can the person do to encourage these virtues, if anything? 
b) How one acquires these virtues, natural and supernatural 
                                                 
103 ST I-II.62.1 - Et quia huiusmodi beatitude proportionem humanae naturae excedit, principia naturalia 
hominis, ex quibus procedit ad bene agendum secundum suam proportionem, non sufficient ad ordinandum 
hominem in beatitudinem praedictam.  Unde oportet quod superaddantur homini divinitus aliqua principia, 
per quae ita ordinetur ad beatitudinem supernaturalem, sicut per principia naturalia ordinatur ad finem 
connaturalem, non tamen absque adiutorio divino. Et huiusmodi principia virtutes dicuntur theologicae, 
tum quia habent Deum pro obiecto, inquantum per eas recte ordinamur in Deum; tum quia a solo Deon obis 




 The human is directed towards a natural end of happiness, and towards a supernatural 
happiness called beatitude.  As Thomas repeatedly affirms, the way to both of these ends 
is virtue, and thus a person should desire virtue as they desire happiness.  They thus need 
to become virtuous: 
In like fashion, too, it is clear that beatitude is the reward of virtue.  Therefore, 
they who tend to beatitude must be virtuously disposed.  But we are stimulated to 
virtue both by words and by examples.  Of course, his examples and words of 
whose goodness we have the more solid opinion induce us the more effectively to 
virtue.  But an infallible opinion of goodness about any pure man was never 
tenable—even the holiest of men, one finds, have failed in some things.  Hence it 
was necessary for man to be solidly grounded in virtue to receive from God made 
human both the teaching and the examples of virtue.  For this reason our Lord 
himself says: “I have given you example that as I have done to you do also.”104 
Our end is beatitude, therefore, and the path is through virtue.105  One way we are 
“stimulated” to virtue is from words and examples, with Thomas holding in mind 
specifically the figure of Christ and the things written about him. 
                                                 
104 SCG 4.54.7 - Similiter etiam manifestum est quod beatitude virtutis est praemium.  Oportet igitur ad 
beatitudinem tendentes secundum virtutem disponi.  Ad virtutem autem et verbis et exemplis provocamur.  
Exempla autem alicuius et verba tanto efficacius ad virtutem inducunt, quanto de eo firmior bonitatis 
habetur opinio. De nullo autem homine puro infallibis opinio bonitatis haberi poterat: quia etiam 
sanctissimi viri in aliquibus inveniuntur defecisse.  Unde necessarium fuit homini, ad hoc quod in virtute 
firmaretur, quod a Deo humanato doctrinam et exempla virtutis acciperet.  Propter quod ipse dominus dicit, 
Ioan. 13:15: exemplum dedi vobis, ut quemadmodum ego feci, ita et vos faciatis. 
105 As Thomas will indicate, beatitude requires charity as that which leads to the union of lover and 
beloved.  Charity, therefore, serves as the primary end of the spiritual life, as will be indicated in the 
chapter on the De perfectione spiritualis vitae.  This project, however, is focused on the means whereby 
charity is preserved, and the possibility of a further infusion of charity is maintained.   
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 But words and examples alone are not enough to make a virtuous person.  Virtues are 
habits, and habits grow through repeated actions.  Thomas affirms this principle, but also 
adds to it.  For one, he writes, “So, too, repeated acts cause a habit to grow.  If, however, 
the act falls short of the intensity of the habit, such an act does not dispose to an increase 
of that habit, but rather to a lessening thereof.”106  For example, if a just person were to 
return stolen goods to their proper owner, but also keeps some of the goods, that action 
would fall short of his habit of justice, and would lessen his virtue.  Thomas therefore 
recommends “studium et exercitium,” that is, “exercise and study,” for the acquisition of 
virtue.  He writes: 
Some moral virtues perfect man as regards his general state, in other words, with 
regards to those things which have to be done in every kind of human life.  Hence 
man needs to exercise himself at the same in the matters of all moral virtues.  And 
if he exercise himself, by good deeds, in all such matters, he will acquire the 
habits of all the moral virtues.107 
Exercise, in this sense, does not simply mean “practice,” in the sense of imitating the 
performance of an act, as we might conceive of it; instead, it refers to the enactment of 
virtuous activity on a regular, repeated basis.  In order to become virtuous, we must study 
and learn about good things, but also do those good things with such regularity that our 
good habit is increased. 
                                                 
106 ST I-II.52.3 
107 ST I-II.65.1 ad 1- Ad primum ergo dicendum quod virtutum moralium quaedam perficiunt hominem 
secundum commune statum, scilicet quantum ad ea quae communiter in omni vita hominum occurrunt 
agenda.  Unde oportet quod homo simul exercitetur circa materias omnium virtutum moralium.  Et si 
quidem circa omnes exercitetur bene operand, acquiret habitus omnium virtutum moralium. 
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 The actions of the just person mentioned above, in keeping some of the goods for 
himself, constitute a sin, an indication of vice.  Thomas explains the implications of this: 
By virtues, again, man is disposed to beatitude, and so by sin he is blocked 
therefrom.  Sin, of course, the contrary of virtue, constitutes an obstacle to 
beatitude; it not only induces a kind of disorder in the soul by seducing it from its 
due end, but it also offends God to whom we look for the reward of beatitude, in 
that God has the custody of human acts.108 
Sin and vice, therefore, prevent us from realizing our end in God, and thus humans 
should want to avoid them.  The question that follows, of course, is how we do so.  For 
Thomas, as many figures before him, the answer lies in our reason: “Thus, acts of virtue 
are suitable to human nature, since they are according to reason, whereas acts of vice are 
discordant from human nature, since they are against reason.  Hence it is clear that habits 
are distinguished specifically by the difference of good and bad.”109  A person, therefore, 
who reasons well about things to be done, made or thought, following the words and 
examples of virtuous person, and repeatedly performs well the activities about which he 
has reasoned, becomes a virtuous person. 
 As indicated above, however, the acquired virtues also have infused forms.  These 
infused forms are dependent upon the human’s reception of grace from God.  They have 
the same matter as the acquired version of the virtue, but a person with the acquired 
                                                 
108 SCG 4.54.8 - Sicut virtutibus homo ad beatitudinem disponitur, ita et peccatis impeditur.  Peccatum 
autem virtuti contrarium, impedimentum affert beatitudini, non solum inordinationem quandam animae 
inducens secundum quod eam ab ordine debiti finis abducit, sed etiam Deum offendens, a quo beatitudinis 
praemium expectatur, secundum quod Deus humanorum actuum curam habet… 
 
109 ST I-II.54.3 - Sicut actus virtutum naturae humane convenient, eo quod sunt secundum rationem, actus 
vero vitiorum, cum sin contra rationem, a natura humana discordant.  Et sic manifestum est quod secundum 
differentiam boni et mali, habitus specie distinguuntur. 
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virtue possess a fuller knowledge of the proper end of the virtue, namely God.  This 
changes, theoretically at least, the specific content of a given action, and results as well in 
a different degree of merit.   
 That much seems clear about the moral and intellectual virtues.  But the question still 
follows as to how we might acquire the theological virtues, without which we cannot 
attain to our supernatural end.  Thomas explains this in several instances, including the 
virtue of faith: “...since man, by assenting to matters of faith, is raised above his nature, 
this must needs accrue to him from some supernatural principle moving him inwardly; 
and this is God.  Therefore faith, as regards the assent which is the chief act of faith, is 
from God moving man inwardly by grace.”110  Faith, therefore, and the rest of the 
theological virtues are entirely dependent on God’s acting through us.  This would seem 
to limit our own efforts toward attaining our supernatural end.  And yet, there are still 
certain actions we can take which can aid in our reception of an increase in the 
theological virtues from God.  Thomas writes: 
The religious state was instituted chiefly that we might obtain perfection by 
means of certain exercises whereby the obstacles to perfect charity are removed.  
By the removal of the obstacles of perfect charity, much more are the occasions of 
sin cut off, for sin destroys charity altogether.  111 
                                                 
110 ST II-II.6.1 - Quia cum homo, assentiendo his quae sunt fidei, elevetur supra naturam suam, oportet 
quod hoc insit ei ex supernaturali principio interius movente, quod est Deus.  Et ideo fides quantum ad 
assensum, qui est principalis actus fidei, est a Deo interius movente per gratiam.  
 
111 ST II-II.186.1 ad 4 - Ad quartum dicendum quod religionis status principaliter est institus ad 
perfectionem adipiscendam per quaedam exercitia quibus tolluntur impedimenta perfectae caritatis.  
Sublatis autem impedimentis perfectae caritatis, multo magis exciduntur occasiones peccati, per quod 
totaliter tollitur caritas.   
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This passage establishes a connection between the acquired and infused virtues, in that 
the further perfected we are in the acquired virtues, the less likely we are to sin.  When 
we are able to avoid sin, we do not forfeit whatever charity God has infused in us, and we 
remain open to the further infusion of charity.112 
How one acquires these virtues: Spiritual Exercises 
 Having established the connection between acquired virtue, exercise, and charity, we 
now have a foundation for a discussion of spiritual exercises in Thomas.  Thomas 
actually employs the term “spiritual exercises,” and does so in a few different contexts.  
The principal instances are found on the one hand in reference to the acquisition of 
wisdom, and on the other, the religious life.  One example is found in the Summa Contra 
Gentilium: 
Now if it were necessary for followers of voluntary poverty to make their living 
by manual labor, the result would be that they might take up the greater part of 
their lives in this kind of work; consequently, they would be kept away from 
other, more necessary activities, such as the pursuit of wisdom and teaching, and 
other such spiritual exercises (spiritualia exercitia).113 
In this instance, The spiritual exercises described are those related to the increase of 
knowledge and the formation of students.  Thomas is perhaps best known for his focus on 
                                                 
112 There are, of course, infused moral and intellectual virtues, whereby God grants “other habits” such that 
they are proportional to the theological virtues, in the sense that they are directed towards the supernatural 
end.  See ST I-II.63.3 
113 SCG 3.132.14 - Si autem voluntariam paupertatem sectantes oporteret labore manuali victum acquirere, 
sequeretur quod circa huiusmodi laborem maius tempus suae vitae consumerent; et per consequens 
impedirentur ab aliis magis necessariis actionibus, quae etiam magnum tempus requirunt, sicut sunt 
stadium sapientiae, et doctrina, et alia huiusmodi spiritualia exercitia. 
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academic work, so that he would identify those activities as spiritual exercises is not 
surprising.   
In the next instance, however, from the Summa Theologiae, other specific 
activities which accompany the religious life are identified as spiritual exercises.  This is 
perhaps a less studied aspect of Thomas, but one that is central to his own way of life.  
He includes activities which fall under the vows of the religious state that aid in the 
avoidance of sin and increase in charity: 
As was shown above (II-II.188.1), the religious state is a spiritual schooling 
(spirituale exercitium) for the attainment of the perfection of charity.  This is 
accomplished through the removal of the obstacles to perfect charity by religious 
observances; and these obstacles are those things which attach man’s affections to 
earthly things.  Now the attachment of man’s affections to earthly things is not 
only an obstacle to the perfection of charity, but sometimes leads to the loss of 
charity, when through turning inordinately to temporal goods man turns away 
from the immutable good by sinning mortally.  Hence it is evident that the 
observances of the religious state, while removing the obstacles to perfect charity, 
remove also the occasions of sin: for instance, it is clear that fasting, watching, 
obedience, and the like withdraw man from sins of gluttony and lust and all other 
manner of sins. 
Consequently it is right that not only those who are practiced (exercitati) in the 
observance of the commandments should enter religion in order to attain to yet 
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greater perfection, but also those who are not practiced (exercitati), in order the 
more easily to avoid sin and attain to perfection.114 
The passage above, in its description of the religious state as a “spirituale exercitium” 
provides the main point of interest for this dissertation.  It is in the context of the religious 
state and in describing religious observances that Thomas is most vocal about the role of 
spiritual exercises.  Explaining the work of the religious orders and Thomas’s explanation 
of the vows will provide the main subject matter for the third chapter of this dissertation. 
Thomas also will refer to certain outward physical actions as a spiritual exercise.  
In this instance, Thomas describes the practice of kneeling in prayer as a “spiritual 
exercise” for the inner soul: 
This is a symbol of humility for two reasons.  First, a man belittles himself, in a 
certain way, when he genuflects, and he subjects himself to the one he genuflects 
before.  In such a way he recognizes his own weakness and insignificance.  
Secondly, physical strength is present in the knees; in bending them a man 
confesses openly to his lack of strength.  Thus external physical symbols are 
                                                 
114 ST II-II.189.1 - Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex supra dictis patet, status religionis est quoddam 
spiritual exercitum ad consequendum perfectionem caritatis, quod quidem fit inquantum per religionis 
observantias auferuntur impedimenta perfectae caritatis.  Haec autem sunt quae implicant affectum hominis 
ad terrena.  Per hoc autem quod affectus hominis implicatur ad terrena, non solum impeditur perfectio 
caritatis, sed interdum etiam ipsa caritas perdidtur, dum per inordinatam conversionem ad bona temporalia 
homo avertitur ab incommutabli bono mortaliter peccando.  Unde patet quod religionis observantiae, sicut 
tollunt impedimenta perfectae caritatis, ita etiam tollunt occasiones peccandi, sicut patet quod per ieiunium 
et vigilias et obedientiam et alia huiusmodi, retrahitur homo a peccatis gulae et luxuriae, et a quibuscumque 
aliis peccatis.  Et ideo ingredi religionem non solum expedit his qui sunt exercitati in praeceptis, ut ad 




shown to God for the purpose of renewing and spiritually training (exercitium 
spirituale) the inner soul.115 
And finally, in an explanation of the purpose of baptism116: 
Secondly, this is suitable for our spiritual training (spirituale exercitium): namely, 
in order that, by fighting against concupiscence and other defects to which he is 
subject, man may receive the crown of victory.  Wherefore on Romans 6:6, “that 
the body of sin may be destroyed,” a gloss says: “If a man after baptism live in the 
flesh, he has concupiscence to fight against, and to conquer by God’s help.”117 
These references, taken together, provide the scope of spiritual exercises in Thomas, 
which is admittedly rather broad.  They cover the full range of the moral and intellectual 
virtues, and also, by implication, have an impact on the reception and preservation of the 
theological virtues.  In covering Thomas’s use of the term “spiritual exercises,” it is 
important to note that the full range of spiritual exercises suggested by Thomas is not 
limited to those areas where he explicitly identifies an activity as an “exercise.”  Instead, 
the supposition is that as Thomas uses the term generally, and thus any exercise for 
developing virtue, disposing one to relationship with God, or for preventing the 
enactment of sinful habits found in Thomas can be considered a “spiritual exercise.”  
                                                 
115 Commentary on Ephesians 3:14 [#166] - Quod est signum humilitatis propter duo.  Primo quia qui 
genua flectit, quodam modo parvificat se, et subiicit se ei, cui genua flectit: unde per huiusmodi ostenditur 
recognitio propriae fragilitatis et parvitatis.  Secundo quia in genu est fortitude corporis.  Quando ergo quis 
genua flectit, protestatur debilitatem suae virtutis.  Et inde est, quod exterior signa corporalia exhibentur 
Deo ad conversionem, et exercitium spirituale animae interioris. 
116 The role of the sacraments in increasing moral capability and progressing in the spiritual life is central to 
Thomas’s work.  It is, unfortunately, outside of the direct subject matter of this work, however, so will be 
not treated in sufficient detail.   
117 ST III.69.3 - Secundo, hoc est conveniens propter spirituale exercitium, ut videlicet contra 
concupiscentiam et alias passibilitates pugnans homo victoriae coronam acciperet.  Unde super illud Rom 
VI, ut destruatur corpus peccati, dicit Glossa, si post baptismum vixerit homo in carne, habet 




 The spiritual exercises that Thomas describes bear a close resemblance to those 
offered by earlier thinkers.  Hadot, citing listings offered by Philo Judaeus, Galen, and 
others includes research, thorough investigation, reading, listening, attention (prosoche), 
self-mastery, indifference to indifferent things, meditations, therapies of the passions, 
remembrance of good things, and the accomplishment of duties.118  Hadot further divides 
spiritual exercises into four categories: 1. Attention 2. Meditations 3. Intellectual 4. 
Practical.  Each of these four categories is found in Aquinas, albeit at times in different 
ways than in ancient thinkers.   
The category of attention as a spiritual exercise is certainly present in Aquinas, 
and will be described in more detail in the next chapter on reflexivity, and in the fourth 
chapter in the discussion of prudence and other virtues.  The concept of attention as a 
spiritual exercise is grounded in the Delphic maxim, “know thyself.”  As Hadot writes:  
“Although it is difficult to be sure of the original meaning of this formula [“know 
thyself”], this much is clear; it invites us to establish a relationship of the self to the self, 
which constitutes the foundation of every spiritual exercise.”119  For Thomas, attention 
takes the form of solicitude, a part of the virtue of prudence, whereby one is called to 
awareness of one’s activities and vigilance against being led astray.  Attention, likewise, 
is seen as the essential orientation of the human, in that a person inclined to behave 
morally must consider their self, and determine how to direct their behavior in an 
appropriate and reasonable manner.  Without this first turn to self-awareness, a person is 
not capable of “human” action, according to Thomas.   
                                                 
118 Philosophy as Way of Life 84 
119 Ibid., 90 
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 Meditations are also found in Aquinas.  One repeated example is the encouragement, 
taken from the Psalms and elsewhere, to meditate on all of God’s works.120  Another is 
found in the virtue of prudence; memory is one of its quasi-integral parts, the aspects of a 
virtue required for its perfection.  Thomas cites Aristotle in the question of “whether a 
habit can be caused by one act.”  Thomas writes: “But with regard to the lower 
apprehensive powers, the same acts need to be repeated many times for anything to be 
firmly impressed on the memory.  And so the Philosopher says (De memor. et remin. 1) 
that ‘meditation strengthens memory.’”121  In another instance, Thomas describes how 
our consistent and repeated reflection on prior experiences keeps them fresh in our mind, 
and thus able to serve us in future moral consideration.122  Another of the key areas of 
meditation for Aquinas is meditation on the scriptures, something which he repeatedly 
encourages his readers and students to undertake.   
 This leads to a discussion of the third category, the intellectual exercises.  As Hadot 
writes, “the exercises of meditation and memorization require nourishment. This is where 
the more specifically intellectual exercises...come in.”123  For Aquinas, nourishment 
comes from academic work, from the reading of the scriptures and works of theology.  
Thus, the intellectual practices for Aquinas are legion.  It is possible to understand the 
entirety of Thomas’s corpus as representing a form of spiritual exercise, in particular the 
Summa Theologiae.124  The ability to think in disputational form, to engage in the 
                                                 
120 SCG II.1.6 
121 ST I-II.51.3 
122 ST II-II.49.1 ad 2 
123 Philosophy as a Way of Life 86 
124 For a discussion of disputatio/quaestio as an “intellectual exercise,” see Philip W. Rosemann, 
Understanding Scholastic Thought with Foucault, especially chapter 3, “Scholastic Intellectual Practices.” 
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methodology of the quaestiones, requires that a person be able to produce both the 
argument and the counterargument to any given question.  Given the Dominican order’s 
role in preaching against heresies, this format is intuitive.  Furthermore, the study of 
scriptures and theology gives students resources for meditation and contemplation. 
 Practical exercises are described by Hadot as “those intended to create habits,” and he 
cites as examples the practice of indifference to indifferent things and freeing oneself 
from the control of the passions.125  These exercises are of particular importance to the 
religious life for Thomas, and each of the vows can be understood as a practical exercise.  
Poverty frees our affections from material things, chastity frees our affections from other 
humans, and obedience frees our affections from ourselves.  With our affections 
withdrawn from earthly things, it is possible to devote them fully to our affection for 
God, and then according to the order of charity, our souls, our neighbors, our bodies.  
Each of the vows, and the practices that accompany them, will be discussed in the third 
chapter.  Practical exercises are also seen in the moral virtues; though Thomas does not 
accept the extirpation of the passions as described by the Stoics, he does prioritize the 
role of reason in rightly ordering both our actions and our passions.  The ordering of the 
passions by reason is another exercise of great importance to Aquinas. 
 Taken together, these exercises form the askesis of Aquinas.  Not to be confused with 
asceticism, an askesis is simply the set of exercises offered by a certain thinker, 
philosophy, or school.  Each askesis is different and reflects the theological or 
philosophical tenets of the different groups they belong to.  Aquinas’s askesis, to speak in 
general terms, is more intellectually oriented than the Stoics or Epicureans, for example, 




in that there is a greater emphasis in his work on the full understanding of Christian 
theology.  It also, however, contains many of the same practical exercises and 
components as these earlier philosophies, an aspect of his work which is significantly 
underappreciated.   
The spiritual exercises of Thomas Aquinas, therefore, include practices associated 
with the sciences, such as reading, study, and contemplation, while also including 
practices related to the observation of the moral virtues in general, and the virtue of 
religion in particular.  The goal of spiritual exercises is identified by Thomas as 
perfection in charity, though these spiritual exercises are not a means but instead a way of 
creating an opportunity for the infusion of charity to occur and be preserved.  It is 
possible to suggest that there are two main types of spiritual exercises for Thomas among 
the four categories described above (attention, meditations, intellectual, practical), though 
there is often overlap between them.  These are as follows:  
1. Spiritual exercises for the preservation or improvement of reason.  
2. Spiritual exercises concerning the will. 
Spiritual exercises for the preservation or improvement of the reason 
As for the first variety, these exercises are committed towards the human’s 
reason, specifically towards preserving it from undue influence from the passions, 
external attachments, ignorance, or irrational action.  This first variety is actually the 
primary purpose of most spiritual exercises, and is a point of emphasis in Martha 
Nussbaum’s treatment of ancient thought, as mentioned previously in the Introduction.  
In fact, one could argue that these exercises are in fact one of the original philosophical 
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exercises.  Hadot suggests that this exercise finds its origin in Plato, and in particular 
from the Phaedo:  
We can perhaps get a better idea of this spiritual exercise126 if we understand it as 
an attempt to liberate ourselves from a partial passionate point of view—linked to 
the sense and the body—so as to rise to the universal normative viewpoint of 
thought submitting ourselves to the demands of the Logos and the norm of the 
Good.127 
While it is rightly stated that Aquinas has a more favorable view of the body than 
traditional Platonism, the principle is still quite similar.  Reason, in the moral person, is 
the “first principle of all human acts,”128 even of the person living in grace, and without 
reason functioning at the behest of itself and not the passions, a person cannot be moral.  
For this reason, Aquinas is particularly interested in exercises that preserve or increase 
the rational ability of a person.   
In order for a person to act morally, one must have their reason in the position of 
governance over the soul and its desires.  For Aquinas, this is embodied in the virtue of 
prudence, which is best described as “right reason about things to be done.”  
Furthermore, the primary activity of prudence is directing the human person in moral 
action.  Thomas writes: 
                                                 
126 The spiritual exercise of “separating the soul from the body.”  As Hadot notes, this exercise is ripe for 
misinterpretation, and does not refer to any achievement of “trance or catalepsy,” but instead refers to 
separating the mind from the inputs of the body in order to be able to reason clearly. 
127 Philosophy as a Way of Life 94.  “...all the arguments in the Phaedo...show the goal of this philosophical 
separation is for the soul to liberate itself, shedding the passions linked to the corporeal sense so as to attain 
the autonomy of thought.” 




But the practical reason, which is directed to action, goes further, and its third act 
is “to command,” which act consists in applying to action the things counseled 
and judged [actions one and two].  And since this act approaches nearer to the end 
of the practical reason, it follows that it is the chief act of the practical reason, and 
consequently of prudence.”129 
For Aquinas, prudence is foundational for moral virtue, in that “Moral virtue cannot be 
without prudence, because it is a habit of choosing, i.e. making us choose well.”130  
Without the intellectual aspect of virtue, even if a person possesses the other moral 
virtues in their underdeveloped form, a person cannot achieve the perfection of virtue.  
This is because a person who does not study or exercise their rational faculty in any way 
will encounter difficulties in choosing correctly the proper action to take.131 
 One of the main tasks in developing the faculty of reason is found in preserving it 
from the undue influence of the passions.  Contemporary discussions of the passions are 
rather contentious, and scholarship on Aquinas and the passions offers some rather 
different conclusions.  One conclusion of this work, however, which is important to 
repeat, is that Aquinas does have a favorable view of certain passions, and does not 
adhere to a “Kantian” understanding of the need for all rational thought to be separated 
from emotion.   
                                                 
129 ST II-II 47.8 
130 ST I-II 58.4 
131 Though one should always follow the dictates of their conscience, Thomas does believe that a person 
should take due measure to provide the rational faculty with knowledge and to be exercised in making the 
correct decision.   
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 A passion is a “movement of the sensitive appetite,” and considered in itself, it is 
morally ambiguous.132  Passions, however, become referable to “good or evil” depending 
on whether they are in accord or disaccord with reason.133  There are eleven passions 
identified by Aquinas, each with a different aspect of concern.  Paul Gondreau, citing, the 
French edition of the Summa, offers this listing: 
The concupiscible passions 
The good object that is suitable to me: this is love or like 
It attracts me: this is desire 
I possess it: this is pleasure or joy 
The evil object that is not suitable to me: this is hatred or dislike 
It repulses me: this is aversion 
I am succumbing to it: this is sorrow 
The irascible passions 
The good object is difficult but possible to attain: this is hope 
It is Impossible to attain: this is despair 
The evil object is threatening me but possible to avoid: this is courage 
It is impossible to avoid: this is fear 
It is here, against me: this is anger. 
 
In one passage which is remarkable for its clarity on this matter, Thomas writes: “The 
passions of the soul, in so far as they are contrary to the order of reason, incline us to sin: 
but in so far as they are controlled by reason, they pertain to virtue.”134  It is possible, 
therefore, to identify two distinct classes of passions: affections, which are good passions, 
and passions, understood negatively.  This distinction is present in Thomas’s own work 
on the subject, especially the negative use of the term “passion.”135  It is important to note 
                                                 
132 ST I-II.59.1 
133 Ibid. 
134 ST I-II 24.2 ad 3 - Ad tertium dicendum quod passions animae, inquantum sunt praeter ordinem rationis, 
inclinant ad peccatum, inquantum autem sunt ordinatae a ratione, pertinent ad virtutem. 
135 See Gondreau on “defect,” The passions of Christ’s Soul in the Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas.  pp. 
220ff. referring to ST I-II.41.1 “Properly speaking, passion is a movement of an appetitive power that uses 
a bodily organ to produce a modification.  Most properly those movements are called passions that imply 
some harm or evil.” Proprie dicitur passio motus appetitivae virtutis habentis organum corporale, qui fit 
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that in identifying these two categories, the above principle holds; a passion is good when 
it proceeds from reason, and does not impinge the activities of the rational faculty.  A 
passion is bad when it does not proceed from reason, and it moves out of the sensitive 
appetite into the rational faculty, altering one’s reason.   
That Aquinas believes the ideal for humans is to have these sorts of passions 
proceed from the judgment of reason is best affirmed in his discussion of the passions of 
Christ’s soul.  As Gondreau notes, “Because most scholarly studies on human affectivity 
in the thought of Thomas Aquinas have ignored the role of passion in Christ’s humanity, 
the notion of passion as defect has all but eluded the attention of Thomist scholars.”136  In 
fact, the discussion of passions in Christ is entitled “The defects of soul assumed by 
Christ.”137  The defects as identified include sin, the “fomes” of sin, ignorance, and for 
passions, pain, sorrow, fear, wonder, anger, with Thomas asking in what way Christ 
experienced these.  He acknowledges first that the passions are in Christ differently than 
they are in humans.  The differences result not from Christ being a different sort of 
                                                                                                                                                             
cum aliqua transmutatione corporali; et adhuc propriissime illi motus passiones dicuntur qui important 
aliquod nocumentum. 
   136 Gondreau 220 – This is especially important to mention, as it renders many accounts of the passions in 
Thomas Aquinas inadequate.  This is true of the work of Diana Fritz Cates, whose work has become the 
standard interpretation of Aquinas on the emotions in recent years.  While her work makes many great 
strides in improving our understanding of the emotions in Aquinas, it does not discuss the passions as they 
appear in Christ, and provides only a brief discussion of the passions as hindrances.  As my dissertation 
suggests, these are not minor points in Thomas Aquinas: if Christ is the prime exemplar, and we become 
Christ-like through grace, then a description of the ideal forms of emotion ought to include a description of 
the emotions as Jesus experienced them.  Furthermore, Cates overlooks the entirety of the religious life as 
described by Thomas, including those areas which suggest a slightly more combative view towards the 
passions than that suggested by Cates.  This oversight leads me to argue for the priority of Gondreau’s 
treatment, which discusses these issues in greater detail.  See Cates, Diana Fritz. 2009. Aquinas on the 
Emotions: A Religious-Ethical Inquiry. Moral Traditions Series. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University 
Press.  See also, Miner, Robert C. 2009. Thomas Aquinas on the Passions: A Study of Summa Theologiae : 
1a2ae 22-48. Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press.  Lombardo, Nicholas E. 2011. The 
Logic of Desire: Aquinas on Emotion. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press. 
137 ST III.15 
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human, but because Christ possessed the fullness of grace, as well as a special gift.138  Of 
the three ways in which the passions are in Christ differently than us, Thomas writes: 
First, as regards the object, since in us these passions very often tend towards 
what is unlawful, but not so in Christ.  Secondly, as regards the principle, since 
these passions in us frequently forestall the judgment of reason; but in Christ all 
movements of the sensitive appetite sprang from the disposition of the 
reason....Thirdly as regards the effect, because in us these movements, at times, 
do not remain in the sensitive appetite, but deflect the reason; but not so in Christ, 
since by His disposition the movements that are naturally becoming to human 
flesh so remained in the sensitive appetite that the reason was no wise hindered in 
doing what was right.139 
In this discussion of the passions, Thomas is far more vocal on the susceptibility of the 
human than at any point in his earlier questions in the secunda pars.  Our passions tend to 
be 1. Wrongly directed 2. Do not proceed from the judgment of reason 3. Move from the 
sensitive appetite into the reason, affecting its operation.  In Christ, however, who is cited 
by Thomas as being the moral exemplar of humans, as will be discussed in detail below, 
these passions exist mainly as “propassions.”  Thomas writes of the passion of sorrow in 
Christ: 
                                                 
138 The gift of the “conservation of powers.” 
139 III.15.4 - Primo quidem, quantum ad obiectum.  Quia in nobis plerumque huiusmodi passions feruntur 
ad illicita, quod in Christo non fuit.  Secundo, quantum ad principium.  Quia huiusmodi passions frequenter 
in nobis praeveniunt iudicium rationis, sed in Christo omnes motus sensitive appetites oriebantur secundum 
dispositionem rationis….Tertio, quantum ad affectum.  Quia in nobis quandoque huiusmodi motus non 
sistunt in appetitu sensitive, sed trahunt rationem.  Quod in Christo non fuit, quia motus naturaliter 
humanae carni convenientes sic ex eius dispositione in appetitu sensitive manebant quod ratio ex his nullo 
modo impediebatur facere quae conveniebant. 
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Now what is virtuous is man’s chief good, and what is sinful is man’s chief evil, 
since these pertain to reason which is supreme in man, yet there are certain 
secondary goods of man, which pertain to the body or to the exterior things that 
minister to the body.  And hence in the soul of the wise man there may be sorrow 
in the sensitive appetite by his apprehending these evils; without this sorrow 
disturbing the reason.  And in this way we are to understand that “whatsoever 
shall befall the just man, it shall not make him sad,” because his reason is troubled 
by no misfortune.  And thus, Christ’s sorrow was a propassion, and not a 
passion.140 
In this instance, Thomas is using the Stoic distinction between passions and propassions, 
where a passion is understood as a movement of the sensitive appetite that impinges upon 
the activity of reason.  A propassion, therefore, would have all of the bodily signs 
associated with a passion, and is felt in the sensitive appetite, but the feeling proceeds 
from a rational judgment and does not impede any future rational judgment.  Thomas’s 
goal in affirming that Christ only felt propassions is an effort to do two things: 1. 
Preserve Christ’s sinlessness 2. Allow Christ to experience pain.  As he affirmed above, 
when a passion is not ordered to reason it inclines to sinful behavior.141  And yet, given 
that Christ is without sin, his reason must have rightly ordered his passions at all times.  
                                                 
140 III.15.6 ad 2 - Quod est signum humilitatis propter duo.  Primo quia qui genua flectit, quodam modo 
parvificat se, et quamvis autem honestum sit principale hominis bonum, et inhonestum principale hominis 
malum, quia haec pertinent ad ipsam rationem, quae est principalis in homine; sunt tamen quaedam 
secundaria hominis bona, quae pertinent ad ipsum corpus, vel ad exteriors res corpora deservientes.  Et 
secundum hoc, potest in animo sapientis esse tristitia, quantum ad appetitum sensitivum, secundum 
apprehensionem huiusmodi malorum, non tamen ita quod ista tristitia perturbed rationem.  Et secundum 
hoc etiam intelligitur quod non contristabit iustum quidquid ei acciderit, quia ex scilicet ex nullo accidente 
eius ratio perturbatur.  Et secundum hoc tristitia fuit in Christo, secundum propassionem, non secundum 
passionem. 
141 ST I-II 24.2 ad 3 
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At the same time, however, Christ must be able to experience pain and sorrow in the 
crucifixion, else the crucifixion loses its effect on humanity.142 
 One final point is important to make concerning the passions of Christ, and this is the 
“control of the Divine power.”  Thomas explains: 
In us, the natural order is that the soul’s powers mutually impede each other, i.e. if 
the operation of one power is intense, the operation of the other is weakened.  
This is the reason why any movement whatsoever of anger, even if it be tempered 
by reason, dims the mind’s eye of him who contemplates.  But in Christ, by 
control of the Divine power, “every faculty was allowed to do what was proper to 
it,” and one power was not impeded by another.  Hence, as the joy of his mind did 
not impede the sorrow or pain of the inferior part, so, conversely, the passions of 
the inferior part no-wise impeded the act of reason.143 
Due to the special circumstances of Christ, namely his having the fullness of grace, the 
powers of his soul are conserved.  This means, effectively, that Jesus, while suffering on 
the cross, would still be able to learn, meditate, or contemplate.  His pain would not be 
lessened by meditation, nor would his contemplation be affected by pain.  This leads to 
an important conclusion: if Christ is the exemplar of all human behavior, and if in Christ 
all passions “sprang from the disposition of reason,”144 then it appears true that humans 
                                                 
142 ST III.15.5 ad 1 
143 ST III.15.9 ad 3 - Ad tertium dicendum quod in nobis, secundum naturalem ordinem, potentiae animae 
mutuo se impediunt, ita scilicet quod, cum unius potentiae operatio fuerit intense, alterius operatio 
debilitetur.  Et ex hoc procedit quod motus irae etiam si sit secundum rationem moderatus, utcumque 
impedit oculum animae contemplantis.  Sed in Christo, per moderationem divinae virtutis, unicuique 
potentiae permittebatur agree quod erat ei proprium, ita quod una potential ex alia non impediebatur.  Et 
ideo, sicut delectation mentis contemplantis non impediebat tristitiam vel dolorem inferioris partis, ita 
etiam e converse passions inferioris partis in nullo impediebant actum rationis.   
144 ST III.15.4 
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should aspire to maintain the control of reason over their passions in the same way as 
Christ. 
Humans, therefore, since they are left with the challenge to imitate Christ as the 
moral exemplar, seem called to maintain reason’s direction over the passions, and ensure 
that all passions are, in Stoic terms, propassions.  In order for us to avoid sinning through 
our having a passion, Aquinas writes that the passion must proceed consequently from 
reason and observe the mean.  This principle can be seen in an extended discussion of the 
history of thought concerning the passions, where Thomas describes first the Stoic 
position, then the Peripatetic, and argues that they do not in fact disagree except for their 
terminology.  He states that the difference “is nevertheless, in reality, none at all, or but 
little, if we consider the intent of either school.”145  At the conclusion of this discussion, 
Thomas appears to affirm the Peripatetic position.  He writes: 
Hence it is evident that Cicero was wrong in disapproving (De Tusc. Quaest. iii, 
4) of the Peripatetic theory of a mean in the passions, when he says that “every 
evil, though moderate, should be shunned...so this mean in the diseases or 
passions of the soul is not sound.”  For passions are not called “diseases” or 
“disturbances” of the soul, save when they are not controlled by reason.146 
Aquinas’s attempt to smooth over the distinction between the Stoics and the Peripatetics 
stems from the differing conception of what a passion is in both schools.  For the Stoics, 
                                                 
145 ST I-II 24.2 - Ex quo patet quod Tullius, in eodem libro, Peripateticorum sententiam, qui approbabant 
mediocritatem passionem, inconvenienter improbat, dicens quod omne malum, etiam mediocre, vitandum 
est, nam sicut corpus, etiamsi mediocriter aegrum est, sanum non est; sic ista mediocritas morborum vel 
passionum animae, sana non est. Non enim passiones dicuntur morbi vel perturbationes animae, nisi cum 




a passion is defined as a movement of the sensitive appetite that impinges or harms 
reason, as opposed to a propassion, which is a passion that does not leave the sensitive 
appetite.  The Peripatetics, on the other hand, use the term “passion” to describe both of 
these things, and condemn those sorts of passions that impinge on the judgment of 
reason.  Thus, in Aquinas’s interpretation, the result is the same; passions that do not 
“deflect” reason are acceptable, and therefore, Thomas approves primarily of 
propassions.   
   The implications of this are interesting for our understanding of the human person.  It 
means that the human may rightly feel the full range of emotions, and, more to the point, 
they in fact should experience these feelings, following the example of Christ.  A person 
may feel anger at injustice or sadness, sorrow after experiencing an evil action, and 
wonder at learning something incredible.  Those passions, however, must proceed from a 
correct judgment about the matter, and be limited to one’s sensitive appetite.  Human 
feeling is thus affirmed, but in a limited way.  One may feel sad at the death of a loved 
one, but should not feel so sad that it impinges upon one’s thought and action.  The 
feeling should remain a feeling, experienced bodily in the sensitive appetite, but should 
not cause intellectual misjudgments, as something that alters the operation of the mind.   
 An example of this is found in Thomas’s Commentary on First Thessalonians, where 
he writes concerning sorrow for the dead: 
Therefore, he [Paul] forbids them to indulge in inordinate sorrow when he tells 
them, you may not grieve.  It seems, though, that the Apostle views sorrow for the 
dead benignly.  Nevertheless, he cautions them not to grieve overmuch, as others.  
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Someone who grieves for the dead does possess compassion.  A person grieves 
first because of the dissolution of the frail body; for we ought to take care of the 
body for the sake of the soul.  “O death, how bitter is the reminder of you to one 
who lives at peace among his possessions” (Sir. 41:1).  Secondly, a person grieves 
because of the separation and departure which is so painful to friends.  “Surely the 
bitterness of death is past” (1 Sam. 15:32).  Thirdly, we mourn because death 
reminds us of our own sin. “For the wages of sin is death” (Rom. 6:23).  Fourthly, 
because death reminds us of our own death.  “For this is the end of all men, and 
the living will lay it to heart” (Ec. 7:2).  So moderate sorrow is permitted. “Weep 
less bitterly for the dead, for he has attained rest” (Sir. 22:11).147 
Thomas’s interpretation of this letter as approving of “moderate” sorrow follows from his 
writings on the passions.  The concern is not that we avoid all passions; instead, our 
passions should be moderated according to reason and proceed from reason, for which 
Thomas provides the rationale in the four reasons why it is proper to feel ordinate sorrow 
at the death of a loved one.148 
Spiritual exercises for the will 
                                                 
147 Commentary on 1 Thessalonians chapter 4 lecture 2. Translation pp. 35-36 - Prohibentur ergo, ne 
scilicet inordinate tristentur, unde dicit sicut et caeteri.  Videtur autem apostolus bene concedere tristari pro 
mortuis, aliquid tamen prohibere, ne scilicet inordinate tristentur, unde dicit sicut et caeteri.  Quod enim 
aliquis tristetur, scilicet de mortuis, habet pietatem.  Primo propter defectum corporis deficientis.  Debemus 
enim eos diligere, et corpus propter animam.  Eccl. XLI, 1: o mors, quam amara est memoria tua homini 
pacem habenti, et cetera.  Secundo propter dicessum et separationem, quae dolorosa est amicis.  I Reg. XV, 
32: siccine separat amara mors? Tertio quia per mortem fit commemoratio peccati.  Rom. VI, 23: stipendia 
peccati mors.  Quarto quia fit commemoratio mortis nostrae.  Eccle. VII, 3: in illa enim finis cunctorum 
admonetur hominum, et vivens cogitat quid futurum sit, et cetera.  Sic ergo tristandum, sed moderate.  Unde 
Eccli. XXII, 11: modicum plora supra mortuum, quoniam requievit, et cetera. 
148 A comparison between the Phaedo, especially the final scene of Socrates’ death, and the principles 
described here, is rather interesting.  Socrates’ condemns those who cry and lament, sending them away, 
while it is repeatedly acknowledged how sad it is to be separated from a friend.   
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 In this group of exercises, there are three categories.  Unlike the first, the specific 
intent of these exercises is not developing the rational faculty, though reason may play a 
role in this pursuit.  This category of spiritual exercises can be broken into three groups, 
based on the area of concern for the spiritual exercises: 1. Spiritual exercises for growth 
in a certain virtue 2. Avoidance of a certain vice 3. Redirection of the affections.  As for 
the first of this category, growth in a certain virtue, there are several examples that can be 
provided.  In one example cited earlier in this chapter, the practice of kneeling in prayer 
is a spiritual exercise intended to train the person in the virtue of humility.149  By 
kneeling before God, the truth of one’s position before God is instilled and becomes 
habitually known by the individual.  The action is physical; but through awareness of the 
meaning of the action, one may internalize humility before God.  In another example, by 
practicing the connected virtues of justice, e.g. the virtue of religion, one increases the 
habit of justice insofar as religion is an aspect of justice. 
 As for practices related to the avoidance of a specific vice, Thomas provides an 
example in the De Perfectione.  He writes that, as an aid to the preservation of chastity, 
one should avoid the company of women, citing a mistranslation of Sirach 42:12: 
“Behold not everybody’s beauty; and tarry not among women.  For from garments 
cometh a moth, and from a woman the iniquity of man.”150  In itself, spending time in the 
company of women is not, of course, a vice.  But the monk, who knows “his own 
frailty”151 should avoid “gazing at women, and especially at young ones,” in order to 
avoid the vice of lust.  A person who practiced this as an aid to chastity would first have 
                                                 
149 Commentary on Ephesians 3:14 [#166] 




sufficient attention turned to themselves so as to be aware of their vision, and then take 
the necessary action to turn themselves away and distance themselves from any 
accompanying lustful thoughts.   
As noted above, Aquinas affirms certain “passions” as being good and essential 
qualities.  This is certainly the case, and can be clearly seen in Aquinas’s De Perfectione, 
among other places.  In this text, Aquinas teaches how we are called to direct all of our 
affection towards God, such that there is nothing we do actually or habitually that does 
not come out of the love of God.  As Aquinas notes, Augustine and others have identified 
three “good passions:”  “As Augustine says (City of God xiv, 8), “for the three 
passions”—desire, joy and fear—the Stoics held three eupatheias i.e. good passions in 
the soul of the wise man, viz. for desire, will; for joy, delight; for fear, caution.” 152 Of 
these three, Aquinas regularly affirms the importance of desire or will, specifically 
directing it to an appropriate end.  As such, the specific exercises that accompany the 
vows, and the vows themselves, are directed towards our holding proper affections 
according to the order of charity.  The vow of poverty limits our desires for material 
things, the vow of chastity our desire for sex, a wife, or children, while the vow of 
obedience limits our love of ourselves.   
How one acquires these virtues: The Religious Life 
 Given that Thomas is a Dominican friar, it is not surprising that he might recommend 
the religious life.  Thomas is, of course, open to other forms of life, and quite often does 
write with the laity in mind.  It can be argued, as well, that the secunda pars of the 
                                                 
152 ST III.15.6 ad 2 
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Summa Theologiae asks the question of how we should live, and ends with the answer in 
the form of the treatise on the religious orders (II-II.179-189).  As he writes: 
Consequently, it is right that not only those who are practiced in the observance of 
the commandments should enter religion in order to attain yet greater perfection, 
but also those who are not practiced, in order to more easily avoid sin and attain 
to perfection.153 
Everybody, so it seems, should join the religious orders.  Thomas does not argue this 
explicitly, nor would I argue that he necessarily intends that everyone should join a 
religious order; yet he clearly thinks that becoming a religious is one of the surest ways a 
person can show their devotion to God and avoid sin.  This is, in part, a result of 
Thomas’s conviction that humanity is in need of healing from sin, and thus, using a 
metaphor from the early philosophical schools, he writes: 
Now it has been stated that the perfection of charity is the end of the religious 
state.  And the religious state is a school or exercise for the attainment of 
perfection, which men strive to reach by various practices (exercitiis), just as a 
physician may use various remedies in order to heal.154 
This is the end that Thomas’s short work De Perfectione Spiritualis Vitae seeks to 
explain in greater detail, and will be covered in chapter three in greater detail.  In this 
section, I will cover what Thomas says about the religious life in the Summae.   
                                                 
153 ST II-II.189.1 – (Latin cited previously) 
154 ST II-II.186.2 – sicut etiam medicus ad sanandum uti potest diversis medicamentis. – For the use of the 
Physician metaphor in Ancient sources, see Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire, pp.316-319;Foucault, The 
Hermeneutics of the Subject 97-99; 
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 First, Thomas recognizes that there are different varieties of religious orders.  He 
distinguishes them, however, by their ends and by their exercises.  He writes: 
Now there are various works of charity to which a man may devote himself; and 
there are also various kinds of exercise.  Wherefore religious orders may be 
differentiated in two ways.  First, according to the different things to which they 
may be directed: thus one may be directed to the lodging of pilgrims, another to 
visiting or ransoming captives.  Secondly, there may be various religious orders 
according to the diversity of practices; thus in one religious order the body is 
chastised by abstinence in food, in another by the practice of manual labor, 
scantiness of clothes, or the like.155 
In this passage, Thomas hints at the purpose of the exercises, and suggests one of the 
primary roles, namely chastising the body and its desires.  This concept is central to 
understanding the main goal of the religious life for Thomas, namely the orientation of all 
of one’s affections towards God.  He writes: 
At the same time, too, some obstacles to acquiring beatitude are removed from 
man.  For, since the perfect beatitude of man consists in the enjoyment of God 
alone, as shown above, necessarily every man is kept from participation in the 
true beatitude who cleaves as to an end to these things which are less than God.  
                                                 
155 ST II-II.188.1 - Sunt autem diversa caritatis opera quibus homo vacare potest, sunt etiam diversi modi 
exercitiorum.  Et ideo religiones distingui possunt dupliciter.  Uno modo, secundum diversitatem eorum ad 
quae ordinantur, sicut si una religio ordinetur ad peregrinos hospitio suscipiendos, et alia ad visitandos vel 
redimendos captivos.  Alio modo potest esse diversitas religionum secundum diversitatem exercitiorum, 
puta quod in una religione castigatur corpus per abstinentias ciborum, in alia per exercertium operum 
manualium, vel per nuditatem, vel per aliquid aliud huiusmodi. 
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But man was able to be misled into this clinging as to an end to things less than 
God in existence by his ignorance of the worthiness of his nature.156 
The goal of the religious life, and of all human life, for that matter, is to love God to the 
greatest possible extent.  This, Thomas suggests, is made possible in the most 
straightforward manner by the religious life because of the specific exercises it contains.  
The stated goal of Thomas’s exercises serves as a key distinction from some ancient 
sources, while it illustrates a clear connection with others.157  As he explains further in 
the Summa Theologiae: 
As stated above, the religious state is an exercise and a school for attaining to the 
perfection of charity.  For this, it is necessary that a man wholly withdraw his 
affections from worldly things; since Augustine says (Confessions X, 29), 
speaking to God: “Too little doth he love Thee, who loves anything with Thee, 
which he loveth not for Thee.”158 
This is a tremendously difficult standard, but it is one that Thomas will continuously 
repeat, especially in his De Perfectione Spiritualis Vitae, which will be discussed in the 
third chapter.  
                                                 
156 SCG 4.54.3 - Simul etiam per hoc homini auferentur impedimenta beatitudinem adipiscendi.  Cum enim 
perfecta hominis beatitudo in sola Dei fruitione consistat, ut supra ostensum est, necessarium est quod 
quicumque his quae infra Deum sunt inharet finaliter, a verae beatitudinis participatione impediatur. 
157 A close resemblance could be seen between Plato’s Phaedrus (though scholars do not think that Thomas 
had access to this text) for example, in that Thomas is looking for the reorientation of the human’s desires 
towards the highest good. 
158 ST II-II.186.3 - Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, status religionis est quoddam 
exercitium et disciplina per quam pervenitur ad perfectionem caritatis.  Ad quod quidem necessarium eest 
quod aliquis affectum suum totaliter abstrahat a rebus mundanis, dicit enim Augustinus, in X Confess., ad 
Deum loquens, minus te amat qui tecum aliquid amat quod non propter te amat. 
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The challenge of redirecting affections is not an easy one, but Thomas provides 
methods for reaching towards this end.  A bit further on, he explains how the redirection 
of the affections is undertaken: 
This is accomplished through the removal of the obstacles to perfect charity by 
religious observances; and these obstacles are those things which attach man’s 
affections to earthly things.  Now the attachment of man’s affections to earthly 
things is not only an obstacle to the perfection of charity, but sometimes leads to 
the loss of charity, when through turning inordinately to temporal goods man 
turns away from the immutable good by sinning mortally.  Hence it is evident that 
the observances of the religious state, while removing the obstacles to perfect 
charity, remove also the occasions of sin: for instance, it is clear that fasting, 
watching, obedience and the like withdraw man from the sins of gluttony, lust, 
and all other manner of sins.159 
“Religious observances” take a number of forms, referring to any exercises done as part 
of the religious life or through the virtue of religion.  These observances are further 
classified by Thomas, in that most of them fall under the heading of one of the three vows 
taken by members of religious orders.  He writes: 
All other religious observances are directed to the three aforesaid principal vows; 
for if any of them are ordained for the purpose of procuring a livelihood, such as 
                                                 
159 ST II-II.189.1 - …quod quidem  fit inquantum per religionis observantias auferuntur impedimenta 
perfectae caritatis.  Haec autem sunt quae implicant affectum hominis ad terrena.  Per hoc autem quod 
affectus hominis implicatur ad terrena, non solum impeditur perfectio caritatis, sed interdum etiam ipsa 
caritas perditur, dum per inordinatam conversionem ad bona temporalia homo avertitur ab incommutabili 
bono mortaliter peccando.  Unde patet quod religionis observantiae, sicut tollunt impedimenta perfectae 
caritatis, ita etiam tollunt occasiones peccandi, sicut patet quod per ieiunium et vigilias et obedientiam et 
alia huiusmodi, retrahitur homo a peccatis gulae et luxuriae, et a quibuscumque aliis peccatis. 
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labor, questing, and so on, they are to be referred to poverty; for the safeguarding 
of which religious seek a livelihood by these means.  Other observances whereby 
the body is chastised such as watching, fasting, and the like, are directly ordained 
for the observance of the vow of continence.  And such religious observances as 
regard human actions whereby a man is directed to the end of religion, namely the 
love of God and his neighbor (such as reading, prayer, visiting the sick, and the 
like), are comprised under the vow of obedience that applies to the will, which 
directs its actions to the end according to the ordering of another person.160   
In this way, Thomas proceeds with his argument from the general to the specific; the 
good live in a way that seeks beatitude, and all of the religious observances helpful in 
seeking beatitude fall under the three vows of the religious life.  It is important to note 
that Thomas was engaged in a debate over the existence of the religious orders, 
particularly the mendicant orders, and whether or not they should be allowed 
involvement in the universities.161  Thus there is a bit of an edge to his remarks 
concerning the validity of the religious order and the work they do.  He continuously 
refers to the importance of the practices that aid in reaching perfection, as well as to the 
superiority of professed religious life.   
                                                 
160 ST II-II.186.7 ad 2 - Ad secundum dicendum quod omnes aliae religionum observantiae ordinantur ad 
praedicta tria principalia vota.  Nam si qua sunt instituta in religionibus ad procurandum victum, puta labor, 
mendicitias vel alia huiusmodi, referuntur ad paupertatem, ad cuius conservationem religiosi per hos modos 
victum suum procurant.  Alia vero, quibus corpus maceratur, sicut viligiae, ieiunia et si qua sunt huiusmodi, 
directe ordinantur ad votum continentiae observandum.  Si qua vero sunt in religionibus instituta pertinentia 
ad humanos actus quibus aliquis ordinatur ad religionis finem, scilicet ad dilectionem Dei et proximi, puta 
lectio, oratio, visitatio infirmorum, vel si quid aliud est huiusmodi, comprehenduntur sub voto obedientiae, 
quod pertinet ad voluntatem, quae secundum dispositionem alterius suos actus ordinat in finem. 
161 Thomas’s works on the matter include: Contra Impugnantes from ~1255 to his later De Perfectione 
from the early 1270s.   
2-96 
 
 The vows, as Thomas explains them, are particularly oriented towards the 
reorientation of the affections.  The vow of poverty is, of course, directed towards the 
withdrawal of the affections from external goods.  If a person does not own anything 
themselves, they cannot either love them inordinately or be worried about them.  The 
vow of continence is directed towards the withdrawal of the affections from other 
persons, especially women and children, and the accompanying concerns.  Thomas 
writes: 
The religious state requires the removal of whatever hinders man from devoting 
himself entirely to God’s service.  Now the use of sexual union hinders the mind 
from giving itself wholly to the service of God, and this for two reasons.  First, on 
account of its vehement delectation, which by frequent repetition increases 
concupiscence, as also the philosopher observes (NE III, 12): and hence it is that 
the use of venery withdraws the mind from that perfect intentness on tending to 
God...Secondly because it involves man in solicitude for the control of his wife, 
his children, and his temporalities which serve for their upkeep.162   
For the first two vows, the affections must be withdrawn from external things, namely 
material objects and familial relations.  In Thomas’s description of the problematic nature 
of sex, it is noteworthy that he does not describe it as sinful, as perhaps Augustine in his 
less charitable moments might.  Instead, Thomas condemns sex as preventing the mind 
                                                 
162 ST II-II.186.4 - Respondeo dicendum quod ad statum religionis requiritur subtractio eorum per quae 
homo impeditur ne totaliter feratur ad Dei servitium.  Usus autem carnalis copulae retrahit animum ne 
totaliter feratur in Dei servitium, dupliciter.  Uno modo, propter vehementiam delectationis, ex cuius 
frequenti experientia augetur concupiscentia, ut etiam philosophus dicit, in III Ethic.  Alio modo, propter 
sollicitudinem quam ingerit homini de gubernatione uxoris et filiorum, et rerum temporalium quae ad 
eorum sustentationem sufficient. 
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from tending to God properly, both by distracting through concupiscence and from worry 
over wife and child.   
The third vow, obedience, would seem to be less clearly connected with 
something external, but there is a sense in which the vow of obedience still relates to 
something which is properly external.  This is more clearly explicated in the De 
Perfectione, with its discussion of obedience as self-abandonment, but is also suggested 
in the Summa Theologiae.  In speaking of whatever hinders the affections from being 
directed to God, Thomas writes: 
Such hindrances are of three kinds.  First, the attachment to external goods, which 
is removed by the vow of poverty; secondly, the concupiscence of sensible 
pleasures, chief among which are venereal pleasures, and these are removed by 
the vow of continence; thirdly, the inordinateness of the human will, and this is 
removed by the vow of obedience.163 
The external thing identified by Thomas is the “inordinate will,” the part of the soul that 
wills sinfully in contrast to the authority of reason.  Thomas will further identify these 
three vows as the offering of one’s external goods, one’s body, and one’s soul, 
respectively.  The vow of obedience is of particular interest, because in the discussion of 
this vow especially one important form of reflexivity is found in Thomas.  Thomas is 
interested in having us hold our inordinate will as something separate from our “true” 
self.  If the person is successful in this distinction, whenever sinful movements of the will 
                                                 
163 ST II-II.186.7 - Huiusmodi autem sunt tria.  Primo quidem, cupiditas exteriorum bonorum.  Quae tollitur 
per votum paupertatis.  Secundum autem est concupiscentia sensibilium delectationum, inter quas 
praecellunt delectationes venereae.  Quae excluduntur per votum continentiae.  Tertium autem est 
inordinatio voluntatis humanae.  Quae excluditur per votum obedientiae.  Similiter autem sollicitudinis 
saecularis inquietudo praecipue ingeritur homini circa tria. 
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are felt, they can be ignored and dismissed. This, in part, is a product of the mental 
exercise of no longer identifying with the sinful desires one feels.  The issue of reflexivity 
will be discussed in further detail in the next chapter. 
How one acquires these virtues: Contemplation and intellectual growth 
 No description of the spirituality of Aquinas is complete without mentioning its 
intellectual aspect.  This area of Thomas has been well treated previously, however, so I 
will not dwell on it.164  Instead, I will mention three important aspects of Thomas’s 
thought that are informed by an academic orientation, and how these aspects are 
supported by exercises.  As indicated above, Thomas is engaged in debates over the 
religious orders.  Beyond this general debate about their existence, he also argues for the 
validity and relative superiority of the Dominican order in particular.  In one instance, he 
writes: 
Accordingly we must say that the work of the active life is twofold.  One proceeds 
from the fullness of contemplation, such as teaching and preaching....And this 
work is more excellent than simple contemplation.  For even as it is better to 
enlighten than merely to shine, so is it better to give to others the fruits of one’s 
contemplation than merely to contemplate.165  
Thomas’s response clearly aligns with the goals of the Dominican order, namely to teach 
and to preach, in distinction from other orders.  Answers like this one explain why 
                                                 
164 See Mulchahey, Emery, Ryan (Fainche), some Thomist articles, and so on. 
165 ST II-II.188.6 – see also ST III.40.1 ad 2: As stated in the II-II.182.1 and 188.6, the contemplative life 
is, absolutely speaking, more perfect than the active life, because the latter is taken up with bodily actions: 
yet that form of active life in which a man, by preaching and teaching, delivers to others the fruits of his 
contemplation, is more perfect than the life that stops at contemplation, because such a life is built on an 
abundance of contemplation, and consequently such was the life chosen by Christ. 
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Thomas was so insistent in his refusal to join the Benedictine order in favor of the 
Dominicans; his choice was not incidental, but a reflection of his understanding of the 
ideal form of life.   
 Though Thomas accepts the importance of the active life, the contemplative life is 
still one of the main goals of human existence.  For one, the contemplative life is bound 
to his understanding of happiness, about which he writes “Consequently, for perfect 
happiness the intellect needs to reach the very Essence of the First Cause.  And thus it 
will have perfection through union with God as with that object, in which alone man’s 
happiness consists.”166  This definition restricts perfect happiness to after death, but 
Thomas will suggest that some “participation” in perfect happiness is possible in this life, 
and this is found in the activity of divine contemplation.167   
 In order for a person to be accomplished as a teacher and preacher, one must be 
exercised in study and practiced in contemplation.  This is not an easy task, as Thomas 
will repeatedly explain, and requires an extended time period for one to become 
proficient.  As Thomas writes in a question on symbols and faith: 
The truth of faith is contained in Holy Writ, diffusely, under various modes of 
expression, and sometimes obscurely, so that, in order to gather the truth of faith 
from Holy Writ, one needs long study and practice, which are unattainable by all 
                                                 
166 ST I-II.3.8 - Ad perfectam igitur beatitudinem requiritur quod intellectus pertingat ad ipsam essentiam 
primae cause.  Et sic perfectionem suam habebit per unionem ad Deum sicut ad obiectum, in quo solo 
beatitudo hominis consistit, ut supra dictum est. 
167 ST II-II.5.3 
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those who are required to know the truth of faith, many of whom have no time for 
study, being busy with other affairs.168 
For Thomas, this justifies the use of symbols in teaching the truths of the faith, but more 
importantly, explains the process of formation for those who do have the time to learn 
directly from scripture.  It is clear that Thomas and the Dominican order as a whole were 
experimenting with different didactic methods, trying to find a more effective and less 
confusing pedagogy than Peter Lombard’s Sentences.169  Further, this study is not simply 
for the sake of increasing knowledge, but as Mark Jordan notes, serves a double goal:   
Thomas begins the Roman Lectura by announcing that teaching is governed by a 
double intention, the demonstration of truth and the acquisition of blessedness.  
Every other science is typed to one half or another of this intention.  Some seek 
only the cognition of truth, while others seek the means to blessedness.  Only 
theology “completely contains and teaches” both the speculative and the 
practical.170 
For Thomas, the study of scripture and of God does not contain discrete areas of concern.  
Instead, the process of studying is a matter of moral formation, and moral formation is a 
prerequisite to the increase of knowledge.   
                                                 
168 ST II-II.1.9 ad 1 - Ad primum ergo dicendum quod veritas fidei in sacra Scriptura diffuse continetur et 
variis modis, et in quibusdam obscure; ita quod ad eliciendum fidei veritatem ex sacra Scriptura requiritur 
longum studium et exercitium, ad quod non possunt pervenire omnes illi quibus necessarium est 
cognoscere fidei veritatem, quorum plerique, aliis negotiis occupati, studio vacare non possunt.   
169 Cf. discussion of this topic in Mulchahey and Jordan. 
170 Rewritten Theology 123 
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 Thus Thomas does maintain the priority of the practice of contemplation, as both the 
goal, and in the Aristotelian sense, the activity that is most divine for humans.  As he 
writes in the Summa Contra Gentiles: 
If then the final happiness of man does not consist in those exterior advantages 
which are called goods of fortune, nor in goods of the body, nor in goods of the 
soul in its sentient part, nor in the intellectual part in respect of the moral virtues, 
nor in the virtues of the practical intellect, called art and prudence, it remains that 
final happiness of man consists in the contemplation of truth.  This act alone in 
man is proper to him, and is in no way shared by any other being in this world.171 
Contemplation of the divine is also the product of our love for God, the increase of 
which, as has been explained, is the purpose of the spiritual life.  As Thomas writes, “We 
are urged to the vision of the first principle, namely God, by the love thereof; wherefore 
Gregory says (Homily 14 in Ezekiel) that ‘the contemplative life tramples on all cares and 
longs to see the face of its creator.’”172  This is, in fact, the way Thomas opens his 
Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard: “All those who think rightly recognize 
that the end of life is found in the contemplation of God.”173 The practice of 
contemplation, however, is not simply a matter of thinking.  Instead, it requires a great 
deal of preparation, not only in study and intellectual exercise, but also exercise in the 
moral life.  Thomas writes: 
                                                 
171 SCG 3.37.1 - Si igitur ultima felicitas hominis non consistit in exterioribus, quae dicuntur bona fortunae; 
neque in bonis corporis; neque in bonis animae quantam ad sensitivam partem; neque quantum ad 
intellectivam secundum actum moralium virtutum; neque secundum intellectuales quae ad actionem 
pertinent, scilicet artem et prudentiam: relinquitur quod ultima hominis felicitas sit in contemplatione 
veritas. 
172 ST II-II 180.1 ad 2 
173 Qtd. in Torrell, Christ and Spirituality, 7 
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I answer that, the active life may be considered from two points of view.  First, as 
regards the attention to and practice of external works: and thus it is evident that 
the active life hinders the contemplative, in so far as it is impossible for one to be 
busy with external action, and at the same time give oneself to Divine 
contemplation.  Secondly, the active life may be considered as quieting and 
directing the internal passions of the soul; and from this point of view the active 
life is a help to the contemplative, since the latter is hindered by the 
inordinateness of the internal passions.  Hence Gregory says (Moralia vi, 37): 
“Those who wish to hold the fortress of contemplation must first of all train in the 
camp of action.  Thus after careful study they will learn whether they no longer 
wrong their neighbor, whether they bear with equanimity the wrongs their 
neighbors do to them, whether their soul is neither overcome with joy in the 
presence of temporal goods, nor cast down with too great a sorrow when those 
goods are withdrawn.  On this way they will know when they withdraw within 
themselves, in order to explore spiritual things, whether they no longer carry with 
them the shadows of things corporeal, or, if they follow them, whether they 
prudently drive them away.”174   
                                                 
174 ST II-II.182.3 - Respondeo dicendum quod vita activa potest considerari quantum ad duo.  Uno modo, 
quantum ad ipsum studium et exercitium exteriorum actionum.  Et six manifestum est quod vita activa 
impedit contemplativam, inquantum impossibile est quod aliquis simul occupetur circa exteriores actiones, 
et divinae contemplationi vacet.  Alio modo potest considerari vita activa quantum ad hoc quod interiores 
animae passiones componit et ordinat.  Et quantum ad hoc, vita activa adiuvat ad contemplationem quae 
impeditur per inordinationem interiorum passionum.  Unde Gregorius dicit, in VI Moral., cum 
contemplationis arcem aliqui tenere desiderant, prius se in campo per exercitium operis probent, ut 
sollicite sciant si nulla iam mala proximis irrogant, si irrogata a proximis aequanimiter portant, si obiectis 
bonis temporalibus nequaquam mens laetitia solvitur, si subtractis non nimio maerore sauciantur.  Ac 
deinde perpendant si, cum ad semetipsos introrsus redeunt, in eo quod spiritualia rimantur, nequaquam 
secum rerum corporalium umbras trahunt, vel fortasse tractas manu discretionis abigunt. 
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Hence the work of the active life conduces to the contemplative, by quelling the interior 
passions which give rise to the phantasms whereby contemplation is hindered.   
For Thomas, therefore, there is no contemplative life without a moral active life.  This 
further reinforces the purpose of the religious life and its accompanying vows, in that 
they provide suitable moral preparation for the ordering of the “internal passions,” 
rendering persons capable of contemplation without distraction.  The end goal of 
contemplation of God for the human is thus greatly served by the spiritual exercises that 
Thomas recommends; it is, in fact, impossible to attain to the end Thomas recommends 
without the exercises that accompany and prepare one for the practice of contemplation.   
c) What the ideal person looks like 
Moving on to the third aspect of an ethics of virtue, I will now attempt to provide 
some description of the ideal person for Thomas.  This effort is complicated in that 
Thomas does not provide a summary or description of the ideal person in the form of the 
sage or the philosopher; instead, Thomas gives as the primary exemplar the figure of 
Christ.  He writes, in describing the reasons for Christ’s incarnation: 
Fourthly, with regard to well-doing, in which He set us an example; hence 
Augustine says in a sermon (xxii de Temp.): “Man who might be seen was not to 
be followed; but God was to be followed, Who could not be seen.  And therefore 
God was made man, that He Who might be seen by man and Whom man might 
follow, might be shown to man.”175 
                                                 
175 ST III.1.2 - Quarto, quantum ad rectam operationem, in qua nobis exemplum se praebuit.  Unde 
Augustinus dicit, in quodam sermone de navitate domini, homo sequendus non erat, qui videri poterat, 
Deus sequendus erat, qui videri non poterat.  Ut ergo exhiberetur homini et qui ab homine videretur, et 
quem homo sequeretur, Deus factus est homo. 
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That Aquinas accepts Augustine’s suggestion that “man who might be seen was not to be 
followed” is particularly interesting.  As shown above, the acquisition of virtue is 
accomplished through “words and examples,” as was quoted above.  And yet, as Thomas 
will repeat once more, though humans provide some examples, the primary example is 
still Christ.  He writes: 
Of course, his examples and words of whose goodness we have the more solid 
opinion induce us the more effectively to virtue.  But an infallible opinion of 
goodness about any pure man was never tenable—even the holiest of men, one 
finds, have failed in some things.  Hence it was necessary for man to be solidly 
grounded in virtue to receive from God made human both the teaching and the 
examples of virtue.  For this reason our Lord himself says: “I have given you 
example that as I have done to you do also.”176 
The example of Christ holds priority for another reason: our likeness to God.  For Torrell, 
this is one of the key points of Thomas’s spirituality, and provides the foundation to all of 
Thomas’s work on that subject.  He writes: 
Accordingly, we find in Thomas a doctrine of Christological exemplarity that is 
developed along two lines.  In Christian experience, the most immediately 
accessible is moral exemplarity.  It emphasizes both Christ as the model of virtue 
to be imitated and the human being’s efforts to cooperate with God through the 
grace that he or she has been given....The second reference to Christ as primary 
model is ontological exemplarity.  It lays the stress on the new creature fashioned 
by God in the image of the Image.  This occurs by means of grace: grace comes 
                                                 
176 SCG 4.54.7 – (Latin cited at n.103). 
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from God and hence conforms us to him, but it also reaches through Christ and 
hence is Christo-conforming.177   
To become Christ-like is thus the primary goal of Thomas’s ethics and spirituality.  
Christ is the only trustworthy exemplar, and further, he is the only mediator of God’s 
grace, through which it is possible to become more like God. 
As Torrell and others have suggested, deification is an important concept for 
Thomas.  Though the use of this term is not overabundant, it is found with sufficient 
regularity to affirm that he holds this doctrine.178  More importantly, it underlies the 
entire theological worldview of Thomas.  He writes, again in discussion of the reasons for 
Christ’s incarnation: 
Fifthly, with regard to the full participation of the Divinity, which is the true bliss 
of man and end of human life; and this is bestowed upon us by Christ’s humanity; 
for Augustine says in a sermon (xiii de Temp.): “God was made man, that man 
might be made God.”179 
Augustine there repeats the axiom made famous by Athanasius in his De Incarnatione.  
Though this is perhaps traditionally understood as a theological principle, it in fact 
underlies all of Thomas’s ethics, an intuitive fact given that Thomas did not understand 
ethics, spirituality, and theology to be discrete spheres.  In order to become most like 
God, Thomas identifies a single activity.  He writes: 
                                                 
177 Ibid., 120-121 
178 See Fainche Ryan, Anna Williams, Torrell, et al. 
179 ST III.1.2 - Quinto, quantum ad plenam participationem divinitatis, quae vere est hominis beatitudo, et 
finis humanae vitae.  Et hoc collatum est nobis per Christi humanitatem, dicit enim Augustinus, in quodam 
sermone de Nativ. Domini, factus est Deus homo, ut homo fieret Deus. 
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I answer that, since man is said to be in the image of God by reason of his 
intellectual nature, he is the most perfectly like God according to that in which he 
can best imitate God in his intellectual nature.  Now the intellectual nature 
imitates God chiefly in this, that God understands and loves himself.180 
This twofold activity of understanding and loving God determines the course of human 
activity, and is best exemplified, according to Thomas, in the activity of contemplation.  
Because contemplation is the highest activity, our lives should be ordered towards 
ensuring that contemplation is possible and effective.   
 Though Thomas here commends the contemplative way of life, it is well known that 
Thomas was not a withdrawn quietist.  Instead, as a member of the Dominican order, he 
was committed to sharing the fruits of contemplation with all persons.  In describing the 
perfection of fraternal charity, he writes:  
The third degree consists in enriching our neighbor with such spiritual benefits as 
are supernatural and exceed human reason….Such benefits are instruction in 
divine truth, direction to God, and the spiritual communion of the 
sacraments....He who bestows upon others gifts of this nature practices a singular 
perfection of brotherly love; for it is by means of these gifts that man attains to 
union with his last End, in which consists his highest perfection.181 
                                                 
180 ST I.93.4 - Respondeo dicendum quod, cum homo secundum intellectualem naturam ad imaginem Dei 
esse dicatur, secundum hoc est maxime ad imaginem Dei, secundum quod intellectualis natura Deum 
maxime imitari potest.  Imitatur autem intellectualis natura maxime Deum quantum ad hoc, quod Deus 
seipsum intelligit et amat. 
 
181 De Perfectione 14 - Sunt autem alii qui bona spiritualia et divina supra naturam et rationem existentia 
proximis largiuntur: scilicet doctrinam divinorum, manuductionem ad Deum, et spiritualium 
sacramentorum communicationem…Huiusmodi autem bonorum collatio ad singularem quandam 
2-107 
 
Once more, the exemplar of this form of life is Christ.  Thomas writes: 
As stated in II-II 182.1; II-II 188.6, the contemplative life is, absolutely speaking, 
more perfect than the active life, because the latter is taken up with bodily actions: 
yet that form of active life in which a man, by preaching and teaching, delivers to 
others the fruits of his contemplation is more perfect than the life that stops at 
contemplation, because such a life is built on an abundance of contemplation, and 
consequently such was the life chosen by Christ.182 
The Christ-like, deiform person in this life is therefore one who contemplates and shares 
the fruits of their contemplation, bringing others into a stronger love of God.   
 This characterization of his theology matches well with descriptions of his work as a 
whole.  Take, for example, Thomas F. Ryan’s description of the end product of academic 
formation: “Thomas seeks to produce students who not only preach well but also model a 
wise, prayerful—indeed Christ-like life, a life in which words and actions flow and are 
expressive of a heart aligned with God.”183  As Ryan affirms, and as this chapter has 
hopefully demonstrated, Thomas is concerned with the formation of the whole person, 
from academic to spiritual to moral, and provides exercises which detail this process. 
Conclusion 
 Returning to the opening of this chapter, the stated goal was to provide a description 
of the virtue ethics of Thomas.  To do so, using Hibbs’ description of virtue ethics as a 
                                                                                                                                                             
perfectionem pertinet fraternae dilectionis: quia per haec bona homo ultimo fini coniungitur, in quo summa 
hominis perfectio consistit. 
182 ST III.40.1 ad 2 - Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut in secunda parte dictum est, vita contemplativa 
simpliciter est melior quam activa quae occupatur circa corporales actus, sed vita activa secundum quam 
aliquis praedicando et docendo contemplata aliis tradit, est perfectior quam vita quae solum contemplatur, 
quia talis vita praesupponit abundantiam contemplationis.  Et ideo Christus talem vitam elegit. 
 
183 Ryan, in Psalmos 144 
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frame, a description of the list of virtues, how these virtues are acquired, and what the 
ideal person looks like was provided.  The most important of these areas for Thomas is 
certainly the description of the ideal person.  The identification of the ideal human with 
Jesus sets an elevated goal for those human persons intent on their end in God.  But while 
this is an arduous goal, the provision of grace by God makes it possible, and the 
preservation of grace becomes one of the principal goals of the spiritual life.  In order to 
preserve grace, and increase opportunities for its infusion, one must avoid sin, something 
which is accomplished by living according to the direction of reason in all aspects of 






Chapter 3 - Reflexivity  
 
In this chapter, I will discuss reflexivity in Thomas Aquinas.  The concept of 
reflexivity, the relationship of the self to itself, is a central concern of philosophic and 
theological thinking, mainly because of its role in moral development.  To become a 
moral person, one must first be aware of his or her thoughts, actions, and intentions, such 
that they have the chance to guide them rightly.  In this way, a person “watches” these 
thoughts and actions, creating a relationship of self to self.  As a foundation for this 
chapter, I will discuss the use of this concept, and the use of the Delphic precept “know 
thyself,” in Hadot and Foucault.  I will then proceed to discuss reflexivity in Thomas 
Aquinas, and suggest some of the salient similarities and differences between classical 
thinkers and Aquinas on this matter.   
For Thomas, the relationship of self to self is dependent on the notion of the 
movement of the person towards something, namely increased relationship with God on 
the path to perfection.  This relationship is accomplished through the imitatio Christi, the 
increase of grace, and the ordering of the soul and body according to reason.  The most 
salient example of reflexivity is found in Thomas’s treatment of the passions and 
affections of the soul, which were discussed in the previous chapter.  He suggests that 
within the person, drawing from Pauline language, there is an “old self” and a “new self.”  
The old self is identified with the “flesh,” where flesh does not mean bodily material, but 
rather sin, sinful desires, and disordered affections.  He also will identify the old self with 
the sensitive aspect of the human, at least when that aspect is disordered.  The new self, 
on the other hand, is modeled on Christ, and is identified with the imago dei.  Thus, it is 
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identified with the mind, or the intellectual nature of the human.  There is a relationship, 
therefore, between the imago dei within oneself and the sensitive aspect of the soul with 
its concupiscences and passions.  The movements of this sensitive aspect, furthermore, 
can stand in opposition to the desires or judgments of the mind, creating a sort of internal 
strife within the person.   
Aquinas’s repeated encouragement to put away the old self represents a key 
feature of the reflexive understanding of the self.  Aquinas intends that the human person 
a) be aware of one’s thoughts, passions, and the movements of one’s will b) be able to 
determine whether they are sinful or disordered and c) dismiss them as not being part of 
the new self, which is the aspect of the person one should be committed to.  Furthermore, 
Thomas recommends that we undertake practices that dispose us to holding certain 
affections, and prevent us from having sinful desires.  In this way, it is possible for 
persons to distance themselves from the sinful, unredeemed aspect of themselves, and 
instead turn fully to the aspect being sanctified by grace.   
The relationship of old self to new self is an example of a reflexive self-relation.  
But, it is important to note, that Thomas is not employing a modern notion of “self,” 
where self means the total sum of a person’s actions, thoughts, abilities, and so on.  
Instead, the old self is to be “put away,” meaning that a person should not identify with 
their sinful desires; that is, a person is not identified as these sinful desires, but only as 
truly acting in accordance with their self when acting correctly.  A person should 
consider themselves to be their mind, where the mind is understood as intellect and will, 
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in accordance with reason, this because a person is the image of God; and thus, a person 
is that part of the soul conformed to Christ.   
Thomas also does not recommend “self-knowledge” in the modern sense.  For 
Thomas, habits cannot be known unless they are in act, so there is no call to extended self 
analysis of thoughts, as if those thoughts were constitutive of a “self.”  The human is 
never static in Thomas’s mind; habits are always increasing or decreasing, whether 
through grace or activity, and thus a person changes constantly.  In fact, this person, if 
they are Christian and pursuing an ideal form of life, is in the process of being formed in 
the divine image. 
This chapter is a description of how a person can come to “know thyself” in the 
thought of Thomas Aquinas.  Thomas, as far as I have been able to find, does not use the 
phrase “nosce teipsum” at any point in his work.184  Nonetheless, self-knowledge (in a 
certain sense) is an undeniably important aspect of his thought.  In order to highlight this 
aspect, and in particular the relationship within which the knowledge of self is derived, I 
will highlight some of the spiritual exercises Thomas recommends as a means of 
improving oneself morally.  I will provide a description of the concept of self-knowledge, 
and then of the concept of reflexivity. 
Following this discussion, I will then provide an overview of Foucault’s treatment 
of Christian reflexivity and self-knowledge, in particular discussing his contention that 
Christian self-knowledge bears a close resemblance to modern practices of the self, and 
that they represent, to a certain extent, a divergence from Classical practices.  Foucault 
                                                 
184 Or “scito teipsum,” the title of Abelard’s ethics.  For Abelard, self-knowledge consists in knowing the intention 
behind one’s actions, a point of emphasis which matches with his suggestion that all that matters to God’s judgment 
is our good or bad intention.   
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argues that the Christian is interested in an “objective” knowledge of the self, as well as a 
total self-renunciation resulting from this increase in self-knowledge.  I will argue that, 
for Thomas, Foucault’s description does not apply, and that Thomas can be distinguished 
from those figures that Foucault focused his work on.185   
After the description of Foucault’s work, I will proceed to the question of self-
knowledge and reflexivity in Aquinas.  Answering this question begins with a description 
of the formal question of the soul’s knowledge of itself in Thomas; in particular, I argue 
that Thomas’s description of the soul only being able to know itself as it is in act clashes 
with Foucault’s description of Christian self-knowledge as an examination of “hidden” 
thoughts.186   
Finally, I proceed to a discussion of reflexivity in Thomas Aquinas.  I argue that, 
in Thomas’s description, reflexivity in a moral person is never simply a relationship of 
the self to itself, but rather a relationship of God → person → that person’s thoughts and 
actions → the actions of others. Thomas intends that person be solicitous in watching 
their thoughts and actions and directing them to the proper activity; at the same time, he 
acknowledges the limits of reason in maintaining a constant vigilance, and thus 
encourages persons to chastise their “concupiscences,” and thereby, with the reduction in 
sinful desires, it becomes easier to avoid sin.  Solicitude is accomplished, for one, by 
emphasizing that a human is most their rational nature, and not their sensitive nature, but 
                                                 
185 It is important to note that I do not endorse Foucault’s particular reading of figures from the antique 
period.  A number of studies forthcoming and already extant have suggested there are a number of 
problems with the conclusions Foucault draws.  I am interested in the questions Foucault is asking, and 
asking them about the work of Aquinas, and not endorsing or rejecting Foucault’s reading of those earlier 
texts.  Furthermore, it is unlikely that Foucault would presume his description of antique thinkers to simply 
hold over for those in the medieval period.   
186 Foucault finds this form of reflexivity in an earlier form in figures like John Cassian.  See Foucault’s 
“The Battle for Chastity.” 
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also, by suggesting the importance of holy fear.  Holy fear is the ordinate fear of God, the 
knowledge that God is aware of all our thoughts and actions, and thus we should be 
directing them rightly.  Likewise, solicitude extends beyond the self, in that when 
Thomas encourages us to be solicitous over ourselves, he often encourages us to watch 
our neighbors as well, and to encourage them to avoid sinful behavior. 
And further, returning to one of the main elements of Foucault’s description of 
Christian reflexivity, I argue that Thomas is not interested in an “objective” knowledge of 
the self, or approaching the self for any “hidden” knowledge.  Thomas’s account of 
reflexivity is interested rather in the immediate knowledge and control of present 
activities.  Though contrition for past sins is present in Aquinas, it is not a point of 
emphasis.  Instead, the new man, one reformed in Christ, is one who has put past sins and 
practices behind him, and is instead focused on maintaining the state of perfection he 
finds himself in.  This requires attention to the self and awareness of present activity; but 
it does not require any sort of discovery of hidden desires.  It requires relationship with 
God and due fear of God, and an awareness of the practices of others, but it does not 
encourage any primitive form of psychoanalysis for one’s self or one’s community.  Self-
knowledge is only possible, for Thomas, as the soul is in act, and thus hidden things are 
only known as they are manifested, and thus uncovered, something which does not occur 
by interrogating the self.  Finally, Thomas is not interested in developing a “self” in the 
modern sense of the word.  Thomas is intent on bringing the person closer to the true 
definition of a human person, which, for him, is a person made to the image of God 




Reflection on the gnothi seauton (“know thyself”) is one of the defining features of 
western philosophy.  Pierre Hadot writes, “Although it is difficult to know the original 
meaning of this formula, this much is clear; it invites us to establish a relationship of the 
self to the self, which constitutes the foundation of every spiritual exercise.”187  Although 
the original meaning is perhaps lost, it can likely be agreed that it did not have the range 
of philosophical meanings it came to possess later in its history.  Hadot offers three of 
these philosophical meanings: 
To know oneself means, among other things, to know oneself qua non-sage: that 
is, not as a sophos, but as a philo-sophos, someone on the way toward wisdom.  
Alternatively, it can mean to know oneself in one’s essential being; this entails 
separating that which we are not from that which we are.  Finally, it can mean 
know oneself in one’s true moral state: that is, to examine one’s conscience.188 
As will be shown below, Thomas’s reflexivity includes each of these meanings in the 
form of wayfarer, new self, and the governance of reason.189  The Christian is called to 
know himself as one on the way towards God, i.e. wayfarer, one on the way towards 
perfection.  This means that though a person may be in a state of “perfection,” so long as 
humans remain enfleshed with an earthly body, there is still a chance or even likelihood 
of sin.  Thus, vigilance is required to preserve oneself from sin.  In regards to the second 
                                                 
187 Hadot, Pierre. Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault. Ed. Arnold I. 
Davidson.  Trans. Michael Chase. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1995.  90. 
188 Ibid. 
189 Where “governance” is not understood as “dictatorship.”  That the human is a soul-body composite, and 
that there are reciprocal influences throughout the whole of this composite, is presumed in this dissertation, 
and has been fruitfully discussed elsewhere.  Nonetheless, any practical account of how a human ought to 
act necessarily must emphasize the intellectual aspect, the intellect being the first principal of all human 
actions.   
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part of Hadot’s definition, the person is called to know himself as the new man, and to 
put off the old man, which is accomplished by separating one’s identity190 from the 
concupiscences of the flesh.  This new man is identified with the person of Christ, and 
with increasing in the likeness of God.  Finally, for the third aspect, Thomas will 
emphasize that true human nature is that which accords with reason, and for a person to 
act out of accord with reason is to be controlled by something outside of that person.  To 
act in accord with reason requires the constant vigilance of reason and its ordering of our 
thoughts and actions.  To this end, Thomas describes the importance of watching 
ourselves and being aware of our thoughts and actions, such that it is possible to direct 
them rightly.    
What is Reflexivity? 
 Reflexivity is a broad term that covers self-knowledge, understanding of true self, 
self-examination and knowledge, practices of self-control, abandonment or denial of self, 
and so on; it refers essentially to any instance where a person observes, analyzes, or 
deliberates with an aspect or aspects of their own person.  In Foucault’s lectures The 
Hermeneutics of the Subject, he identifies three major forms of reflexivity, each 
corresponding to a specific period in history.  For Foucault, a central point of distinction 
in the varieties of reflexivity is the difference in the understanding of knowledge and its 
relation to the person.  Beyond their use of knowledge, different forms of reflexivity 
represent different self understandings; each form of reflexivity hinges on an 
                                                 
190 I use the term identity with some hesitation, recognizing that it is not found in Thomas according to this 
usage.  What is meant by the modern usage is not at all foreign to Thomas, however; Aristotle employs the 
concept of “true self” in the Nicomachean Ethics, which Thomas commented on, in that instance to refer to the 
intellect.   
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understanding of what the person’s “true self” is in relation to the universe.  The three 
forms are schematically offered by Foucault as follows:191 
1) Memory – “The subject is modified since in the act of memory, he brings about his 
liberation; his return to his homeland and to his own being.”  In this form of 
reflexivity, the philosopher “remembers” his origins and original location in the 
universe, which provides the grounding for his identity.  It is, of course, identified 
with Plato and Platonic thought, but will also be present in Christian thinkers, though 
in a modified form.  For Christians, what is remembered is not that we were once 
souls that have fallen to earth (though Origen is perhaps an exception), but rather that 
humans were made in the image of God, an image which is now covered over by sin. 
2) Meditation – “This form of reflexivity carries out the test of what one thinks and acts 
as he thinks, with the objective of the subject’s transformation and constitution as...an 
ethical subject of the truth.”  Foucault identifies this form of reflexivity primarily with 
Stoic thinkers, but also as the dominant form of reflexivity throughout the medieval 
period.  Foucault’s characterization of this form is, however, a bit incomplete, in that 
his description emphasizes only the relation of self to self, and not what this 
relationship is fixed or grounded upon.  Thus, by way of example, the Stoic’s 
relationship of self to self does not stop with the self, as if the person were able to 
determine their proper mode of living on their own.  Instead, the person examines 
their self with a view towards incorporating the understandings derived from physics, 
ethics, and logic, and their relation to the divine, thus transforming their manner of 
                                                 
191 Foucault, Michel. The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1981-1982. Ed. 
Frédéric Gros, François Ewald, and Alessandro Fontana. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2005. 460ff.  
3-117 
 
life and their perspective towards reality.  Meditation as a form of reflexivity is quite 
often founded upon a concept of divinization, of becoming like God. 
3) Method – “Method is a form of reflexivity that makes it possible to fix the certainty 
that will serve as a criterion for all possible truth, and which, starting from this fixed 
point will advance from truth to truth up to the organization and systemization of an 
objective knowledge.”  This third form of reflexivity is identified in particular with 
enlightenment thinkers and with Descartes.  Descartes’ cogito ergo sum is understood 
as providing a certain starting point, one which provides a basis for all further 
knowledge.  The self is approached with the goal of deriving a scientific, objective 
understanding of what it is. 
It is important to note that Foucault’s description of the forms of reflexivity is offered by 
him as a sketch or broad outline, and that there is a fair degree of overlap among each of 
these forms in the course of history.   
Despite his hesitance, Foucault is clear that there is a significant rupture between 
the first two and the third.  Most importantly, this distinction lies in the perspective one 
takes to approach the self.  Instead of remembering what one is or examining the actions 
of thoughts of the self for the purpose of moral action, the final form attends to the self as 
an object of knowledge, that is, something to be studied and understood.  When the Stoic 
examines the self and its desires and actions, it is not for the purpose of coming to a 
concrete understanding of the person, such that the sum of human faculties, desires and 
actions constitute a person “me.”  Instead, the Stoic analyzes thoughts, habits, and desires 
for the purpose of becoming a moral person.  The distinction can be seen further in the 
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response to the imperative, “know thyself.”  The Platonist “knows thyself” when they 
remember that they are a soul in the process of returning to the divine, and distinguishes 
this self from those thoughts and actions which do not accord with the true self.  The 
Stoic “knows thyself” when they vigilantly analyze their thoughts and actions to ensure 
that they accord with and proceed from reason.  The “method” thinker “knows thyself” 
when they are able to provide an objective account of the self as an object of knowledge; 
that is, one might say, I am a person who has these desires, has accomplished these 
things, holds this role in society, and is all these things in combination. 
Reflexivity and models of the person 
The distinction between these two types of thinking is essential to understanding both 
reflexivity in pre-modern thinkers in general, and the thought of Aquinas in particular.  
For Aquinas, self-understanding is predicated on the proper understanding of oneself as a 
rational soul made in the image of God, with the possibility, through grace, of recovering 
the original clarity of that image.  Aquinas’s model is not predicated on any form of 
unique self-realization; in fact, self-realization in Aquinas is to realize oneself as a soul 
that desires only God, and a denial of identity with those aspects of the person which 
desire proximate, sinful things. 
 These two models highlight an essential difference in reflexivity from the pre-modern 
to the modern.  In our modern notion of the self, it is possible to speak of the self as 
something entirely independent from outside concerns, that is, a self can only be in 
relationship to itself.  In the pre-modern era, however, there is never truly a place where 
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the self is only in relationship to itself.  For Aquinas, the self is always in relation to the 
world, to other persons, and to God.  As he writes in the Summa Theologiae: 
For the first thing that occurs to a man who has discretion, is to think of himself 
(seipso cogitet), and to direct other things to himself as to their end, since, the end 
is the first thing in the intention.  Therefore, this is the time when man is bound by 
God’s affirmative precept, which the Lord expressed to by saying: “Turn ye to 
Me...and I will turn to you.”192 
In this passage, Aquinas speaks of the moral development of the person.  And the “first 
thing” that occurs to a person once they achieve a sufficient stage of “discretion” is to 
consider the self and direct it suitably.  The proper direction, Aquinas suggests, is that a 
person be directed to God, after which, God will respond in turn.  This is the case, as 
well, for Seneca, as Strozier writes:  
Seneca distinguishes between mind and body, although the animus, the seat of 
reason and judgment, regulates desires and the impulse toward action and thus the 
relation to the world.  Reason and mind constitute the form of human nature, and 
self-reflexivity as well, as the ability of consciousness to see itself in relation the 
world or turned towards its own resources.  The self is placed between itself and 
the world.193 
                                                 
192 ST I-II.89.6 ad 3, with reference to Zechariah 1:3 -- Primum enim quod occurrit homini discretionem 
habenti est quod de seipso cogitet, ad quem alia ordinet sicut ad finem, finis enim est prior in intentione.  Et 
ideo hoc est tempus pro quo obligatur ex Dei praecepto affirmativo, quod dominus dicit, convertimini ad 
me, et ego convertar ad vos, Zachariae I. 
193 Strozier, Robert M. Foucault, Subjectivity, and Identity: Historical Constructions of Subject and Self. 
Detroit: Wayne State UP, 2001.  170. 
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In Strozier’s description of Seneca, the self takes up a relationship not only with the self, 
but with the world below and the divine reason above.  These external aspects are an 
essential part of self-relation in Seneca, and no person is complete without their context 
in the cosmos as a whole, including their immediate relations.  The purpose of reflexivity, 
therefore, is not simply that a person becomes “self-aware.”  Instead, what is developed is 
a mode of living that draws greater attention to the connections and relationships of a 
person’s life, and how these impact action.  The “external” parties in a reflexive 
relationship are found in both the world, that is in persons, communities, and so on, but 
also the divine, in the influence of divine reason or in the constant presence of God. 
Foucault’s explanation of Christian reflexivity and self-knowledge 
 Providing a description of Foucault’s thoughts on Christian forms of reflexivity is 
complicated by the fact of his death before the completion of a comprehensive project on 
the topic.  The works available do not represent a sustained treatment, but rather hints and 
suggestions in articles and classroom lectures, most of which lack the full weight of 
substantiation.  Nonetheless, Foucault is consistent in his presentation of the nature of 
Christian reflexivity, and his understanding of the techniques of the self employed in 
Christianity from its earliest periods through to the present day.   
 For Foucault, Christianity is a confessional religion centered on two types of 
confession.  The first is the confession of a certain truth, namely the dogmas of the 
Christian religion.  The second is the confession of oneself, namely the necessity of 
providing an account of one’s temptations and habits of sinful thought, all of which must 
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be confessed to others.  These two forms of confession are interrelated, as Foucault 
explains: 
A Christian needs the light of faith when he wants to explore himself, and, 
conversely, his access to the truth cannot be conceived of without the purification 
of the soul...In Christianity, these two types of truth obligation, the one concerned 
with access to light and the other concerned with discovering truth inside oneself, 
have always kept a relative autonomy – even after Luther and Protestantism.194  
Foucault’s contention is that there is a distinction in these two types of confession which 
keeps them functionally separate; that is, though a person needs the light of faith to see 
within his self, the movement of understanding faith and understanding oneself are 
separate movements in different directions.  In describing the thought of Augustine, he 
writes: 
Libido is the result of one’s will when it goes beyond the limits God originally set 
for it.  As a consequence, the means of the spiritual struggle against libido do not 
consist, as with Plato, in turning one’s eyes upwards and memorizing the reality 
one has previously known and forgotten.  The spiritual struggle consists, on the 
contrary, in turning one’s eyes continuously downward or inward in order to 
decipher, among the movements of the soul, which one comes from the libido.195 
The movement of self-confession, therefore, is an internally focused movement for 
Foucault, one which can be discussed separately from the task of learning about God.  He 
distinguishes this movement from that seen in Platonic philosophy and Buddhist thought.  
                                                 
194 Rieff, David, ed. Humanities in Review. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1982.  “Sexuality and Solitude.”  
Michel Foucault and Richard Sennett.  11. 
195 Ibid., 15. 
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First, he argues that Plato’s philosophy counters libido not by turning within and 
providing a description of the self and its desires, then renouncing them, but by 
remembering that the true self is the soul in relation to the One.  Furthermore, 
Christianity, he argues, does not hold the self to be an illusory thing, as in the case of 
Buddhism.  Instead, Christian practices of the self are committed to uncovering the true 
self, which is the self of hidden desires and sexual longings.  He writes: 
I would also like to underline that the Christian discovery of the self does not 
reveal the self as an illusion....This task has two objectives.  First, there is the task 
of clearing up all illusions, temptations and seductions that can occur in the mind 
and discovering the reality of what is going on – within ourselves.  Second, one 
has to get free from any attachment to this self, not because the self is an illusion 
but because the self is much too real.  The more we discover the truth about 
ourselves, the more we want to renounce ourselves, the more we need to bring to 
light the reality of ourselves.196 
Christianity, therefore, according to Foucault, is about the goal of self-purification 
accomplished through self-knowledge.  The person wishes to grow in relationship to 
God, but to do so they must be pure in mind and will.  To do so, Foucault suggests, they 
must be fully aware of those aspects of their self which are impure, and then renounce 
them, which creates a path to purity.  Foucault continually identifies Christian spirituality 
as possessing an essentially exegetical function: “Christian spirituality was not to give 
knowledge of the self the memorial function of rediscovering the subject’s being, but 
rather the exegetical function of detecting the nature and origin of internal impulses 
                                                 
196 Idid., 11. 
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within the soul.”  The problem with this characterization, however, is that it seems to 
elide some of the distinctions in the history of reflexivity Foucault uncovers elsewhere in 
his project.  In order for a characterization of “Christian spirituality” to be applicable to 
Christianity as a whole, including before and after the Enlightenment, it would seem 
necessary to leave a space.   
But, as the work of Christopher Gill has suggested,197 to use the term “self” in 
reference to both modern and pre-modern thought in an interchangeable way is a 
questionable activity.  Second, to suggest that, for Christians, a person’s true self is the 
sum of their desires and sexuality is easily called in to question.  Though other historical 
examples could be cited, for the purposes of this dissertation I will provide only the 
example of Thomas Aquinas, and suggest that Foucault’s description of Christian 
subjectivity does not apply to all Christian thinkers.   
Self-Knowledge in Aquinas – The soul’s knowledge of itself 
 The formal question of whether or how a person can know their self is not directly 
asked in Aquinas, nor would that be expected.  The closest approximation of this question 
can be seen in ST I.87, “How the intellectual soul knows itself and all within itself.”  This 
question is split into four articles, each of which asks about a separate aspect of the soul: 
essence, habits, intellect, will.  Though there are nuances in each of these four articles 
which will be discussed below, Thomas gives his overriding principle in his response to 
the first article.  He writes, “Everything is knowable so far as it is in act, and not so far as 
                                                 
197 Gill, Christopher. Personality in Greek Epic, Tragedy, and Philosophy: The Self in Dialogue. Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1995. 11. 
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it is in potentiality:198 for a thing is a being, and is true, and therefore knowable, 
according as it is actual.”199  In part, this suggests that Foucault’s description of a 
Christian practice of ferreting out “hidden” desires is not an aspect of Thomas’s work, as 
desires which are “hidden” do not manifest in thought or action, and thus do not affect 
the person.200  Nor is Thomas’s description of self-knowledge, either in the formal 
discussion of the Summa Theologiae, or in the practical discussions found in his Biblical 
Commentaries, in any way interested in deciphering “hidden” desires; as mentioned 
above, Thomas does not identify illicit desires as being properly a part of oneself. 
This means that humans have a rather limited access to their own soul, in a certain 
sense, for, as Thomas explains, the soul is in potentiality, and is only knowable when it is 
in action:  
Now the human intellect is only a potentiality in the genus of intelligible beings, 
just as primary matter is a potentiality as regards sensible beings; and hence it is 
called “possible.”  Therefore in its essence the human is potentially 
understanding.  Hence it has in itself the power to understand, but not to be 
understood, except as it is made actual.201 
For a human to “know thyself,” therefore, they can only analyze the actions of their soul 
and body.  A person cannot, therefore, know that they have a habit of lust simply by 
                                                 
198 Referring to Aristotle, Metaphysics IX, Did. 8.9. 
199 ST I.87.1 – Respondeo dicendum quod unumquodque cognoscibile est secundum quod est in actu, et non 
secundum quod est in potentia, ut dicitur in IX Metaphys., sic enim aliquid est ens et verum, quod sub 
cognitione cadit, prout actu est. 
200 Thomas does not speak of “hidden” desires, but typically of hidden sins, that is, sinful actions a person 
has taken and then refused to confess.   
201 ST I.87.1 – Intellectus autem humanus se habet in genere rerum intelligibilium ut ens in potentia tantum, 
sicut et materia prima se habet in genere rerum sensibilium, unde possibilis nominatur.  Sic igitur in sua 
essentia consideratus, se habet ut potentia intelligens.  Unde ex seipso habet virtutem ut intelligat, non 
autem ut intelligatur, nisi secundum id quod fit actu. 
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thinking about their soul, except as they are aware of their own lust as it is actualized in 
thought and action.   
 So what is it that a soul can know about itself?  It can know that it exists, something 
which is made possible again through actions.  Thomas explains: “This happens in two 
ways; in the first place, singularly, as when Socrates or Plato perceives that he has an 
intellectual soul because he perceives that he understands.”  In this first instance, the soul 
is capable of reflecting on itself, that is, to be aware of its own activity, and by this 
awareness of its own activity, illustrate its own existence.  Thomas continues: “In the 
second place, universally, as when we consider the nature of the human mind from 
knowledge of the intellectual act.202”  In this instance, Thomas suggests that we can know 
that the soul exists from developing an understanding of the intellectual aspect of the soul 
by awareness of the soul’s power to undertake intellectual acts.  This second form of 
knowledge is only possible after “careful inquiry” into the nature of the soul, that is, the 
study of the structure and the faculties of the soul.  In this form of knowledge, a soul 
knows that it exists not because it is evident through simple reflection, as in the first 
form, but over time by discerning the faculties of the soul (again, known only by their 
actions).  What Thomas is referring to, it would seem, is precisely the understanding of 
the soul he offers in the prima and secunda pars of the Summa Theologiae; that is, a 
formal discussion of the nature of the soul, its operations, powers, and essence. 
 Second, a soul holds some knowledge of its habits; but this knowledge is possible 
only as it arises from repeated action.  Thus, in the same way as the soul’s essence, there 
                                                 
202 ST I.87.1 – Uno quidem modo, particulariter, secundum quod Socrates vel Plato percipit se habere 
animam intellectivam, ex hoc quod percipit se intelligere.  Alio modo, in unversali, secundum quod 
naturam humanae mentis ex actu intellectus consideramus. 
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are two ways of knowing that we have a habit: “The first kind of knowledge of the habit 
arises from its being present, for the very fact of its presence causes the act whereby it is 
known.”203  This means that a human can know they have the virtue of fortitude only 
when they accomplish an act of courage repeatedly, and with eventual ease.  Once the 
courageous acts occur, then the habit of fortitude which produced that act is known to be 
present in the soul.  Thomas continues: “The second kind of knowledge of the habit arises 
from a careful inquiry, as is explained above of the mind.”204  Again, Thomas seems to be 
referring the formal discussion of habits and their variety, one which he offers in the I-
II.49-54. 
 Third, a soul holds some understanding of its own act.  This question connected to the 
object of the intellect’s understanding, which is why Thomas answers the question with a 
foray into the intellect’s object in the Divine and Angelic intellects.  The discussion of 
these two intellects, divine and angelic, establishes their fundamental difference from the 
human intellect, a difference which relates directly to the question of the soul’s 
knowledge of its action.  For God, the intellect’s object is its own intellectual act, because 
“His essence is His act of understanding.”205  Second, there is the angelic understanding 
of its own act and essence, which can be “logically” divided into two actions, yet the 
understanding of both is accomplished in a single action.  This is differentiated from the 
human’s understanding of its own act.  The object of the human intellect is, as Thomas 
explains, “being” and the “true.”  Whereas God understands these things immediately, 
                                                 
203 ST I.87.2 – Et prima quidem cognitio habitus fit per ipsam praesentiam habitus, quia ex hoc ipso quod 
est praesens, actum causat, in quo statim percipitur. 
204 Ibid. – Secunda autem cognitio habitus fit per studiosam inquisitionem, sicut supra dictum est de mente.   
205 ST I.87.3 – ...quia sua essentia est suum intelligere. 
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since God is being and truth, and the angel understands these because of the special 
nature of its intellect in its relation to God, the human intellect is oriented to material 
realities.  Thus, our intellect can understand “being” and “true” “as considered in material 
things.”206  For that reason, the human does not understand its own intellectual act in the 
manner of God or an angel, but rather the human knows the object first, and then is able 
to understand the action of knowing the object. 
 Finally, the soul has knowledge of the actions of the will.  Again, will is known in the 
soul insofar as it is enacted.  Thomas writes: 
Hence the Philosopher expresses himself thus (De Anima iii, 9)—that “the will is 
in the reason.”  Therefore the act of the will is understood by the intellect, both 
inasmuch as one knows that one wills; and inasmuch as one knows the nature of 
this act, and consequently, the nature of its principle which is the habit or 
power.207   
The soul therefore knows its own will in two ways: first, from the action, and second, 
from the habit or power from which the action must have proceeded.  Though a person 
can know that they have a habit or power which can produce a certain action 
representative of willing a certain way, one cannot know that one wills a certain way 
without an action to reflect on.   
                                                 
206 ST I.87.3 ad 1 
207 ST I.87.4 – Unde et philosophus hoc modo loquendi utitur in III de anima, quod voluntas in ratione est.  
Quod autem intelligibiliter est in aliquo intelligente, consequens est ut ab eo intelligatur.  Unde actus 
voluntatis intelligitur ab intellectu, et inquantum aliquis percipit se velle; et inquantum aliquis cognoscit 
naturam huius actus, et per consequens naturam eius principii, quod est habitus vel potentia 
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 This leads to an important point about the soul’s knowledge of itself.  For Thomas, 
we do not have knowledge of our affections or our intentions except as they are enacted.  
As Thomas writes of the affections: 
The affections of the soul are in the intellect not by similitude only, like bodies; 
nor by being present in their subject, as the arts; but as a thing caused is in its 
principle, which contains some notion of the thing caused.  And so Augustine 
says that the soul’s affections are in the memory by certain notions.208 
This passage suggests that the affections of the soul are in the intellect insofar as an act of 
the intellect contains some notion of the activity.  Thus an act of affection for God 
contains with it some notion that it is an act of affection towards God.  But, without an 
action or thought, the notion of the affection will not be present in the intellect.  The 
affections of the person remain knowable, therefore, only insofar as they are enacted and 
then reflected in the intellect.   
 This remains true for the intention for which an act is accomplished, which Thomas 
believes to be wholly unknown to us except as intentions are reflected by works.  In his 
Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews, he writes: 
In another way something is not known because it is wholly unknown and 
invisible, and in such a way are those things unknown which are in the will.  In 
the will there is the intention of the end, which of its nature is invisible.  For what 
                                                 
208 ST I.87.4 ad 3 – Ad tertium dicendum quod affectus animae non sunt in intellectu neque per 
similitudinem tantum, sicut corpora; neque per praesentiam ut in subiecto, sicut artes; sed sicut 
principiatum in principio, in quo habetur notio principiati.  Et ideo Augustinus dicit affectus animae esse in 
memoria per quaedam notiones.   
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man does or thinks is manifest through works, but by what intention he does this 
is utterly uncertain.  These things, however, are not unknown to God.209 
Thomas writes here that the intention of the will is essentially unknowable, except to 
God.  Again, in his Commentary on the Psalms, Thomas discusses the lack of human 
access to the intention.  He writes: 
Therefore he says “examines.”  There are three ways [of examining] in man: one 
is apparent, namely an exterior work: and two are hidden, namely the intention 
and the delight.  These two are hidden in us, but apparent to God.  And since they 
are known, though hidden from us, thus it is said, examines the heart, since the 
intention is known, and the kidneys [inner being], that is, the delight, namely 
whether the delight is in the praise of the Lord or of man.  But since to examine is 
to inquire, and to inquire is from ignorance, this is not applicable to God.  But it is 
shown that God knows evidently, since it is said, Let the wickedness of sinners be 
consumed, it is fittingly said, examines [i.e., tests]: since in tribulation the 
condition of humans is shown to the greatest extent.210 
We cannot, therefore, know the end to which each person is directed, except as it is 
reflected in a person’s actions, and then only in a limited way.  The fact that intention and 
                                                 
209 Commentary on Hebrews 4, lecture 2, 104. – Alio modo non cognoscitur aliquid, quia est omnino 
ignotum et invisibile, et sic ea quae sunt in voluntate, sunt ignota.  In voluntate autem est ipsa intentio finis, 
quae de natura sua est invisibilis.  Quid enim homo facit vel cogitat manifestatur per opus, sed qua 
intentione hoc faciat, penitus est incertum.  Ista autem non sunt occulta Deo. 
210 Commentary on the Psalms 7, no. 5 – the vulgate of Jerome provides a variant word, probator, 
forThomas’s scrutans.  In the last sentence, he makes a play on the words by using “examines” in the sense 
of tests and referring to the passage in the Psalms which refers to God’s testing of sinners through 
tribulation.  – Dicit ergo scrutans.  Tria sunt in homine: unum apparens, scilicet exterius opus: et duo quae 
latent, scilicet intentio et delectatio.  Haec duo nobis latent, sed Deo patent.  Et quia Deo sunt nota, licet 
nobis occulta, ideo dicit, scrutans corda, quia novit intentionem, et renes, idest delectationem, utrum 
scilicet delecteris in laude Dei vel hominum.  Sed quia scrutari est inquirere autem est ignorantis, hoc a Deo 
removet.  Et ut ostendat quod Deus evidenter scit; cum dixit, consumetur, etc., convenienter dixit, scrutans: 
quia in tribulatione maxime apparet conditio hominum. 
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delight are hidden from humans, even from our own minds, speaks to the nature of 
reflexive self-understanding in Thomas, highlighting its limited role.   
 Self-knowledge, therefore, as described by Thomas is possible only in a partial 
manner.  The human being is not an object of knowledge that can be deciphered in a 
simply through observation; instead, the person must come to self-knowledge over time, 
and through repeated observation of repeated actions.  Further, what is received from this 
observation is not a static form of knowledge; instead, a person’s habits and actions are 
always changing, and thus what a modern person would call a “self” is always changing.  
For the pre-modern thinker, a changing person is intentional; as indicated in the previous 
chapter, the spiritual life is about progress and growth, and these are only possible 
through the person and God changing the self in a movement towards perfection, as far as 
that is possible in this life.   
Self Knowledge and Spiritual Exercises211  
 Self-knowledge was treated above as a formal question of possibility, but Thomas 
also discusses the person’s knowledge of their self in the context of spiritual practices.  
Moving in this direction returns to the imperative of the “nosce teipsum” where it is 
interpreted as a crucial aspect of moral practice.  Returning to the passage from the 
Summa Theologiae cited above:  
For the first thing that occurs to a man who has discretion, is to think of himself 
(seipso cogitet), and to direct other things to himself as to their end, since, the end 
                                                 
211 The appearance of this discussion of self knowledge and prosoche (attention) follows the emphasis in 
this dissertation on the appearance of classical concepts at work in Thomas Aquinas.  Though these 
concepts take alternative forms, they maintain many of the same elements, and our understanding of them 
can be renewed when read in light of the work of classical authors, and with the methodological questions 
of Hadot and Foucault.   
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is the first thing in the intention.  Therefore, this is the time when man is bound by 
God’s affirmative precept, which the Lord expressed by saying: “Turn ye to 
Me...and I will turn to you.”212 
The admonition “turn ye to me...and I will turn to you” provides the end to which the 
human’s intention should be directed.  In order to do so, however, the person must direct 
their self by paying attention to their self.  Aquinas will repeatedly mention the 
importance of vigilance in watching oneself to preserve oneself from falling into sin.   
It is important to note that Thomas does not emphasize attention in the manner of the 
Stoics or the Epicureans.  The language used by Thomas is not the same as the 
Epicureans or the Stoics as it relates to self-knowledge; he does not encourage persons to 
“know thyself” throughout his writings, at least not in such terms.  Further, when Thomas 
encourages persons to pay attention to themselves, he usually encourages them to pay 
attention to others as well, in order to help ensure that others do not fall into sin.  And 
finally, Aquinas will offer words of caution about the inability of reason to maintain 
constant vigilance over all of one’s actions and affections.   
 Nonetheless, attention is an essential part of Thomas’s spirituality.  In the De 
Perfectione and elsewhere, Thomas repeatedly emphasizes that the spiritual life is about 
the love of God, and we love God “if there be nothing in us which is wanting to divine 
love, that is to say, if there is nothing which we do not, actually or habitually, refer to 
God.”213  Working from the traditional injunction to love God with heart, mind, soul, and 
strength, Thomas describes different aspects of the person and their actions which must 
                                                 
212 ST I-II.89.6 ad 3, with reference to Zechariah 1:3.  Latin cited previously. 
213 De Perfectione 5 – Alio vero modo ex toto corde, mente, anima et fortitudine Deum diligimus si nihil 
nobis desit ad divinam dilectionem, quod actu vel habitu in Deum non referamus.   
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be referred to God.  The love of God with the whole heart is accomplished “when we 
order our life to the service of God; and when, in consequence, all our actions are, 
virtually, directed to him.”  The love of the whole mind is accomplished “when we 
subject our understanding to him, believing what has been divinely transmitted to us.”  
The love of the whole soul is accomplished “when all that we love is loved in God, and 
when we refer all of our affections to the love of Him.”  Finally, the love with the whole 
strength is accomplished “when all our words and works are established in divine charity 
according to the precept of St. Paul, ‘Let all your things be done in charity.’”214   
Be Watchful 
In order for any of these objectives to be accomplished, persons must hold certain 
forms of self-awareness to preserve themselves from taking the wrong path.  These types 
of attention the self are found in different forms in Thomas’s writings, though for the 
purposes of this dissertation I will discuss only two.  The first are general 
encouragements taken from lines of scripture which encourage the person to be watchful 
over their person and others.  The second is found in descriptions of the virtue of 
prudence, and in the qualities of the prudent person.  Each of these aspects repeats the 
importance of paying attention to the regulation of one’s activities in the struggle to 
prevent sin.   
First, Thomas will mention with some regularity the importance of watching and 
examining one’s thoughts and actions, and controlling oneself to prevent sin.  In one 
extended section in his Commentary on the Letter to the Hebrews, Thomas writes of the 
                                                 
214 Ibid., with reference to 1 Cor. 16:14.  
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importance of being watchful over oneself and others, working from a single word from 
the letter.  In this section, he discusses the importance of examining oneself: 
He says, Watch.  For each one of you ought to consider in himself what condition 
he is.  Gal. 6:4: But let everyone prove his own work.  Jer. 2:23: See thy ways in 
the valley.  Watch, therefore, brothers, as to whatever is in yourself, since 
everyone is a part of the community, and each one is commanded by God 
concerning his neighbor, Ecclesiasticus 17:12.  Watch, that is, examine one 
another, lest perhaps something is in you, as is said: many among you are in a 
perfect state, but because of fragility and the freedom of will it is possible there is 
evil in some of you. Job 4:18: Behold, they that serve him are not steadfast, and 
in his angels he found wickedness. How much more shall they that dwell in houses 
of clay, who have an earthly foundation, be consumed as with the moth?  John 
6:71: Have I not chosen twelve?  And one of you is a devil?  One therefore cannot 
be too solicitous for himself; but also for those in his community. 
But why?  Lest perhaps there be in any of you an evil heart of unbelief, to 
depart from the living God.  See the evil of which the apostle speaks, namely the 
unbelieving heart, that is, one infirm in faith, in which consists the malice of the 
soul: since just as the good of the soul is in adhering to God, Psalm 72:27: But it 
is good for me to adhere to my God, so it is that to withdraw from God through 
unbelief is evil for man. ...And thus, it is said scattered, since through unbelief 
one withdraws from the living God.   
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But if this evil is found in anyone, is he to be despaired of?  No, rather he 
ought to be exhorted, that is, admonished: thus it is said but exhort one another 
every day, that is, continuously scrutinizing their consciences, and inducing them 
to good...215 
This passage emphasizes the importance of attention to oneself for the purpose of 
analyzing one’s behavior and sentiment and preventing movement away from God.  This 
section of commentary is based on Hebrews 3:12, “Take heed (videte), brethren, lest 
perhaps there be in any of you an evil heart of unbelief, to depart from the living God.”  
Working from that sentence, Thomas encourages his audience to self-examination and 
the examination of others as part of the “community” (societas).  The word he uses for 
examines, probare, holds a range of meanings, including test, tempt, approve, 
recommend, certify, and demonstrate.  In translating the word as “examines,” however, 
one should not understand the term as referring to something in the vein of a psychiatric 
examination.  Instead, the admonition to examine should be understood as watching the 
“external act,” as explained in the quote above from Psalm 7.  Thus, a person should 
                                                 
215 Commentary on Hebrews ch. 3 lec. 3 (translation p.88).  As indicated above, the lectures on the Pauline 
Epistles date from the later stage of Thomas’s career, 1270-1272  – Dicit ergo, videte.  Unusquisque enim 
in se debet considerare in quo statu sit.  Gal. VI, 4: opus suum probet unusquisque. Ier. II, 23: vide vias tuas 
in convalle.  Videte ergo, fratres, quantum ad quemlibet in se, quia quilibet est pars societatis, unicuique 
mandavit Deus de proximo suo, Eccli. XVII, 12.  Videte, id est multi inter vos sunt in statu perfecto, tamen 
propter fragilitatem et arbitrii libertatem posset esse malum in aliquo vestrum.  Iob IV, 18: ecce qui serviunt 
ei, non sunt stabiles, et in Angelis suis reperit pravitatem, quanto magis hi qui habitant domos luteas, et 
terrenum habent fundamentum? Io. VI, 71: nonne ergo duodecim vos elegi, et unus ex vobis Diabolus est? 
Non ergo aliquis sit tantum sollicitus de se; sed etiam de quolibet suae societatis.  Sed quid? Ne sit in aliquo 
vestrum cor malum incredulitatis.  Ecce malum de quo loquitur apostolus, scilicet cor indredulum, id est, 
non firmum in fide, in quo consistit malitia animae: quia sicut bonum animae est in adhaerendo Deo, Ps. 
LXXII, 27: mihi autem adhaerare Deo bonum est, quod scilicet est per fidem ita recedere a Deo per 
incredulitatem est malum hominis.  Ier. II, 19: scito et vide, Israel, quia malum et amarum est reliquisse te 
dominum, et cetera.  Et ideo dicit discedendi, quia per incredulitatem recedit a Deo vivo, Ier. II, 13: me 
dereliquerunt fontem aquae vivae. Sed si inveniatur istud malum in aliquo, numquid desperandum est?  
Non, sed magis debet exhortari, id est, admoneri: ideo dicit sed adhortamini vosmetipsos per singulos dies, 
id est, continue scilicet discutiendo conscientiam suam, et inducendo ad bonum...  
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watch his neighbor’s action, and his own actions and thoughts, to be on the lookout for 
something being done inordinately.   
 In this first quotation, the sin referred to is the product of unbelief.  In the same 
commentary, Thomas also comments on the possibility of “fornication” among the 
brothers.  He recommends that persons “contemplate” themselves and others to prevent 
the error of carnal sins.  The verses he is commenting on here are Hebrews 12:15-16: 
“Looking diligently (contemplantes), lest any man be wanting to the grace of God: lest 
any root of bitterness springing up do hinder and by it many be defiled: lest there be any 
fornicator or profane person.”216  Thomas writes: 
Whence it is said lest there be any fornicator, he admonishes the avoidance of 
sins contrary to holiness, and he opposes especially carnal sins, namely luxury 
and taste (gula), which are brought about through carnal delights, through which 
the mind is stained.  Thus are the mind and flesh stained.  And thus these vices are 
especially to be avoided.  And the first, luxury, saying contemplating.  And not 
only in oneself, but lest there be any fornicator, so also one should contemplate 
this in his neighbor.217 
The Vulgate translation of “looking diligently” is apt in its understanding of 
contemplation, as Thomas does not mean contemplation in the sense of thinking about 
the divine things.  Instead, Thomas is encouraging his audience to take note of their 
                                                 
216 From the Vulgate – Contemplates ne quis desit gratiae Dei ne qua radix amaritudinis sursum germinans 
inpediat et per illam inquinentur multi, ne quis fornicator aut profanus ut Esau qui propter unam escam 
vendidit primitiva sua. 
217 Commentary on Hebrews ch. 12 lec. 3 – deinde cum dicit ne quis fornicator, monet vitare peccata 
contraria sanctimoniae, cui specialiter opponuntur peccata carnalia, scilicet luxuria et gula, quae 
perficiuntur in delectatione carnali, per quam mens inquinantur.  Unde ista mentem et carnem inquinant.  Et 
ideo specialiter monet ista vitari.  Et primo luxuriam, dicens contemplantes.  Et non solum quilibet in 
seipso, sed ne quis fornicator, ita quod quilibet in proximo suo hoc contempletur. 
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thoughts and actions and the actions of others in the avoidance of error.  In this way, 
“contemplantes” holds the sense of “consider thoroughly,” and the object of this 
consideration is one’s own person and the others in proximity.  But once more, it is the 
actions immediate to the moment, and the preservation from the ongoing risk of sin, 
rather than an exploration into the depths of one’s “character.”  
 The efforts of attention to self are not limited to an awareness of actions, but also 
relate to the distinction between inner discourse and exterior action.  In a passage from 
his Commentary on the Psalms,218 Thomas describes the three origins of sin in humans.  
These three are from an irascible, a rational, and a concupiscible error within us, each of 
which leads to sin.  For the second of these, Thomas writes: “Second, he prevents the 
vice of the rational, namely deceit, saying: those things you say in your hearts, you 
supply them as they are in you; as it is said: so that one thing is not said in the heart, and 
another thing is pretended externally.”219  Briefly remarked on here is a classic trope of 
classical thought, the importance of aligning internal speech with external action.  
Foucault and Hadot both comment on this concept in classical authors, and it is not 
surprising to find the concept mentioned in Aquinas. 
 Finally, in commentary on Psalm 12, Thomas again once more mentions the role of 
attention in avoiding sin.  He writes, “Similarly, as long as man is solicitous in resisting 
sin, he will not fall into death; but when he sleeps, he falls.”220  The reference to sleep 
                                                 
218 The Postilla super psalmos dates from 1272-1273.   
219 Commentary on the Psalms 4 no. 4 - Secundo prohibet vitium rationalis, scilicet simulationem, dicens: 
quae dicitis in cordibus vestris, supple sint in vobis; quasi dicat: non aliud sitis in corde et aliud 
praetendatis extra. 
220 Commentary on the Psalms 12 no. 4 - Similiter et quamdiu homo solicitus est ut peccato resistat, non 
cadit in mortem; sed quando dormit, occiditur. 
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here simply means “fails to pay attention,” the result of which is invariably a mistaken 
action.  The importance of solicitude221 in avoiding error is something that is repeated in 
the Summa Theologiae, especially in discussion of the virtue of prudence.  In response to 
the question of whether solicitude is a part of prudence, Thomas writes: 
According to Isidore (Etymologies X), a man is said to be solicitous through 
being shrewd and alert, in so far as a man through a certain shrewdness of mind is 
on the alert to do whatever has to be done.  Now this belongs to prudence, whose 
chief act is a command about what has already been counseled and judged in 
matters of action....Hence it is that solicitude belongs properly to prudence, and 
for this reason Augustine says (De Moribus Eccles. XXIV) that “prudence keeps 
most careful watch and ward, lest by degrees we be deceived unawares by evil 
counsel.”222 
In this instance, solicitude is described as an alertness and preparedness to carry out the 
activity deemed proper through counsel.  It is only with the quotation from Augustine 
which rounds out the discussion do we see solicitude carrying the same sense as used in 
the commentary on Psalm 12 above.  In this quotation, the importance of self awareness 
of activities and the wariness of the source of counsel is explained.   
                                                 
221 Solicitude, it should be noted, is used in different ways by Thomas.  In some instances it has a negative 
valence, in that persons who are overly solicitous about are criticized by Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount, 
a criticism seconded by Thomas.  On the other hand, however, Thomas will mention the importance of 
being properly solicitous over oneself and others in regard to moral matters.  This latter use is less frequent, 
though still present. 
222 ST II-II.47.9 – Sicut dicit Isidorus, in libro Etymol., sollicitus dicitur quasi solers citus, inquantum 
scilicet aliquis ex quadam solertia animi velox est ad prosequendum ea quae sunt agenda.  Hoc autem 
pertinet ad prudentiam, cuius praecipuus actus est circa agenda praecipere de praeconsiliatis et iudicatis.  
Unde philosophus dicit, in VI Ethicorum, quod oportet operari quidem velociter consiliata, consiliari autem 
tarde.  Et inde est quod sollicitudo proprie ad prudentiam pertinet.  Et propter hoc Augustinus dicit, in libro 
de moribus Eccles., quod prudentiae sunt excubiae atque diligentissima vigilantia ne, subrepente paulatim 
mala suasione, fallamur.   
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Opposed to the virtue of prudence is the vice of negligence, which Thomas describes 
specifically in terms related to solicitude.  Negligence is defined as “a lack of due 
solicitude,”223 and, in particular, it is a failure to take on the specific acts of reason central 
to the actions of prudence.  This is unsurprising given the emphasis in Thomas’s work on 
reasoning well in relation to moral matters, but one solution for the problem of 
negligence offers an interesting perspective into Thomas’s moral psychology of the 
person.  He writes: 
The fear of God helps us to avoid all sins, because according to Proverbs 15:27, 
“by the fear of the Lord everyone declineth from evil.”  Hence fear makes us 
avoid negligence, yet not as though negligence were directly opposed to fear, but 
because fear incites man to acts of reason.  Wherefore it has already been stated 
above (I-II.44.2), when we were treating of the passions, that “fear makes us take 
counsel.”224 
Fear of God is actually one of the repeated aids to moral living, appearing not only in 
discussions of prudence, but also in temperance.  In fact, though temperance lacks a 
formal discussion of the accompanying gift from grace, it is mentioned in a reply to an 
objection.  In this instance, Thomas identifies “fear” as the corresponding gift of 
temperance, in that through awareness of God’s presence and knowledge of our activities, 
and a desire to avoid offending God, we avoid those things which are sinful.  Thomas 
writes, “Now man stands in the greatest need of the fear of God in order to shun those 
                                                 
223 ST II-II.54.1 – Respondeo dicendum quod negligentia importat defectum debitae sollicitudinis. 
224 ST II-II.54.2 ad 4 – Ad quartum dicendum quod timor Dei operatur ad vitationem cuiuslibet peccati, 
quia ut dicitur Prov. XV, per timorem domini declinat omnis a malo.  Et ideo timor facit negligentiam 
vitare.  Non tamen ita quod directe negligentia timori opponatur, sed inquantum timor excitat hominem ad 
actus rationis.  Unde etiam supra habitum est cum de passionibus ageretur, quod timor facit consiliativos.   
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things which are most seductive, and these are the matter of temperance: wherefore the 
gift of fear corresponds to temperance also.”225  The presence of God in this manner 
speaks to a further aspect of self understanding, in that God essentially acts as a third 
party in our reflexive experience.  It is not enough for a person to watch their self, to be 
aware of every action; instead, a further inducement is suggested.  In this understanding, 
the person is one aspect of a larger equation, and their attention is directed towards God 
on one end, to the proper fear of and due desire to avoid offending God.  On the other 
side, the person must watch their own thoughts and actions, and distinguish those aspects 
which belong to the new and old self.  Finally, they are called upon to watch others, and 
to encourage them if they fall short. The picture, therefore, we develop of reflexivity in 
Aquinas is not of a basic self-relation, but a self-relation that participates in community 
with others and with God. 
Old and New Man 
 Still, there is more to be said regarding the nature of reflexive self-understanding in 
the work of Aquinas.  In particular, one important issue can be seen in his treatment of 
the Pauline concept of the old man and the new man.  As Paul writes in Ephesians, “You 
were taught to put away your former life, your old self, corrupt and deluded by its 
lusts.”226  From the few brief references found in Paul, Thomas develops the concept in 
concert with the rest of his thought on the ideal form of life.  He uses these two types to 
refer to aspects of the human person, and, most importantly, to underline the implications 
                                                 
225 ST II-II.141.1 ad 3 – Maxime autem homo indiget timore divino ad fugiendum ea quae maxime 
alliciunt, circa quae est temperantia.  Et ideo temperantiae etiam respondet donum timoris.   
226 NRSV – “To put off, according to former conversation the old man, who is corrupted according to the 
desire of error.” Vulgate – Deponere vos secundum pristinam conversationem veterem hominem qui 
corrumpitur secundum desideria erroris. 
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of his understanding of human nature.  As Thomas writes in his Summa Theologiae: “It is 
essential to virtue to incline man to good.  Now the good of man is to be in accordance 
with reason, as Dionysius states (Divine Names iv).  Hence human virtue is that which 
inclines man to something in accordance with reason.”227  Not only is it good for humans 
to be inclined towards reason; it is, in fact, an aspect of their very nature as humans that 
they be aligned towards reason and the good.  This point is explained further in the rest of 
this article on temperance, from which the above quote originates.  What is good for 
humans to do is necessarily arrived at because of their human nature.  He continues: 
Nature inclines everything to whatever is becoming to it.  Wherefore man 
naturally desires pleasures that are becoming to him.  Since, however, man as 
such is a rational being, it follows that those pleasures are becoming to man which 
are in accordance with reason.  From such pleasures temperance does not 
withdraw him, but from those which are contrary to reason.  Wherefore it is clear 
that temperance is not contrary to inclination of human nature, but is in accord 
with it.  It is, however, contrary to the inclination of the animal nature that is not 
subject to reason.228   
                                                 
227 ST II-II.141.1 – Sicut supra dictum est, de ratione virtutis est ut inclinet hominem ad bonum.  Bonum 
autem hominis est secundum rationem esse, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. De Div. Nom.  Et ideo virtus 
humana est quae inclinat ad id quod est secundum rationem.  Manifeste autem ad hoc inclinat temperantia, 
nam in ipso eius nomine importatur quaedam moderation seu temperies, quam ratio facit.  Et ideo 
temperantia est virtus.   
228 ST II-II.141.1 ad 1 – Ad primum ergo dicendum quod natura inclinat in id quod est conveniens 
unicuique.  Unde homo naturaliter appetit delectationem sibi convenientem.  Quia vero homo, inquantum 
huiusmodi, est rationalis, conequens est quod delectationes sunt homini convenientes quae sunt secundum 
rationem.  Et ab his non retrahit temperantia, sed potius ab his quae sunt contra rationem.  Unde patet quod 
temperantia non contrariatur inclinationi naturae humanae, sed convenit cum ea.  Contrariatur tamen 
inclinationi naturae bestialis non subiectae rationi. 
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In this passage, Thomas mentions two natures, each of which can be found, in certain 
ways, within the human person.  The nature that we ought to act in accordance with is, of 
course, the human nature, which is aligned with right reason.  
 For Thomas, however, this distinction leads to something more than a simple 
admonition to abide by reason.  Instead, it leads to the development of a complex mode 
of self-understanding, one which is dependent on a question of what one considers 
oneself to be.  For Thomas, the person is called to identify themselves properly, and to do 
so by identifying with the new man being renewed by grace in Christ, and to deny the old 
man.  In a passage from his Commentary on the Psalms, Thomas describes these two 
aspects of the human person: 
Our soul has two faces: one faces God and is according to reason; the other faces 
the flesh according to the sensitive nature, which comprehends things as far as 
they are corporeal.  And just as a thing delights in its own good, thus man delights 
in that which he considers his soul.  Indeed sinners consider their soul to be that 
which they principally strain towards: since whatever is preeminent in a thing is 
that which it is identified as, just as a king is his kingdom.  And therefore those 
who have principally a sensitive nature delight in it; while those who understand, 
love the intellective aspect.  No one therefore hates the soul insofar as he esteems 
the principal aspect.  The good therefore hate [the soul] with respect to the 
sensitive nature; the bad hate [the soul] in its intellective nature.229   
                                                 
229 Commentary on the Psalms 10 no. 4 –  Sed quod mali quodammodo odiunt seipsos, et etiam boni 
quodammodo se odiunt, declaratur hoco modo.  Anima nostra duas habet facies: unam versus Deum 
secundum rationem, aliam versus carnem secundum naturam sensitivam, quae tantum corporalia 
comprehendit.  Et sicut quaelibet res diligit proprium bonum, ita homo diligit illud quod aestimat animam 
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Thomas is here critical of those “sinners” who consider the soul to be what it chiefly 
desires from its sensitive aspect.  Instead, Thomas corrects them, stating that the human is 
chiefly the rational nature, and thus a person should love their rational nature and hate, 
charitably, their sensitive nature.  The concept of charitable self-hatred will be discussed 
in greater detail in the next chapter, but the concept of hatred of self leads to a discussion 
of the new and old man.   
 This passage can be brought into further relief by referencing Thomas’s Commentary 
on the Nicomachean Ethics.  Aristotle repeatedly mentions that the thing which is most 
properly human is the reason or intellect.  Thomas cites this concept, employing the same 
example of a king and his kingdom as in the above passage: 
Third, at “As a state,” he proves what he had taken for granted: that the person 
who loves the most dominant element in him, the intellect or reason, particularly 
loves himself.  He proves this by three arguments.  The first is: in the state it is the 
most authoritative part that especially seems to be the state.  Hence what the 
rulers of a state do is said to be done by the whole state; and the same reason 
holds for any other composite of several parts.  Consequently, in man it is his 
reason or intellect, his principal element, that especially seems to be man.  
Therefore, he who loves his intellect or reason, and treats it well seems to be 
philautos or a lover of self most of all.230  (1869) 
                                                                                                                                                             
suam.  Peccatores enim aestimant animam suam quod principaliter intendunt: quia quaelibet res est illud 
quod est praecipuum in ea, sicut rex dicitur regnum.  Qui ergo naturam sensitivam habent principalte 
diligunt eam; qui autem intellectivam, eamdem amant.  Nullus ergo odit animam quantam ad id quod 
aestimat principale.  Boni ergo odiunt quantum ad naturam sensitivam; mali quantum ad intellectivam. 
See also ST 2-2.25.7 on whether sinners love themselves. 
230 Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics 1869, bk.9, lec.9, n.4. - Tertio ibi, quemadmodum autem, etc., 
probat quod supposuerat: scilicet quod ille qui amat id quod est principalissimum in ipso scilicet 
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As in the above passage from Thomas’s Commentary on the Psalms, a specific aspect of 
the human is singled out and identified as the person.  In this instance, however, the term 
which is identified as the person is not the “rational nature” but the “reason.” In the 
Summa Theologiae, Thomas approaches this passage once more, though the meaning is 
not necessarily clarified.  He writes: 
According to the philosopher, a thing seems to be chiefly what is principle in it; 
that what the governor of a state does, the state is said to do.  In this way 
sometimes what is principle in man is said to be man; sometimes, indeed, the 
intellectual part, which in accordance with truth, is called the “inward” man; and 
sometimes the sensitive part with the body is called man in the opinion of those 
whose observation does not go beyond the senses.  And this is called the 
“outward” man.231 
The inward and outward, or inner and outer, man are also Pauline terms which appear 
synonymously with the old and new man.  This provides yet another exposition of the 
same principle in Thomas, though again the phrase “intellectual” part is not entirely 
precise.  Nonetheless, the “chief power” of the intellectual soul is the intellect, which 
provides the name for specific variety of soul that is the form of the human. 
                                                                                                                                                             
intellectum vel rationem, maxime amat seipsum.  Et hoc ostendit tribus rationibus.  Quarum prima est, 
quod civitas maxime videtur esse id quod est principalissimum in ea, unde illud quod faciunt in ea rectores 
civitatis dicitur tota civitas facere, et eadem ratio est de omni alia re ex pluribus constitua.  Unde et homo 
maxime est id quod est principale in eo, scilicet ratio vel intellectus; et sic ille qui diligit intellectum vel 
rationem et ei largitur bona, maxime videtur esse philautus, idest amator sui. 
231 ST 1.75.4 ad 1 - Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, secundum philosophum in IX Ethic., illud potissime 
videtur esse unumquodque, quod est principale in ipso, sicut quod facit rector civitatis, dicitur civitas 
facere.  Et hoc modo aliquando quod est principale in homine, dicitur homo, aliquando quidem pars 
intellectiva, secundum rei veritatem, quae dicitur homo interior; aliquando vero pars sensitiva cum corpore, 
secundum aestimationem quorundam, qui solum circa sensibilia detinentur. Et hic dicitur homo exterior. 
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Human nature for Thomas is fundamentally good, reasonable, and rational, and this 
by virtue of its intellectual soul.  Yet, while this is the case, the human still has a sensitive 
aspect, and that sensitive aspect can lead people astray.  Again, this is a matter of the 
proper end of human life, which is found in the full contemplation of God.  As Thomas 
writes: “So it is that the more a soul is free of the passions and is purged from affections 
for earthly things, the higher it rises in contemplation of truth and tastes how sweet the 
Lord is.”232  If this is the proper end of humans, then it is necessary that we take on 
practices to redirect our affections from earthly things towards divine things, and in this 
way, that we adopt practices which distance ourselves from our sensitive aspect.  
Thomas, it would seem, is encouraging persons to abandon care for a real aspect of 
oneself.   
But, for Thomas, it is not simply a matter of “self-renunciation,” strictly speaking.  
Instead, a person is their rational nature, and all other aspects that seek to hold influence 
over that rational nature are considered external.  What is rejected, therefore, is not the 
self, but an external aspect which provides misdirection.  As Thomas writes:  
Now according to his nature, man is rational.  And thus when he acts according to 
reason, he is acting by his own proper motion and is acting of himself; and this is 
a characteristic of freedom.  But when he sins, he is acting outside reason; and 
then he is moved by another, being held back by the limitations imposed by that 
                                                 
232 Commentary on John vol. 1 ch. 1 lec. 12 (translation p.87).  The Commentary on John is dated from 
1269-1272, and emphasizes the contemplative aspect, in that it interprets the Gospel of John to be an 
essentially contemplative oriented work.  This partially explains the apparent disconnect with other works 
of Thomas which hold a more positive view of material things, but the emphasis on ascendance is still 
consonant with the description contemplation in the Summa Theologiae, especially that of ST II-II.180.4 ad 
3.   
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other.  Therefore, everyone who commits a sin is a slave of sin: “whatever 
overcomes a person, is that to which he is a slave” (2 Pet. 2:19).233 
To hear language of this sort is rather interesting, in that Thomas appears to be indicating 
that sin is not one of our capabilities.  And, in a way, he is saying this: the human, in this 
limited mode of moral self-understanding, is its rational nature, and when it fails to act in 
accordance with the higher parts of its soul, it is being moved by something outside of it, 
in most cases, the sensitive nature.  The person is still responsible for sin, as Thomas will 
make abundantly clear throughout his works; still, Thomas is clear that if we are to speak 
of an “identity” or a “self,” our self is our rational nature, and, chiefly, our intellect.   
 This leads to Thomas’s understanding of the old and new man.  The old nature is 
whatever is aligned with sin and sinful actions, while the new nature is aligned with 
reason and with Christ.  In an extended passage from his Commentary on Colossians, 
Thomas describes the new and old natures, and the way of putting the old man off and 
putting the new man on.  In this first section, Thomas describes the old self: 
So Paul tells us to get rid of these things, Put off the old nature, because it has 
grown old by sin: “what is becoming obsolete and growing old is ready to vanish 
away” (Heb 8:13).  This old nature, this old self, is approaching decay, because 
sin is the road to decay.  In addition, sin destroys virtue and spiritual beauty.  The 
oldness of our nature, of course, was brought in by the sin of our first parent: 
“Therefore as sin came into the world through one man and death through sin, and 
                                                 
233 Commentary on the Gospel of John 9-21. 2013.  Latin/english Works of St. Thomas Aquinas .vol. 2 ch. 
8 (translation p. 126) – homo autem secundum suam naturam est rationalis.  Quando ergo movetur 
secundum rationem, proprio motu movetur, et secundum se operatur, quod est libertatis; quando vero 
peccat, operatur praetur rationem, et tunc movetur quasi ab alio, retentis terminis alienis: et ideo qui facit 
peccatum, servus est peccati; 2 Pet. 2:19. 
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so death spread to all men because all men sinned” (Rom. 5:12).  This old nature, 
therefore, or this old self, is the oldness of sin: “We know that our old self was 
crucified with him so that the sinful body might be destroyed” (Rom. 6:6).  We 
are to put off this old self with its practices: “Put off your old nature which 
belongs to your former manner of life and is corrupt through deceitful lusts” (Eph. 
4:22).234   
Thomas associates the old nature with the corruption inherited through the original sin of 
Adam, which has been transmitted to us.  This is the nature we have received from birth, 
and with this nature come certain practices, namely sinful practices according to 
“deceitful lusts.”  As Thomas continues, he explains the new self: 
The new nature of the self is the mind, renewed from within, because before grace 
our mind is subject within to sin, and when it is renewed by grace it becomes 
new: “Your youth is renewed like the eagle’s” (Ps. 103:5); “For neither 
circumcision counts for anything, not uncircumcision, but a new creation” (Gal. 
6:15).  Yet there is an oldness that still remains in our flesh.  Nevertheless, if you 
follow the judgment of the new nature, the new self, you are putting on the new 
nature or new self; while if you lust according to the desires of the flesh, you are 
                                                 
234 Commentary on Colossians ch. 3 lec. 2.  Translation p. 82 – Deinde cum dicit expoliantes, etc., ostendit 
rationem quare sunt vitanda praedicta vitia, quia scilicet deposita vetustate, debet indui novitas. Matth. IX, 
16: nemo mittit commissuram panni rudis in vestimentum vetus, et cetera. Et primo ponit depositionem 
vetustatis; secundo assumptionem novitatis, ibi et induentes. Dicit ergo:deponite, hoc expoliantes, et cetera. 
Nam hoc inveteratur per peccatum. Hebr. VIII, 13: quod autem antiquatur et senescit, prope interitum est. 
Haec vetustas propinquat corruptioni, quia peccatum est via ad corruptionem. Item per peccatum perditur 
virtus et decor spiritualis, quae quidem vetustas est introducta per peccatum primi parentis. Rom. V, 
12: sicut enim per unum hominem peccatum in hunc mundum intravit, et per peccatum mors, ita et in 
omnes homines mors pertransiit, in quo omnes peccaverunt. Hunc ergo veterem hominem, id est 
vetustatem peccati. Rom. VI, 6: vetus homo noster simul crucifixus est, ut destruatur corpus peccati, ut 
ultra non serviamus peccato, et cetera. Exuite cum actibus suis. Eph. IV, 22: deponite vos secundum 
pristinam conversationem veterem hominem, qui corrumpitur secundum desideria erroris, et cetera.  
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putting on the old self or nature: “Put on the new nature, created after the likeness 
of God in true righteousness and holiness” (Eph. 4:24).235 
Thomas again continues with the dichotomy between flesh and mind.  The new self is to 
be led by the judgment of the rational nature renewed and restored by grace.  Still, as 
Thomas reminds us, the human person is not solely their mind, nor do they fully escape 
the possibility of sinful desires. This occurs because “there is an oldness that still remains 
in our flesh,” that is, a propensity towards sin.  In interpreting this line, it is important to 
note that Thomas is not blaming flesh, that is, corporeal matter, but rather the possibility 
of the person being led astray by the sensitive aspect of the soul.  Hence, he writes that 
we ought to “follow the judgment of the new nature.”  Still Thomas is perhaps not as 
optimistic about the extent of human perfection as others in the Christian tradition, as he 
appears to believe that there is no point at which sinful desires either stop or our vigilance 
about our behavior can stop, short of the reception of the fullness of grace.   
Finally, in the last portion of this passage, Thomas identifies in specific terms the 
qualities that the new self possesses.  As was indicated in the previous chapter, the ideal 
person is one made to the image of God, and this is precisely what Thomas understands 
by the term “new self.”  He writes: 
                                                 
235 Ibid. – Novus homo est animus interius renovatus, quia homo, ante gratiam, habet mentem interiorem 
peccato subiectam, et quando reparatur per gratiam, habet novitatem. Ps. CII, 5: renovabitur ut aquilae 
iuventus tua. Gal. ult. 15: in Christo Iesu neque circumcisio, neque praeputium aliquid valet, sed nova 
creatura. Nova creatura est gratia innovans, sed adhuc vetustas remanet in carne. Sed si sequaris iudicium 
novi hominis, tunc induis novum hominem; si vero concupiscis secundum desideria carnis, induis 
vetustatem. Eph. IV, v. 24: induite novum hominem, qui secundum Deum creatus est in iustitia, et 
sanctitate veritatis. Deinde cum dicit et induentes, etc., describit novum hominem. Et primo ostendit 
renovationis modum, secundo ubi renovetur, tertio secundum quid renovatur. Ostendit ergo quod interior 
homo vetus per ignorantiam Dei, renovatur per fidem et agnitionem Dei. II Cor. III, 18: in eamdem 
imaginem transformamur a claritate in claritatem, tamquam a domini spiritu. Sed ubi est haec renovatio? 
Ibi, scilicet ubi est imago Dei, quae non est in potentiis sensitivae partis, sed in mente. 
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Then when Paul says, and have put on the new nature, he describes the new self.  
First, he shows how this renewal takes place, second, where it takes place.  He 
shows that the inner self, having become old by its ignorance of God, is made 
new by faith and the knowledge of God: “we are being changed into his likeness 
from one degree of glory to another” (2 Cor 3:18).  And where is this renewal 
taking place? It is taking place where the image of God is, and this is not in the 
sense faculties, but in the mind.  And so Paul says, after [in the sense of “with 
respect to”] the image of its creator.  In other words, the image of God in us is 
being renewed.236 
Through our alignment of what we consider ourselves to be with the rational aspect of 
our nature, we are actually aligning ourselves with the image of God.  This is, of course, 
accomplished through grace and not our own actions, but can at least be described as a 
co-operation between humans and God.   
 In another passage from Thomas’s Commentary on the Epistle to the Ephesians, 
Thomas provides more specifics of the old nature.  In particular, he describes how the old 
nature is not something “exterior,” that is, outside of the soul, but that a person actually 
becomes “old” in their soul through adherence to sinful actions.   
First, what does the old man mean?  Some hold that the old man is external and 
the new man interior.  But it must be said that the old man is both interior and 
                                                 
236 Commentary on Colossians ch. 3 lec. 2 –Eph. IV, v. 24: induite novum hominem, qui secundum Deum 
creatus est in iustitia, et sanctitate veritatis. Deinde cum dicit et induentes, etc., describit novum hominem. 
Et primo ostendit renovationis modum, secundo ubi renovetur, tertio secundum quid renovatur. Ostendit 
ergo quod interior homo vetus per ignorantiam Dei, renovatur per fidem et agnitionem Dei. II Cor. III, 
18: in eamdem imaginem transformamur a claritate in claritatem, tamquam a domini spiritu. Sed ubi est 
haec renovatio? Ibi, scilicet ubi est imago Dei, quae non est in potentiis sensitivae partis, sed in mente. 
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exterior; he is a person who is enslaved by a senility in his soul, due to sin, and in 
his body whose members provide the tools for sin.  Thus a man enslaved to sin in 
soul and body is an old man.  He is already on the way to corruption, or is actually 
beginning to decay since “that which decayeth and grow old is near its end” (Heb. 
8:13).  And so man subjected to sin is termed an old man because he is on the way 
to corruption.  On this account, he goes on, corrupted according to the desire of 
error. Anything will corrupt when it deviates from the order of its inner being.  
Man’s nature longs for what accords with reason; and truth is reason’s perfection 
and good.  Hence, when someone’s reason sways toward error, and his desire is 
corrupted from this error, he is referred to as an old man.237 
This passage helps to clarify what Thomas means in condemning the flesh; it is not that 
the flesh is inherently sinful, but rather by a person’s decision to follow the desires of the 
sensitive appetite out of accord with reason, a person is behaving according to the flesh.  
The problem, therefore, still lies in the soul, that is, in the interior of the person, and their 
failure to follow what is proper to themselves, reason.  The person is thus called upon to 
deny the desires of the flesh, and not to harm or renounce the flesh itself.  Thomas 
describes how this is accomplished: “In Colossians 3:9, the apostle indicates how to leave 
the old man behind: Stripping yourselves of the old man with his deeds. The substance of 
                                                 
237 Commentary on Ephesians Ch. 4 lec. 7 – Primo quid intelligatur per veterem hominem. Dicunt aliqui, 
quod hic homo vetus exterior, novus vero dicitur interior. Sed dicendum est quod homo vetus dicitur tam 
interior quam exterior, qui subiicitur vetustati quantum ad animam per peccatum et quantum ad corpus, 
quia membra corporis sunt arma peccati. Et sic, subiectus homo peccato secundum animam et corpus, 
dicitur vetus homo, secundum quod illa vetusta sunt, quae sunt in via corruptionis, vel in ipso corrumpi; 
quia quod antiquatur et senescit, prope interitum est, ut dicitur ad Hebr. VIII, 13. Et sic homo subiectus 
peccato dicitur vetus, quia est in via corruptionis; propter quod subdit qui corrumpitur secundum desideria 
erroris. Nam unumquodque corrumpitur, cum recedit ab ordine naturae suae. Natura autem hominis est, ut 
desiderium eius tendat ad id quod est secundum rationem. Perfectio autem et bonum rationis est veritas. 
Quando ergo ratio tendit ad errorem, et desiderium ex hoc errore corrumpitur, tunc vetus homo dicitur. 
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human nature is not to be rejected or despoiled, but only wicked actions and conduct.”  
This distinction is helpful in clarifying the ascetic aspect of Thomas’s spiritual practices; 
Thomas is not, in distinction from the caricature of medieval figures, a believer in bodily 
disfigurement for the purpose of chastising the flesh.  The goal in chastising the flesh is 
to create a mind capable of rejecting the impulses of the sensitive aspect of the soul, not 
to harm the corporeal part of the body. 
 This is emphasized as well in a passage from Thomas’s Commentary on Galatians.  
In this section, Thomas indicates the proper means of restraining the fleshly aspect of the 
person, working from Galatians 5:24: “And those who belong to Christ Jesus have 
crucified the flesh with its passions and desires.”238  He writes:  
He does not say that they shun vices and concupiscences, because a good 
physician cures well, when he applies remedies against the cause of the disease. 
But the flesh is the root of vices. Therefore, if we would shun vices, the flesh 
must be tamed: “I chastise my body and bring it under subjection” (1 Cor 9:27). 
But because the flesh is tamed by vigils, fasts and labors—“Torture and fetters are 
for a malicious slave; send him to work that he be not idle” (Sir 33:28)—and one 
is led to such works out of devotion to Christ crucified. Therefore he specifically 
says, they have crucified, i.e., conformed themselves to Christ crucified by 
afflicting their flesh: “Our old man is crucified with him that the body of sin may 
                                                 
238 NRSV.  Douay-Rheims: “And they that are Christ’s have crucified their flesh with the vices and 
concupiscences.” Vulgate: Qui autem sunt Christi carnem crucifixerunt cum vitiis et concupiscentiis. 
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be destroyed” (Rom 6:6); that I may live to God: with Christ I am nailed to the 
cross (2:19).239 
There are a number of interesting elements in this passage.  First, the employment of the 
physician metaphor for moral treatment is noteworthy; the disease afflicting humans in 
this situation are the vices and concupiscences, and these may be “cured” by taming the 
flesh.  The practices Thomas recommends for taming the flesh are found in a line taken 
from John Cassian’s Collations, and is one which Thomas repeats throughout his works.  
“Vigils, fasts, and labors,” are three practices Thomas recommends for chastising and 
restraining the flesh, and each of these will appear with greater explanation in other 
locations.  Finally, this method of chastising the flesh is not about bodily torture.  For 
Thomas, as will be developed in the next chapter of this dissertation, the practices of 
fasting, vigils, and labors do not involve doing bodily damage to oneself.  Fasting, for 
Thomas, is about restraining oneself only to what food is necessary for proper bodily 
function.  Vigils, or concerted times of prayer, are not practiced by ignoring the needs of 
the body; likewise, Thomas includes reading, writing, and contemplation under the 
                                                 
239 Commentary on Galatians ch. 5, lec. 7 – Isti, inquam, carnem suam crucifixerunt, et cetera. Non autem 
dicit: vitia et concupiscentias vitant, quia bonus medicus tunc bene curat, quando adhibet remedia contra 
causam morbi. Caro autem est radix vitiorum. Si ergo volumus vitare vitia, oportet domare carnem. I Cor. 
IX, 27: castigo corpus meum, et cetera. Quia vero caro domatur per vigilias, ieiunia et labores Eccli. 
XXXIII, 28: servo malevolo tortura et compedes, etc. ad haec autem opera moventur ex devotione quam 
habent ad Christum crucifixum, ideo signanter dicit crucifixerunt, id est Christo crucifixo se 
conformaverunt, affligendo carnem suam, et cetera. Rom. VI, 6: vetus homo noster simul crucifixus est, et 
cetera. Supra II: ut Deo vivam, Christo confixus sum cruci, et cetera. 
Quia vero non crucifigunt carnem destruendo naturam, quia nemo carnem suam odio habuit, ut dicitur Eph. 
V, 29, sed quantum ad ea quae contrariantur legi, ideo dicit cum vitiis, id est cum peccatis, et 
concupiscentiis, id est passionibus, quibus anima inclinatur ad peccandum. Non enim bene crucifigit 
carnem qui etiam passionibus locum non aufert, aliter cum ratio non semper invigilet ad peccata vitandum, 
ut oportet, posset quandoque cadere. Eccli. XVIII, 30: post concupiscentias tuas non eas, et cetera. Rom. 
XIII, 14:carnis curam ne feceritis in desideriis, et cetera. 
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umbrella of “labor,” and does not recommend much manual labor for those engaged in 
the religious orders.  Thomas explains this further in the same lecture: 
But because they do not crucify the flesh by destroying nature, for “No one hates 
his own flesh” (Eph 5:29), but with respect to matters that are contrary to the 
Law, for that reason he says, with the vices, i.e., with the sins, and 
concupiscences, i.e., passions, whereby the soul is inclined to sin. For he does not 
crucify his flesh well who leaves room for passions; otherwise, since reason is not 
always alert to avoid sin, as it ought, he might fall at some time: “Go not after thy 
lusts, but turn away from thy own will” (Sir 18:30); “Make not provision for the 
flesh in its concupiscence” (Rom 13:14).240 
As Thomas suggests, the work of “crucifying the flesh” is a matter of the proper presence 
of the passions within a person, and not a question of inflicting bodily harm in order to 
resist vices and concupiscences.  What a person ought to do, instead, is avoid sin, 
something which is accomplished in two ways.  The first is the alertness of reason in 
watching the self and preventing inappropriate thoughts and actions; the second is 
through the redirection of the affections, and the movement away from sinful desires.  
This second aspect becomes necessary because “reason is not always alert to avoid sin.”  
Since this is the case, a person is aided in avoiding sin by not having the desires that lead 
                                                 
240 Commentary on Galatians ch. 5 lec. 7 – Quia vero non crucifigunt carnem destruendo naturam, 
quia nemo carnem suam odio habuit, ut dicitur Eph. V, 29, sed quantum ad ea quae contrariantur legi, ideo 
dicit cum vitiis, id est cum peccatis, et concupiscentiis, id est passionibus, quibus anima inclinatur ad 
peccandum. Non enim bene crucifigit carnem qui etiam passionibus locum non aufert, aliter cum ratio non 
semper invigilet ad peccata vitandum, ut oportet, posset quandoque cadere. Eccli. XVIII, 30: post 
concupiscentias tuas non eas, et cetera. Rom. XIII, 14:carnis curam ne feceritis in desideriis, et cetera. 
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to sin.  In the next chapter, working from the De Perfectione, Thomas describes what are 
essentially practices of distraction to help a person avoid those sinful desires. 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I provided an overview of the work of Thomas Aquinas on the matter 
of self-relation.  As Christopher Gill writes, in quoting from Plato’s Republic and 
describing one of the classical models of personhood, “the oligarchic person is ‘never 
free of internal strife’ and is a ‘double person’ a ‘διπλους, because there is a constant 
struggle between the reason and the rest.”241  This characterization is absolutely true for 
Thomas, as seen from his description of the concept of the Old and New man.  This 
double person, however, does not mark the extent of the relationship of the self.  The 
practices which accompany the distinction between Old and New self also call one’s 
attention to God and to the neighbor.  The person, therefore, is called to seek God, and to 
aid others in seeking God as well.  This pursuit requires vigilance and solicitude, an 
ordered fear of God, and a desire to accomplish the good.   
 The account of reflexivity in Thomas is one of some tension, therefore.  For persons 
who are fully blessed by grace, however, like Jesus, the lower faculties are fully aligned 
with the direction of reason, and no tension exists.  For the rest, however, a reliance on 
grace and the practices which help align the rest of one’s faculties with reason are 
required.  These practices, especially solicitude and watchfulness over the self, closely 
resemble many of the classical aspects of reflexive self-understanding.  There is no 
emphasis on uncovering any sort of deep, hidden truth within the self; self knowledge is 
momentary, and is about the examination of actions and thoughts with regard to 
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determining a proper thought or course of action.  As will be suggested in the next 
chapter, the practices associated with the examination of thoughts are rather limited, with 
Thomas essentially recommending the immediate dismissal of any illicit thoughts of any 
sort.  With this practice, there is no possibility of the examination of illicit thoughts, 





Chapter 4 - On the vows and the perfection of the spiritual life 
 
Following the introduction to Aquinas and the concepts of spiritual exercise and 
reflexivity, this next chapter will provide an analysis of Aquinas’s De perfectione 
spiritualis vitae as a key example of his employment of these two areas of moral 
development.  The De perfectione is a treatise on perfection, written in the context of the 
debate over the role of religious orders and poverty which began in the middle of the 13th 
century.  It is an especially important text for this dissertation in that it offers, in a 
condensed form, an explanation of perfection, the practices which serve as a means to 
perfection, and the understanding of self requisite for this pursuit.  In this way, it serves 
as an abbreviated description of the whole of Thomas’s teaching on how one ought to 
live. 
 This chapter will cover a number of issues: first, the context of the De perfectione and 
its popularity.  Second, Aquinas’s understanding of human perfection, as described in 
both the De perfectione and in the Summa Theologiae and Summa Contra Gentiles, and 
the importance of the three vows of the religious orders.  Finally, I will turn to a 
discussion of the De perfectione in detail, an effort which will represent much of this 
chapter.  In this discussion, I will focus on the description Thomas offers of the three 
means to perfection, namely poverty, continence, and obedience, and the accompanying 
practices which are subsumed under these means.  As Thomas will repeatedly emphasize, 
being poor, chaste, and obedient does not make a person perfect; but the practices of 
these three can aid in a person’s becoming perfect through the grace of God.   
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 These three means to perfection represent, of course, the three vows taken by 
members of religious orders, including Thomas’s own Dominican order.  Thomas does 
not, however, refer to them as vows initially, nor does he refer to any specific religious 
order.  Instead, poverty, continence, and obedience are discussed as general means to 
perfection, one which can in fact be embodied and fulfilled by rich, married men.  This is 
especially important to note: Thomas does not write the De perfectione only for the 
religious orders, though the text, of course, holds the greatest resonance with their way of 
life.  Thomas continually responds to questions regarding Abraham and other exemplars 
from the Hebrew Scriptures who were wealthy, married, and did not have a hierarchy to 
be obedient to.  This does not exclude them from perfection, however; as Thomas writes 
of Abraham, he was poor in that he had no affection for external things; he was continent 
in that his sexual activity took place in a rightly ordered manner within the confines of 
marriage; he was obedient in that he was obedient directly unto God.  Thus, the De 
Perfectione is a manual for all people concerning the path to perfection in this life.   
 What is represented in this description of the spiritual life is an emphasis on 
contemplation and the life of the mind similar to that found in classical thinkers.242  
Poverty, continence, and obedience represent a reprioritization of affections in the 
person; poverty is the separation of one’s undue affections from external things; 
continence is the separation of one’s affections from other persons, including family 
members, children, wives, and so on, where these form obstacles to charity; obedience is 
                                                 
242 Seneca does, in fact, provide a description of the spiritual life rather similar in his encouragement to 
avoid the attachment of affections to things, other humans, and the orientation of the person towards 




the separation of one’s affections for one’s own will.  This movement of separation and 
redirection of affections affirms the priority of place for the intellectus and its 
relationship to God.  In Thomas, one separates one’s undue affections from all of the 
lower aspects of the person, including the body, the sensitive appetite, and the will, but a 
person never disregards their higher rational faculty.243  The reason for this control of the 
lower aspects is clear; the emphasis in Thomas is on preparing the person for 
contemplation of God, something which is better accomplished through the proper 
disposition of one’s affections. 
 Poverty and continence are accompanied by certain practices directed towards the 
withdrawal of the affections from external things.  As Thomas describes poverty in this 
text, a person in voluntary poverty is not necessarily materially poor, but rather lacks 
attachment to the material things surrounding their person, using them only as necessary 
for the maintenance of the body and the efforts of the religious life.  Likewise, the 
continent person is not necessarily someone who avoids all sexual activity, but that 
person who has due attachment to their relations.  At the same time, however, Thomas 
does offer a special chapter on “aids to the preservation of chastity,”244 one which 
provides spiritual exercises directed towards the celibate life of a professed religious 
person.  In this chapter, Thomas describes seven exercises aimed at maintaining the 
chastity of a person, each of which will be described in detail below. 
                                                 
243 Though Thomas speaks of separating affections from such things, he makes clear that he is only 
speaking of preventing undue solicitude over such concerns.  A person should always provide due care for 
their own body, just not such care as would prevent them from the love of God. 
244 De Perfectione 9 
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 This movement of affections also provides a further description of the relationship of 
self to self in Thomas.  As was established in the previous chapter, the person should seek 
to identify as their rational nature in order to live a moral life.  This does not, however, 
mean a denial or removal of the affections or of the will.  Instead, the affective aspect of a 
person performs in a reasonable way, in concert with one’s reason.  Nonetheless, Thomas 
does recommend a certain distancing of the person from the lower faculties.  In the De 
perfectione, Thomas explains that the vow of obedience is about “charitable self-
hatred”245 and the sacrifice of one’s own will to God.  For members of religious orders, 
this is accomplished by a vow of obedience to follow the direction of one’s superior, who 
serves as a proxy for God.  In describing this vow, Thomas uses reflexive language like 
self-hatred, self-abnegation, and self-denial to describe the mindset necessary for 
achieving this form of obedience.  Furthermore he argues, in distinction from the 
previous two means that “this practice of salutary self-abnegation and charitable self-
hatred [obedience], is, in part, necessary for all men in order to salvation, and is, partly, a 
point of perfection.”  Thomas justifies this statement by appealing to Dionysius, 
summarizing him thus: “it is in the nature of divine love that he who loves should belong 
not to himself, but to the one beloved.”246  For the human to love God, therefore, a degree 
of renunciation of self is necessary. 
Argument 
 Once more, the human is approached as a project to be worked on, one which 
requires constant maintenance and care to keep from going astray.  As described in the 
                                                 




previous chapters, the identity Thomas believes humans ought to hold is with their 
intellect or mind.  In identifying as mind, a true “self” is not produced, however; there is 
no language of self-realization or true self in Thomas.  Instead, the person is encouraged 
to take up a position that distances the mind from the other aspects of the human life, 
such that the mind is able to operate without encumbrance.  Thus, for poverty, the person 
renounces goods so that he does not have to use his mind for the procurement of goods, 
saving its activity for contemplation.  Likewise for chastity, an unmarried man does not 
need to provide for a family, and he is able to combat sexual desires, such that they lessen 
their hold on the person over time.  The vow of obedience does even more, in that a 
person no longer has to consider precisely his own activities, in terms of where he is 
going or what he is doing, though it is still of great importance that a person be aware of 
his actions and only obey when it is morally approvable. 
 In these three movements away from encumbrance, there is a profound comment on 
the nature of sin and human perfection for Thomas.  Sin and perfection are the two 
options for the human mind; each originates with the activity of thought, and the nature 
of each thought leads to a chain reaction.  A sinful thought, as Thomas will explain in the 
section on chastity, quite often leads to a sinful action.  The consideration of good things, 
however, will preserve the person from sinful action.   
 Most importantly, in terms of the reflexive understanding of the self, there is no 
emphasis on confessing or providing an account of any “self.”  As seen previously, the 
interior movement of Thomas’s spirituality leads to treating most of the human person as 
“extrinsic” to the thing that is most properly the self.  This prevents any need for 
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confessing a sinful thought as something “self-constituting;” that is, a person’s identity is 
not constituted by their actions, whether good or bad.  Thomas still acknowledges the 
need for confession and repentance,247 but these are accomplished more towards 
preventing future error, and less because of the weight of sin.    
The Perfection of the Spiritual Life 
 The De perfectione spiritualis vitae is perhaps one of the least read of Thomas’s 
works in modern times.  This is, one may suggest, a result of two overriding 
characterizations of the text which serve to preclude its consideration.  First, it is 
understood as a product of the debate over the validity of mendicant orders, a statement 
which is in many ways accurate, but requires further qualification.  Torrell dates the De 
perfectione to the early months of 1270, “since its last chapters echo the Quodlibet XIV 
of Gerard of Abbeville held at Christmas 1269.”248  This places the text about fifteen 
years after Thomas’s original defense of religious orders, the Contra impugnantes Dei 
cultum et religionem.  In each of these works, Thomas responds to critiques from those in 
university positions against the existence of the new religious orders in general, and in 
particular their involvement in the universities.  Thomas responds by providing an 
explanation of what the religious orders do, why they are justified, and why those arguing 
against them are incorrect.  The two works share many similarities, but there is one key 
difference.  The De perfectione contains an extended teaching on the subject of 
perfection, and a detailed explanation of the observance and intent of the vows taken by 
                                                 
247 Confession and repentance in Thomas needs further discussion in Thomas, especially in light of his 
spiritual practices.  Thomas does not show much concern for the practice of confession in most of his 
writings, though repentance will make a few appearances.   
248 Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas I, 85.  Gerard’s Quodlibet was critical once more of the mendicant orders 
and their emphasis on poverty.   
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professed religious.  This leads to the second characterization of the text, again from 
Torrell:  
The interest of the De perfectione is not limited to the history of this polemic.  
From the very outset, its teaching on Christian perfection and the religious life 
begins an exposition that will find its completion in the Summa and is already 
rather different from the one in the Contra Gentiles.  Furthermore, this little work 
marks a decisive stage in Thomistic theology about the bishop’s office.249 
The De perfectione is thus understood in two ways: first, as an example of polemic in the 
debate over religious orders, and second, as a sort of trial run to the questions found in 
the Summa Theologiae on “The acts which pertain especially to certain men” (cf. ST II-
II.181-188).  For these reasons, many are inclined to overlook the text in favor of the 
Summa Theologiae. 
 Despite this characterization, there is to be found in the De perfectione an important 
reflection of the spiritual life according to Thomas Aquinas.  Thomas never wrote a short 
spiritual treatise as did his contemporaries, e.g. Bonaventure’s Lignum vitae or 
Itinerarium mentis in Deum, or Albert’s De adhaerendo deo.  The De perfectione does, 
however, represent a rather similar entry, and was in fact a widely distributed work.  J.N. 
Hillgarth, in his lecture, Who Read Thomas Aquinas?, describes the work as “very 
popular” and writes that “118 copies of the De perfectione survive, as compared to only 
one or three copies of the works against which Thomas was writing.”250  He writes 
                                                 
249 Ibid., 86. 
250 Hillgarth 6.  Leonard Boyle’s work The setting of the ‘Summa Theologiae’ of Thomas Aquinas identifies 




further that “The Contra impugnantes, a defense of mendicants, and the De perfectione 
spiritualis vitae, an apologia for religious orders, were copied for Benedictine houses 
from Normandy to Austria.”251   
 Regardless of previous characterizations, the De perfectione does provide some 
important teachings, which provide us with a fuller picture of the spiritual practices of 
Thomas Aquinas.  In particular, the first fifteen chapters are of particular interest (out of 
twenty-six total in the work), the last several chapters containing teachings on the work 
of bishops and responses to criticisms from opponents.  These first chapters contain 
Thomas’s teachings on perfection, the vows, and charity.  These chapters also provide 
practical advice less apparently found in Thomas’s Summae, in the form of spiritual 
exercises.  These aspects make the De perfectione not only an “apologia” for religious 
orders, nor a simple defense of mendicant orders, but a text which offers an in-depth 
teaching of how one progresses towards perfection within the spiritual life, which is 
available to all persons.  In Thomas’s own words, in introducing the text, he describes it 
as a “treatise on perfection, explaining what is meant by the term; how perfection is 
acquired; what is the state of perfection; and what are the employments befitting those 
who embrace this state.”252  
 The decision to emphasize the place of the De perfectione in the corpus of Thomas 
Aquinas is the result of several considerations.  First, the texts popularity in its own day 
provides a warrant for modern readers to at least be aware of the text.  Second, its subject 
                                                 
251 Hillgarth 11. 
252  De Perfectione 1 - Quoniam quidam perfectionis ignari, de perfectionis statu vana quaedam dicere 
praesumpserunt, propositum nostrae intentionis est de perfectione tractare: quid sit esse perfectum, qualiter 
perfectio acquiratur, quis perfectionis status, et quae competant assumentibus perfectionis statum. 
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matter: the De perfectione contains in a concise form the teaching of Thomas Aquinas on 
the spiritual life, including a focus on the three vows of the religious orders (poverty, 
chastity, and obedience), and how these are actually applicable in the life of all persons, 
even those who are wealthy and married (e.g., Abraham).  Although much of the text is 
committed to an explanation of the various offices of persons in the church, and to a 
defense of the mendicant orders, the chapters on the spiritual life provide a teaching that 
serves as an important entry point into the work of Thomas Aquinas.   
The End of the Spiritual Life 
 For Thomas, the spiritual life is about the pursuit of perfection, which holds many 
degrees.  Thomas writes that “we must bear in mind that the word ‘perfect’ (perfectum) is 
used in several senses.  A thing may be absolutely perfect or it may be perfect 
relatively.”253  Perfection for humans is understood to consist in the possession of charity, 
something which is possible in a limited way while we remain on earth.  The priority of 
charity is understood by Thomas to be a teaching of Paul: “Paul considers charity as the 
chief element in perfection.”  Therefore, “the spiritual life consists, principally, in 
charity.”254  This love in which perfection consists is not limited to the love of God.  
Instead, following Christ’s two “precepts of charity,” humans are called to the love of 
God and the love of neighbor.255   
According to the De perfectione, there are three ways to enact the love of God, and 
thus three possible ways of being perfect.  The first form of perfection is God’s alone, 
and refers to God’s perfect self-love.  The second refers to the love achieved by the 
                                                 
253 Ibid. 
254 Ibid., 1 
255 Ibid., 2 
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blessed, those who dwell in the presence of God.  Finally, the third way of loving God 
refers to humans as they are now in the world (wayfarers).  Perfect perfection is not 
possible in this life; instead, perfection for wayfarers consists in the “endeavor, as far as 
we can, to emulate” the perfection of the blessed.256  For these persons, the love of God is 
perfect if there is “nothing in us which is wanting to divine love, that is to say, if there is 
nothing in us which we do not, actually or habitually, refer to God.”257 
 For Thomas, the means to the state of perfection are not found simply in the precepts 
(laws) of the Bible, but in the counsels provided by Jesus (as was commonly accepted at 
that time).  This distinction, between counsels and precepts, is particularly interesting, 
and is actually found in an article in the Summa (II.II 184.3).  Thomas is careful to say 
that the counsels do not overstep the precepts given, and that perfection is not restricted 
to those who follow the counsels.  He does say, however, that the counsels “call” or 
“invite” humans to perfection in this life, something which occurs in a different way than 
is possible in the observance of precepts.258 
 The calls provided by the counsels, in concert with the vows of the religious, provide 
the structure for the next sections in the De Perfectione.  These three are, of course, 
poverty or “the renunciation of earthly possessions,” continence or “perpetual chastity,” 
and third, “the abnegation of our own will,” or obedience.  These three vows form the 
key means to the achievement of the perfection of the spiritual life, and in his discussion 
of each of these categories, Thomas provides practical advice as to how it is possible to 
realize the pursuit of these goals.   
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 This practical advice is centered on a passage from Augustine, which Thomas 
summarizes as follows: 
It is abundantly clear that the human heart is more intensely attracted to one 
object in proportion as it is withdrawn from a multiplicity of desires.  Therefore, 
the more a man is delivered from solicitude concerning temporal matters, the 
more perfectly he will be enabled to love God.  Hence Augustine says in the Book 
of 83 Questions that the hope of gaining or keeping material wealth is the poison 
of charity; that, as charity increases, cupidity diminishes; and that when charity 
becomes perfect, cupidity ceases to exist.  Hence, all the counsels which call man 
to perfection tend to withdraw his affections from temporal objects; so that his 
soul is enabled the more freely to turn to God by contemplating Him, loving Him, 
and fulfilling His will.259 
The withdrawal and redirection of desires provides the logic for the three vows taken by 
the members of religious orders.  The renunciation of material possessions separates our 
affections from the things we use to live, and limits our concern to the greatest extent 
possible, thereby freeing us for the love of God.  Likewise, the renunciation of earthly 
ties and matrimony separates our affections from other people, and our affection for our 
own sensitive nature.  Finally, obedience separates our affections from our own freedom 
of willing.  For Thomas, this completes the separation of our affection from things 
                                                 
259 Ibid., Manifestum namque est quod humanum cor tanto intensius in aliquid unum fertur, quanto magis a 
multis revocatur.  Sic igitur tanto perfectius animus hominis ad Deum diligendum fertur, quanto magis ab 
affectu temporalium removetur.  Unde Augustinus dicit in libro LXXXIII quaestionum quod venenum 
caritatis est cupiditas diminutio; perfectio vero nulla cupiditas.  Omnia igitur consilia, quibus ad 





external to the divine and to the divine image within us, allowing for the proper directing 
of the affections towards God.  Again, this separation is predicated in terms of freeing us 
from solicitude over external things, not by suggesting the essential immorality of those 
things which are rejected.  Thomas recognizes that external goods, marriage, family, and 
one’s own will are not essentially wrong, thus needing to be renounced; instead, he is 
arguing that our continued concern over all these things, i.e. the need to provide food and 
shelter for oneself, watch over one’s family, and choose the best course of life for 
oneself, are activities that distract us from committing ourselves fully to the love and 
praise of God in contemplation and action.   
The Summae on Perfection 
 Thomas repeats the threefold distinction in defining perfection in the Summa 
Theologiae, though the discussion is accomplished in different terms.  Instead, Thomas 
relates perfection to the capacities held in each part of the relationship of love.  The first 
form is “absolute, and answers to a totality not only on the part of lover, but also on the 
part of the object loved,” whereas the second form, “answers to an absolute totality on the 
part of the lover,” and not to the object loved as well.  God is perfect as lover and 
beloved, because the object is fully loved and understood and loves itself; the objective 
loved and the lover stand in perfect unity in this understanding, and thus, love is perfect.  
In the second form of perfection, which Thomas again identifies with the “blessed,” it is 
the affective faculty of the person which always tends to the object loved, which remains, 
to an extent, a separate entity, thus limiting the possibility of perfection.   
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 The third form of perfection, as above, refers to human perfection as possible in this 
life.  Again, it is dependent on the degree of charity present within us, and the removal of 
all impediments260 to this charity.  The impediments to charity are, of course, sin and 
misdirected affections.  Thomas explains: 
Such perfection can be had in this life, and in two ways.  First, by the removal 
from man’s affections of all that is contrary to charity, such as mortal sin; and 
there can be no charity apart from this perfection wherefore it is necessary to 
salvation.  Secondly, by the removal from man’s affections not only of whatever 
is contrary to charity, but also of whatever hinders the mind’s affections from 
tending wholly to God.261 
The answer provided in the Summa Theologiae is largely the same as that seen in the De 
perfectione, and certainly holds the same implications for human action.  The human 
should, in order to attain the perfection of charity, avoid sin and direct the affections fully 
towards God.   
                                                 
260 The term “impediment” appears well over 1000 times in Thomas, especially in noun and verb forms, 
mainly to refer to external things, passions, or other motions which negatively impact charity, reason, or the 
will.  For the use of the term in this dissertation, see the following: SCG 3.133.4 (n.246), Perfectione 9 
(n.285, n. 282, n.291, n. 316) ST I-II.46.4 ad 3 (n.346) II-II.123.1 (n.371, n.372) SCG 4.54.8 (n.107) ST II-
II.186.1 ad 4 (n.110) ST II-II.189.1 (n.113, n.158) SCG 4.54.3 (n.155) SCG 3.133.4 (n.264) II-II.184.2 
(n.260) SCG 3.136.13 (n.274) ST II-II.25.7 (n.302) I-II.33.3 (n.344) I-II.48.3 (n.347) SCG 3.132.14 (n.112) 
III.15.4 (n.138) ST III.15.9 ad 3(n.142) ST II-II.186.4 (n.161) ST II-II.182.3 (n.173)  This is an often 
overlooked aspect of the thought of Thomas Aquinas, but as its repeated occurrence  in this dissertation 
suggests, without any intended collation on my part, it plays an important role in the thought of Thomas 
Aquinas.  It is translated in a number of ways: hindrance, impediment, obstacle, or as a verb, to hinder, or 
to impede. 
261 ST II-II.184.2 - Et talis perfectio potest in hac vita haberi.  Et hoc dupliciter.  Uno modo, inquantum ab 
affectu hominis excluditur omne illud quod caritati contrariatur, sicut est peccatum mortale.  Et sine tali 
perfectione caritas esse, non potest.  Unde est de necessitate salutis.  Alio modo, inquantum ab affectu 
hominis excluditur non solum illud quod est caritati contrarium, sed etiam omne illud quod impedit ne 
affectus mentis totaliter dirigatur ad Deum.   
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This description can also be seen in Thomas’s understanding of the “perfecting” 
virtues.  Thomas describes these as the “virtues of men who are on their way and tending 
towards the Divine similitude.”  He writes; 
Thus prudence, by contemplating the things of God, counts as nothing all the 
things of the world, and directs all the thoughts of the soul to God alone: 
temperance, so far as nature allows, neglects the needs of the body: fortitude 
prevents the soul from being afraid of neglecting the body and rising to heavenly 
things; and justice consists in the soul giving a whole-hearted consent to follow 
the way thus proposed....Thus, prudence sees naught else but the things of God; 
temperance knows no earthly desires; fortitude has no knowledge of passion; and 
justice, by imitating the Divine Mind, is united thereto by an everlasting covenant.  
Such are the virtues attributed to the Blessed, or, in this life, to some who are at 
the summit of perfection.262 
One immediately notices the cardinal virtues in this passage, especially in that Thomas 
here gives them a particularly “religious” appearance.  This sort of interpretation of 
“tending to perfection” runs throughout Thomas’s work, and is not limited to the De 
perfectione.  The emphasis in the passage above, and elsewhere, is a complete focus on 
the divine and a withdrawal of affection, as far as is reasonably possible, from worldly 
things.  
                                                 
262 ST I-II.61.5 - Ita scilicet quod prudentia omnia mundana divinorum contemplatione despiciat, 
omnemque animae cogitationem in divina sola dirigat; temperantia vero relinquat, inquantum natura 
patitur, quae corporis usus requirit; fortitudinis autem est ut anima non terreatur propter excessum a 
corpore, et accessum ad superna; iustitia vero est ut tota anima consentiat ad huius propositi viam….Ita 
scilicet quod prudentia sola divina intueatur; temperantia terrenas cupiditates nesciat; fortitudo passiones 
ignoret; iustitia cum divina mente perpetuo focedere societur, eam scilicet imitando.  Quas quidem virtutes 
dicimus esse beatorum, vel aliquorum in hac vita perfectissimorum. 
4-169 
 
Elsewhere in the Summae, Thomas presents this distinction as the difference 
between necessary and inordinate solicitude.  These two texts provide a relatively 
consistent approach with that seen in the De Perfectione, though with a more expansive 
treatment of the subject.  In one section in the Summa Contra Gentilium, Thomas 
describes in detail the rationale for the three vows.  He writes: 
Moreover, in the general mode of human life, human concern is devoted to three 
items: first, to one’s own person, what he should do, or where he should spend his 
time; second, to the persons connected with him, chiefly his wife and children; 
and third, to the acquisition of external things, which a man needs for the 
maintenance of life.  So, to cut off solicitude for external things the counsel of 
poverty is given in the divine law...And to cut off concern for wife and children 
there is given man the counsel of virginity or continence....Finally to cut off 
man’s solicitude even for himself there is given the counsel of obedience, through 
which man hands over the control of his own acts to a superior.263 
It is noteworthy that at no point in this discussion, or in the previous one in the De 
Perfectione, that Thomas mentions the renouncing of the mind.  This is for the simple 
reason that freeing up the mind for its proper activity is the intent of all these actions.  As 
indicated in the second chapter of this dissertation, the end of human life is found in the 
contemplation of God.  Thomas understands the vows of the religious to be precisely for 
                                                 
263 SCG 3.130.2 - Occupatur autem humana sollicitudo, secundum communem modum humanae vitae, 
circa tria: primo quidem, circa propriam personam, quid agat, aut ubi conversetur; secundo autem, circa 
personas sibi coniunctas, praecipue uxorem et filios; tertio, circa res exteriores procurandas, quibus homo 
indiget ad sustentationem vitae.  Ad amputandum igitur sollicitudinem circa res exteriores, datur in lege 
divina consilium paupertatis: ut scilicet res huius mundi abiiciat, quibus animus eius sollicitudine aliqua 
implicari posset….Ad amputandam autem sollicitudinem uxoris et filiorum, datur homini consilium de 
virginitate vel continentia….Ad amputandam autem sollicitudinem hominis etiam circa seipsum, datur 
consilium obedientiae, per quam homo dispositionem suorum actuum superiori committit. 
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the sake of freeing the mind for contemplation.  He writes that “the perfection to which 
these three counsels give a disposition consists in detachment of the mind for God.”264  
The goal of the vows, therefore, is not found in the content of each vow, but the degree to 
which they contribute to the detachment of the mind from worldly concerns, which 
results in the freedom to contemplate the divine.  Thomas repeats this in the Summa 
Contra Gentilium:  
For poverty in itself is not good, but only insofar as it liberates from those things 
whereby a man is hindered from intending spiritual things.  Hence, the measure of 
its goodness depends on the manner in which man is freed by means of it from the 
aforementioned obstacles.  And this is generally true of all external things: they 
are good to the extent that they contribute to virtue, but not in themselves.265   
The same can be said for obedience and for chastity; they are not, in themselves, “good” 
things, but they become good by virtue of their contribution to the contemplation of God.   
 Again, one of the more important concepts in Thomas is the question of solicitude.  
As suggested in the previous chapter, there is a positive valence to the term, especially in 
regard to due concern over moral action.  Thomas is also highly concerned about 
inordinate solicitude (a vice), however, which provides part of the rationale for the vows.  
He writes: 
Our Lord forbade not necessary but inordinate solicitude.  Now there is a fourfold 
solicitude to be avoided in temporal matters.  First, we must not place our end in 
                                                 
264 SCG 3.130.6 - Perfectio autem ad quam praedicta disponunt, in vacatione mentis circa Deum consistit. 
265 SCG 3.133.4 - Non enim paupertas secundum se bona est: sed inquantum liberat ab illis quibus homo 
impeditur quominus spiritualibus intendat.  Unde secundum modum quo homo per eam liberatur ab 
impedimentis praedictis, est mensura bonitatis ipsius.  Et hoc est commune in omnibus exterioribus, quod 
in tantum bona sunt in quantum proficiunt ad virtutem, non autem secundum seipsa. 
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them, nor serve God for the sake of the necessities of food and raiment.  Second, 
we must not be so anxious about temporal things as to despair of God’s help: 
wherefore our Lord says: “Your father knoweth that you have need of all these 
things” (Mt. 6:32).  Thirdly, we must not add presumption to our solicitude; in 
other words, we must not be confident of getting the necessaries of life by our 
own efforts without God’s help: such solicitude Our Lord sets aside by saying that 
a man cannot add anything to his stature (Mt. 6:27).  [Fourthly] We must not 
anticipate the time for anxiety; namely, by being solicitous now for the needs, not 
of the present, but of a future time: wherefore He says: “Be not solicitous for 
tomorrow...” (Mt. 6:34).266 
This form of solicitude, the due care for oneself and those immediate to you, is not only 
approvable, it is morally necessary in most situations.  The reduction of this form of 
solicitude is accomplished through the vows, as even though this form of solicitude is 
justifiable, it still retains some of its distracting characteristics.   
The Means of Perfection 
 As indicated above, the three primary means to perfection are found in the 
renunciation of material things, earthly bonds, and one’s own will.  In the De Perfectione, 
Thomas provides a teaching on each of these vows, and describes some of the practices 
                                                 
266 ST I-II.108.3 ad 5 - Ad quintum dicendum quod dominus sollicitudinem necessarium non prohibuit, sed 
sollicitudinem inordinatam.  Est autem quadruplex inordinatio sollicitudinis vitanda circa temporalia.  
Primo quidem, ut in eis finem non constituamus, neque Deo serviamus propter necessaria victus et vestitus.  
Unde dicit, nolite thesaurizare vobis, et cetera.  Secundo, ut non sic sollicitemur de temporalibus, cum 
desperatione divini auxilii.  Unde dominus dicit, scit pater vester quia his omnibus indigetis.  Tertio, ne sit 
sollicitudo praesumptuosa, ut scilicet homo confidat se necessaria vitae per suam sollicitudinem posse 
procurare, absque divino auxilio.  Quod dominus removet per hoc quod homo non potest aliquid adiicere 
ad staturam suam.  Quarto, per hoc quod homo sollicitudinis tempus praeoccupat, quia scilicet de hoc 
sollicitus est nunc, quod non pertinet ad curam praesentis temporis, sed ad curam futuri.  Unde dicit, nolite 
solliciti esse in crastinum. 
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associated with them.  The description of each of these practices will comprise the 
remainder of this chapter.   
The Means of Perfection: Poverty 
Thomas is quite explicit that the practice of poverty is not primarily concerned 
with the renunciation of material possessions, but rather focused on the interior 
disposition of the soul to outward things.  The emphasis on the internal disposition of the 
soul towards material things is located first in Aquinas’s interpretation of Christ’s 
teachings contained in the New Law.  Describing how the New Law “directed man 
sufficiently as regards interior actions,” he writes:  
Our Lord explained the manner of fulfilling those precepts which the Scribes and 
Pharisees did not rightly understand: and this affected chiefly those precepts of 
the Decalogue.  For they thought that the prohibition of adultery and murder 
covered the external act only, and not the internal desire.267 
In this instance, Thomas is referring to Christ’s interpretation of the commandments, not 
the counsels.  And yet, the same principle holds for the counsels; the counsel of voluntary 
poverty does not concern only the external act of having no possessions, but insists that 
holding the proper detachment from material things is essential to the proper observance 
of the counsel. 
 This principle is expressed quite clearly in Thomas’s question on “the state of 
perfection in general.”  In replying to the suggestion that the religious state is more 
                                                 
267 ST I-II.108.3 ad 1- …in quibus scribae et pharisaei non rectum intellectum habebant.  Et hoc 
contingebat praecipue circa tria praecepta Decalogi.  Nam circa probitionem adulterii et homicidii, 
aestimabant solum exteriorem actum porhiberi, non autem interiorem appetitum. 
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perfect than that of bishops, since religious follow poverty while bishops do not, Thomas 
explains the significance of internal ordering.  He writes: 
Renunciation of one’s possessions may be considered in two ways.  First, as being 
actual: and thus it is not essential, but a means to perfection, as stated above (a.3).  
Hence nothing hinders the state of perfection from being without renunciation of 
one’s possessions, and the same applies to other outward practices.  Secondly, it 
may be considered in relation to one’s preparedness, in the sense of being 
prepared to renounce or give away all: and this belongs directly to perfection.268  
Bishops, therefore, while they are wealthy, are always ready to give their money away as 
necessary.  This may have been news to many of the bishops in Thomas’ day, but this 
was his way of accounting for their perfection.  This also furthers the point that poverty, 
for Thomas, is not about the lack of material possessions, but the interior disposition of 
the soul towards external goods.   
The Observance of Poverty 
From Aquinas’s work on poverty in the De Perfectione, three aspects can be 
described.  These three are: 
1. The giving up of material possessions 
2. The renunciation of the desire for possessions 
3. Detachment from material things 
                                                 
268 ST II-I184.7 ad 1 - Ad primum ergo dicendum quod abrenuntiatio propriarum facultatum dupliciter 
considerari potest.  Uno modo, secundum quod est in actu.  Et sic in ea non consistit essentialiter perfectio, 
sed est quoddam perfectionis instrumentum, sicut supra dictum est.  Et ideo nihil prohibet statum 
perfectionis esse sine abrenuntiatione propriorum.  Sic etiam dicendum est de aliis exterioribus 
observantiis.  Alio modo potest considerari secundum praeparationem animi, ut scilicet homo sit paratus si 
opus fuerit, omnia dimittere vel distribuere.  Et hoc pertinent directe ad perfectionem. 
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The first aspect of poverty is derived from the story found in Matthew 19, where a young 
man seeking to be perfect asks Jesus what is required of him.  After the man explains 
how he had perfectly observed the commandments his entire life, Jesus responds, “If thou 
wilt be perfect, go, sell all that thou hast and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure 
in Heaven; and come, follow me.”  Aquinas, and an immense number of commentators 
before him, understood this statement as a counsel given by Christ recommending 
voluntary poverty as a way of life.  Christ’s statement was taken literally, that a person 
should divest themselves of all material property, giving it to the poor.  The reason for 
this is not because possessions are inherently immoral, but because they distract one’s 
focus and affections away from God.  First, Thomas cites Jerome: “And, ‘Behold,’ says 
Jerome in his Commentary on Matthew, ‘the cause of this sadness.  He had many 
possessions, which, like thorns and briars, choked the seed of the Lord’s words.’”  In this 
quotation, possessions stand in the way of the person accepting the words of Christ, and 
allowing them to grow within and change the person.  Aquinas also cites from St. 
Augustine’s Epistle to Paulinus and Therasia:  
When earthly things are inordinately loved, those that we already possess fetter us 
more closely than those that we desire; for why did this young man go away sad, 
save because he had great possessions?  For, it is one thing not to be anxious to 
acquire the things that we lack, but quite another to be ready to divest ourselves of 
those that we possess.  For the things that are not ours we can repudiate as 
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extrinsic to ourselves, but our own possessions are dear to us as the limbs of our 
body.269  
This quotation points to one of the key aspects of Thomas’s thought on the spiritual life, 
namely the narrowing of the identification of the self.  The rich man identifies so strongly 
with his possessions, that he considers them to be intrinsic to himself; that is, as if they 
were his arms and legs.  The vow of poverty, by divesting the person of these 
possessions, withdraws the identity from external things inward to the immediate body, 
and then to the soul.  The human is not its possessions, and therefore, these possessions 
can be dispensed with.   
 The second aspect to be given up is the desire for possessions.  This follows the 
above interpretive principle of the New Law, in that it takes a concrete exterior act and 
adds a prohibition on the interior act as well.  Again citing from Augustine, this time his 
comments on “For it is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a 
rich man to enter the Kingdom of Heaven”:  
From these words, says Augustine, (lib. De quaest. evang.) “the disciples 
understood that all they that covet riches are included in the number of the rich; 
otherwise, considering how small is the number of the wealthy in comparison to 
the vast multitude of the poor, they would not have asked, ‘who then shall be 
saved?’”270 
                                                 
269 De Perfectione 7 - Augustinus etiam dicit in Epist. Ad Paulinum et Therasiam, quod terrena diliguntur 
artius adepta, quam concupita constringant; nam unde iuvenis ille tristis discessit, nisi quia magnas 
habebat divitias? Aliud est enim nolle incorporare quae desunt, aliud iam incorporata divellere.  Illa enim 
velut extranea repudiantur, ista velut membra praeciduntur. 
270 Ibid. - Ex quibus verbis, ut Augustinus dicit in Lib. De quaest. Evang., discipuli adverterunt, omnes qui 
divitias cupiunt, in divitum haberi numero: alioquin cum pauci sint divites in comparatione multitudinis 
pauperum, non quaesivissent discipuli: quis ergo poterit salvus esse? 
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In this quotation, Augustine suggests that all those, even if they are poor, who desire 
riches are included in the numbers of the rich.  Thomas accepts this, and writes: 
In truth, it is impossible for those to enter Heaven who love money inordinately.  
Far easier is it for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle.  The latter feat 
would indeed be impossible without violating the laws of nature.  But, if a 
covetous man were admitted into Heaven it would be contrary to Divine justice, 
which is more unfailing than any natural law.271 
The task of the person seeking to follow Christ, then, is to withdraw their affections from 
material things and orient them towards God and neighbor.  This is, of course, easier said 
than done, but Thomas does not provide much further information on practices regarding 
the withdrawal of affections from material things in the De Perfectione.272 
 The third aspect of poverty in the De Perfectione is given in a slightly different 
context than the previous two.  The first two presume the actual renunciation of 
possessions, whereas the third aspect presumes the possibility that a rich man can be 
perfect.  Thomas, responding to suggestions that “Matthew, Bartholomew, and Zacchaeus 
were rich” and were still able to enter into Heaven, writes that this problem “cannot be 
answered if we hold that it is the mere renunciation of wealth which constitutes 
perfection.”  Instead, Thomas returns to the example of Abraham.  He writes: 
A rich man may be perfect if his affections be not entangled in his possessions, 
but devoted entirely to God.  In this way, Abraham was perfect.  The words of the 
                                                 
271 Ibid. - Eos vero qui divitias inordinate amant, impossibile est intrare in regnum caelorum, multo magis 
quam ad litteram camelum per foramen acus transire: hoc enim est impossibile, quia repugnat naturae; illud 
vero, quia repugnat divinae iustitiae, quae est virtuosior omni natura creata 
272 There are a few references to the practice of separating affections from material things in scriptural 
commentaries.   
4-177 
 
Lord spoken to him, “walk before me and be perfect,” make it clear that the 
perfection of the Patriarch was to consist in walking before God, and in loving 
Him with a love so perfect that it reached to contempt of himself and of all that 
belonged to him....Our Lord, we repeat, did not mean by this counsel that rich 
men cannot be perfect, or cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven; but He meant 
that they cannot do so easily.  The virtue of Abraham was very great; for, 
although possessed of great wealth, his heart was detached from riches.273 
There are two key points in this passage in reference to Abraham.  The first identifies 
Abraham’s perfection to consist in a love “so perfect” that it leads to “contempt” 
(contemptus) for self and possessions.  Thomas takes the traditional “contemptus mundi” 
found throughout Christian theologies into a position at once more moderate and more 
radical.  The emphasis is not on the separation from material goods as in previous 
explanations, but the interior disposition which grants true separation from external 
things, something found only in the perfection of the love of God as far as possible in this 
life.   
 Second, is the principle of detachment.  In the final sentence of the above passage, 
which reads literally as “his soul had freedom from wealth,” Thomas expresses one of the 
central tenets of his teaching on the spiritual life.  Wealth is a great risk for humans 
because they are likely to become attached to it.  Any attachment, in Thomas’s mind, 
                                                 
273 De perfectione 1 - Potest ergo contingere quod aliquis divitias possidens perfectionem habeat, caritate 
perfecta Deo inhaerens; et hoc modo Abraham divitias possidens perfectus fuit, no quidem habens animum 
divitiis irretitum, sed totaliter Deo coniunctum: et hoc significant verba domini dicentis ad eum: ambula 
coram me, et esto perfectus: quasi in hoc eius perfectionem esse ostendens quod coram Deo ambulaverit, 
eum perfecte amando usque ad contemptum sui et omnium suorum…Non enim dominus ea ratione hoc 
dedit consilium quasi divites perfecti esse non possint, aut intrare in regnum caelorum; sed quia non de 




detracts from the love and contemplation of God, and thus remaining “detached” is 
essential for progression in the spiritual life.  The vows represent an ascending scale of 
detachment, moving in proximity to the person, detaching from exterior possessions, 
close relations, and self. 
The Means of Perfection: Chastity 
 Moving to the second means of perfection as described by Thomas, we come to the 
principle of chastity.  Chastity, like poverty, is given an expansive treatment by Thomas, 
and once more includes persons who are married but chaste in internal action.  The 
rationale for chastity is also taken from a counsel found in the scriptures, this time from 
Paul’s letters: “He that is without a wife, is solicitous for the things that belong to the 
Lord, how he may please God.  But he that is with a wife, is solicitous for the things of 
the world, how he may please his wife.”274  The problem with a wife and family is similar 
to the problem present in the person of wealth, namely the concern over these things 
prevents proper contemplation of God. This point is made in the Summa contra Gentiles: 
It should be said that solicitude and occupation which encumber those who are 
married, concerning their wives and children and the procuring of the necessities 
of life, are continuous.  But the disturbance which a man suffers in the fight 
against concupiscent tendencies is for a limited time.  For this decreases as a 
result of a man refusing to consent to it...Thus, concupiscent feelings are 
weakened by acts of abstinence and other corporeal practices suitable to those 
who have the vow of continence.  Moreover, the enjoyment of corporeal delights 
distracts the mind from its peak activity and hinders it in the contemplation of 
                                                 
274 1 Corinthians 7:32 
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spiritual things much more than the disturbance that results from resisting the 
concupiscent desires for these pleasures, because the mind becomes very strongly 
attached to carnal things through the enjoyment of such pleasures, especially 
those of sex.  For enjoyment makes the appetite become fixed on the thing that is 
enjoyed.  And so, for those people who devote their attention to the contemplation 
of divine things and of every kind of truth, it is especially harmful to have been 
addicted to sexual pleasures and particularly beneficial to abstain from them.275  
As explained here, the justification for avoidance of certain activities is not in the fact of 
their sinfulness, but in the fact that they serve to distract from the contemplation of God.  
When a person, in this account, gives in to corporeal practices and enjoys them, their 
mind is not able to contemplate at the highest possible level.  The mind instead becomes 
distracted by or even focused on corporeal things, which blind the person to divine 
things. 
 The problem of marriage, therefore, is twofold, namely solicitude and carnal pleasure.  
Neither of these is inherently sinful; a person who has a family rightfully must care for 
them, and a husband and wife should engage in sexual activity for the sake of 
procreation.  Thomas, it must be said, does not think that everyone should be a celibate 
                                                 
275 SCG 3.136.13 - Ad quintum dicendum quod sollicitudo et occupatio quam habent hi qui coniugio 
utuntur, de uxoribus, filiis, et necessariis vitae acquirendis, est continua.  Inquietatio autem quam homo 
patitur ex pugna concupiscentiarum, est ad aliquam horam.  Quae etiam minoratur per hoc quod ei aliquis 
non consentit: nam quanto aliquis magis delectabilibus utitur, tanto magis crescit in eo delectabilis 
appetitus.  Debilitantur etiam concupiscentiae per abstinentias, et alia exercitia corporalia quae conveniunt 
his qui continentiae propositum habent.  Usus etiam corporalium delectabilium magis abducit mentem a sua 
altitudine et impedit a contemplatione spiritualium, quam inquietudo, quae provenit resistendo 
concupiscentiis horum delectabilium: quia per usum delectabilium, et maxime venereorum, mens maxime 
carnalibus inhaeret: cum delectatio faciat quiescere appetitum in re delectabili.  Et ideo his qui ad 
contemplationem divinorum, et cuiuscumque veritatis, intendunt, maxime nocivum est venereis deditos 
esse, et maxime utile ab eis abstinere. 
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religious.  He does, however, think that those who pursue perfection should be inclined to 
avoid the distractions of familial life by avoiding those problems in chastity.  Further, he 
will suggest that those who engage in any sort of sexual behavior, even within the 
confines of marriage, limit the capability of their minds and prevent the fullest possible 
contemplation of divine things.   
 The problem of pleasures is discussed by Thomas repeatedly in the ST.  In a passage 
focused on the problems of the vices, Thomas makes the connection explicitly between 
carnal pleasures and the weakness of the mind.  He writes: 
Now carnal vices, namely gluttony and lust, are concerned with pleasures of touch 
in matters of food and sex; and these are the most impetuous of all pleasures of 
the body.  For this reason, these vices cause man’s attention to be very firmly 
fixed on corporeal things, so that in consequence man’s operation in regard to 
intelligible things is weakened, more, however by lust than by gluttony, 
forasmuch as sexual pleasures are more vehement than those of the table.  
Wherefore lust gives rise to blindness of mind, which excludes almost entirely the 
knowledge of spiritual things, while dullness of sense arises from gluttony, which 
makes a man weak in regard to the same intelligible things.276 
In this passage, Thomas points to the problem of lust, namely that it prevents man’s 
contemplation of spiritual things.  This results from the distraction provided by 
                                                 
276 ST II-II.15.3 - Vitia autem carnalia, scilicet gula et luxuria, consistunt circa delectationes tactus, 
ciborum scilicet et venereorum, quae sunt vehememtissimae inter omnes corporales delectationes.  Et ideo 
per haec vitia intentio hominis maxime applicatur ad corporalia, et per consequens debilitatur operatio 
hominis circa intelligibilia, magis autem per luxuriam quam per gulam, quanto delectationes venereorum 
sun vehementiores ciborum.  Et ideo ex luxuria oritur caecitas mentis, quae quasi totaliter spiritualium 
bonorum cognitionem excludit, ex gula autem hebetudo sensus, quae reddit hominem debilem circa 
huiusmodi intelligibilia.  Et e converso oppositae virtutes, scilicet abstinentia et castitas, maxime disponunt 
hominem ad perfectionem intellectualis operationis. 
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indulgence in carnal pleasures, namely the focus of the mind on material things and the 
sense pleasures derived from them.  For Thomas, however, there is an alternative, found 
in the form of the virtues contrary to lust and gluttony.  He writes: 
On the other hand, the contrary virtues, viz. abstinence and chastity, dispose man 
very much to the perfection of intellectual operation.  Hence it is written (Daniel 
1:17) that “to these children” on account of their abstinence and continence, “God 
gave knowledge and understanding in every book and wisdom.”277 
These two virtues are part of the virtue of temperance, which will be discussed in greater 
detail in the next chapter.  Nonetheless, virtue provides the response to the problem of 
sexual pleasure for Thomas.  Though he suggests that they dispose to “perfection of 
intellectual operation,” these virtues do not have much in the way of a positive content; 
instead, they are virtues directed specifically towards changing habits of thought and 
preventing the human from becoming oriented towards material things.  For Thomas, the 
problem of chastity is not a problem of the body, but of the mind, and is one that must be 
faced primarily within the soul. 
 In a question on bodily harm to others, Thomas provides further emphasis on the 
importance of the soul in dealing with lust.  Responding to the suggestion that self-
mutilation as a way of avoiding lust was outlawed, he agrees, and writes: 
A member should not be removed for the sake of the bodily health of the whole, 
unless otherwise nothing can be done to further the good of the whole.  Now it is 
always possible to further one’s spiritual welfare otherwise than by cutting off a 
                                                 
277 Ibid, - Et e converso oppositae virtutes, scilicet abstinentia et castitas, maxime disponunt hominem ad 
perfectionem intellectualis operationis.  Unde dicitur Dan. I, quod pueris his, scilicet abstinentibus et 
continentibus, dedi Deus scientiam et disciplinam in omni libro et sapientia. 
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member, because sin is always subject to the will: and consequently in no case is 
it allowable to maim oneself, even to avoid any sin whatever.  Hence Chrysostom, 
in his Exposition on Matthew 19:12 (Homily 62 in Matth.), “there are eunuchs 
who have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven,” says: “Not by 
maiming themselves, but by destroying evil thoughts, for a man is accursed who 
maims himself, since they are murderers who do such things.”  And further on he 
says, “Nor is lust tamed thereby, on the contrary it becomes more importunate, for 
the seed springs in us from other sources, and chiefly from an incontinent purpose 
and a careless mind: and temptation is curbed no so much by cutting off a 
member as by curbing one’s thoughts.”278 
It is clear that Thomas is not employing a modern biological understanding of the libido 
in humans.  Instead, lust, gluttony, and anything sinful for that matter, are all products of 
a soul which is not oriented towards its proper end.   
Example of Christ’s Chastity 
 Chastity, like poverty, is an essential value for those committed to following Christ 
because it is understood as a value held by Christ himself.  Thomas writes in his 
Commentary on 1 Timothy:  
                                                 
278 ST II-II 65.1 ad 3 - Ad tertium dicendum quod membrum non est praecidendum propter corporalem 
salutem totius nisi quando aliter toti subveniri non potest.  Saluti autem spirituali semper potest aliter 
subveniri quam per membri praecisionem, quia peccatum subiacet voluntati.  Et ideo in nullo casu licet 
membrum praecidere propter quodcumque peccatum vitandum.  Unde Chrysostomus, exponens illud 
Matth. XIX, sunt eunuchi qui seipsos castraverunt propter regnum caelorum, dicit, non membrorum 
abscisionem, sed malarum cogitationum interemptionem.  Maledictioni enim est obnoxius qui membrum 
abscidit, etenim quae homicidarum sunt talis praesumit.  Et postea subdit, neque concupiscentia 
mansuetior ita fit, sed molestior,.  Aliunde enim habet fontes sperma quod in nobis est, et praecipue a 




Regarding himself, chastity orders life and mind since it is extremely indecent 
that the lives of ministers be discordant with the life of the Lord.  Sirach 10:2: “As 
the judge of the people is himself, so are his ministers.”  Now, Christ so loved 
chastity that He willed to be born from a virgin, and He Himself kept it; hence it 
follows: in chastity.279 
The points discussed in this brief paragraph provide the justification for the practice of 
chastity, especially in ministers.  The first concern is that Christ was not only chaste in 
his life, but chose a virgin womb for his birth, suggesting that chastity was an essential 
value.  Second, chastity “orders life and mind.”  This was mentioned above, and will be 
discussed in more detail below, but chastity, in Thomas’s mind, frees a person from the 
stress of caring for family and allows the person to avoid sexual pleasure, which is the 
variety of pleasure most destructive to the work of reason.   
Means of Perfection: What is Chastity? 
 In the De perfectione, chastity is defined in the same expansive manner as poverty.  
Chastity, in this account, moves far beyond a simple avoidance of sex with other persons.  
It is again possible to identify three aspects of chastity in this text, which are as follows: 
1. Discrete hatred of family 
2. Avoidance of marriage and children 
3. Separation of affections from pleasures and personal connections 
                                                 
279 Commentary on I Timothy ch. 4 lec. 3 - Quantum ad se, vitam et mentem ordinat castitas, quia indecens 
est nimis, ut vita ministroum discordet a vita domini.  Eccl. X, 2: secundum iudicem populi, sic et ministri 




This first aspect is perhaps surprising to readers of Thomas, especially those familiar with 
his account of the order of charity.  At the same time, however, it can be understood as a 
logical conclusion of the principles of perfection he outlines.280  So Thomas writes:  
The things to be first given up are those least closely united to ourselves.  
Therefore, the renunciation of material possessions which are extrinsic to our 
nature, must be our first step on the road to perfection.  The next objects to be 
sacrificed will be those which are united to our nature by a certain communion 
and necessary affinity.  Hence, our Lord says, “if any man come to me and hate 
not his own father, and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters, 
yea, and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple” (Luke 14:26).281 
This hatred is properly limited by Thomas, and does not represent a true lack of affection 
or interaction.  Much like in the description of poverty seen above, Thomas is not 
recommending the complete cessation of contact with family members.  Instead, what is 
hated in others is whatever prevents the person from moving closer to God in love and 
contemplation.  Thomas explains this with a quote from Gregory the Great:  
Thus we must bear this discrete hatred towards our kinsfolk, loving in them what 
they are in themselves, and hating them when they hinder our progress towards 
God.  For, whosoever desires eternal life must, for the love of God, be 
                                                 
280 It is also perhaps understandable if one is familiar with Thomas’s biography.  As a teen, his family 
locked him up for a year in hopes of preventing his joining of the Dominican order, and later, repeatedly 
tried to make him abbot of the Benedictine house at Monte Cassino, a rather prestigious position, against 
his wishes.  I think his discussion of discrete hatred of family should be read with this background in mind. 
281 De perfectione 8 - Prius enim relinquenda occurrunt quae minus nobis coniuncta existunt: unde in primo 
loco occurrit ad perfectionem tendentibus exteriora bona relinquere, quae a nostra natura sunt separata.  
Post haec vero relingquenda occurrunt ea quae nobis naturae communione et affinitatis cuiusque necessitate 
coniunguntur.  Unde dominus dicit, Luc. XIV, 26: si quis venerit ad me, et non odit patrem suum et matrem 
et uxorem et filios et fratres et sorores…non potest meus esse discipulus. 
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independent of father and mother, of wife, children, and relations, yea, detached 
from self, in order that he may the better know God, for whose sake he loses sight 
of very other.  For it is but too clear that earthly affections warp the mind and 
blunt its keenness.282 
The idea of detachment again lies behind the explanation of chastity, as it is suggested 
that the human can only properly adhere to God when unencumbered by familial bonds.  
This need for detachment extends to the self, as is seen in both of these quotations, a fact 
which will provide the justification for the next stage, obedience. 
 The second aspect, namely the avoidance of marriage and children, is a further 
example of the emphasis on the freedom of the person from worldly concern.  The 
justification is provided in 1 Corinthians 7:32, “He that is without a wife, is solicitous for 
the things that belong to the Lord, how he may please God.  But he that is with a wife, is 
solicitous for the things of the world, how he may please his wife.”  Though this is 
perhaps a simplistic distinction, it is central to Aquinas’s understanding of the true 
perfection of the human.  Thomas believes that marriage, for one, is inherently distracting 
in that it requires the man provide nourishment and housing to wife and children, but also 
that it distracts in that part of marriage is the exchange of physical affection.  Allowing 
for any sort of physical affection, regardless of whether it is “moral” or “immoral,” 
weakens the mind in Thomas’s understanding.  Hence, Thomas offers this comment: 
                                                 
282 Ibid. - Sic enim exhibere proximis nostris odii discretionem debemus: ut in eis et diligamus quod sunt, et 
habeamus odio quod in Dei nobis itinere obsistunt.  Quisquis enim iam aeterna concupiscit, in eam quam 
aggreditur causam Dei, extra patrem, extra matrem, extra uxorem, extra filios, extra cognatos, extra 
semetipsum fieri debet;ut eo verius cognoscat Deum, quo in eius causa neminem cognoscit.  Manifestum 




Therefore, the second means whereby a man may be more free to devote himself 
to God, and to cleave more perfectly to Him, is by the observance of perpetual 
chastity.  But continence possesses the further advantage of according a more 
peculiar facility to the acquirement of perfection.  For the soul is hindered in its 
free access to God, not only by the love of exterior things, but much more by the 
force of interior passions.  And, amongst these passions, the lust of the flesh does, 
beyond all others, overpower reason.  Hence in Book 1 of the Soliloquies, 
Augustine says, “I know nothing which doth more cast a manly soul down from 
the tower of its strength, than do the caresses of a woman, and the physical 
contact essential to marriage.”  Thus continence is most necessary to 
perfection.283 
The reference to Augustine is telling, and Aquinas is in many ways repeating the 
viewpoint of late Roman and Greek thinkers towards the inherent weakening of mind and 
resolve resulting from sexual acts.284  It is noteworthy that throughout the De perfectione, 
there is no reference to any theory of pollution or purity as a justification for avoiding 
contact with women.  The logic for chastity is simple in this situation: sexual activity 
                                                 
283 De perfectione 9 - Ut ergo homo liberius Deo vacet, eique perfectius inhaereat, secunda ad perfectionem 
via est perpetua observatio castitatis.  Habet autem et hoc continentiae bonum aliam idoneitatem ad 
perfectionem adipiscendam.  Impeditur enim animus hominis ne libere Deo possit vacare, non solum ex 
amore exteriorum rerum, sed multo magis ex interiorum passionum impulsu.  Inter omnes autem interiores 
passiones maxime rationem absorbet concupiscentia carnis, et venereorum usus: unde Augustinus dicit in I 
Lib. De Soliloquiorum: nihil esse sentio quod magis ex arce deiciat animum virilem, quam blandimenta 
feminae, corporumque ille contactus, sine quo uxor haberi non potest.  Et ideo continentiae via est maxime 
necessaria perfectionem consequendam. 
284 The celibacy of thinkers from the late antique period was widely known among Christian authors, and 
also dismissed.  The justification for the practice of celibacy was rather similar to what Thomas writes here, 
namely that by being freed from the responsibilities of a wife and children, and from sexual desires, one 
can contemplate more effectively.  This takes on a different significance for Christians, however, in that the 
example of Christ’s celibacy plays a key role in emphasizing its fitness for others.   
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weakens the mind, and the perfect person must have a strong mind, so they must temper 
sexual activity.   
Furthermore, Aquinas repeatedly indicates that those who live a life of perpetual 
virginity receive this as a grace from God, and not as something one can simply choose, 
citing 1 Corinthians 7:7, “I would that all men were even as myself, but everyone hath his 
proper gift from God; one after this manner, and another after that.”  Nonetheless, as has 
been previously mentioned in this work, Aquinas believes that the human must do 
everything they can to make the reception of grace possible and functional in their life.  
He adds, therefore: “But, lest anyone should, on the other hand, fail to use his own 
endeavor to obtain this gift, Our Lord exhorts all men to it.”  Immediately after this line, 
Aquinas then refers to the passage cited above from Chrysostom’s Commentary on 
Matthew, that “there are eunuchs who have made themselves eunuchs, not by mutilation, 
but by resisting evil thoughts.”  The problem of continence, therefore is a problem of a 
mind committed solely to God. 
 Finally, the third aspect of chastity is the separation of affections from close relations.  
This third aspect again arises in response to the counterpoint of Abraham, who was, of 
course, married to Sarah and still deemed perfect by God.  Aquinas responds to this 
objection first: 
If anyone should object to us the example of Abraham, and of other just men of 
old, who were perfect without refraining from matrimony, we will answer them in 
the words written by Augustine in his book de bono conjugali.  “The continence 
that is a virtue is that of the mind, not of the body.  And virtue is sometimes 
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revealed in deeds, and sometimes lies disguised as a habit.  The patience of John 
who did not suffer martyrdom was equal in merit to that of Peter who was slain; 
and Abraham who begat sons, was equal in continence to the virgin 
John....Therefore, any one of the faithful who observes continence may say, ‘I 
certainly am no better than Abraham; but the chastity of celibacy is superior to the 
chastity of married life.  Abraham practiced the one actually, the other habitually.  
For he lived chastely as a husband, and could have lived continently had he been 
unmarried.’”285 
Though Augustine seems to pay only a backhanded compliment to Abraham’s chastity in 
this passage, it is clear that Abraham’s perfection is affirmed.  This perfection of chastity, 
therefore, is found in the mind, in the form of a devotion to God alone, and a due 
separation from concerns over the material world.  Aquinas concludes this thought, 
adding: “The conclusion of Augustine agrees with what has already been said about 
poverty.  For Abraham had arrived at such perfection that his heart never wavered in love 
to God on account of either temporal possessions or of wedded life.”  The continence of 
the mind, therefore, is ability of a person to remain committed to God regardless of their 
interaction with other persons, something which is the more easily accomplished by 
prudently avoiding as many of these separating contacts as possible.   
                                                 
285 De Perfectione 9 - Si quis autem obiectionem moveat de Abraham qui perfectus fuit, et aliis iustis 
antiquis a matrimonio non abstinentibus; patet responsio per hoc quod Augustinus dicit in Lib. De bono 
coniugali: continentia non corporis, sed animi virtus est.  Virtutes autem animi aliquando, in opere 
manifestantur, aliquando in habitu latent.  Quocirca sicut non est impar meritum patientiae in Petro, qui 
passus est, et in Ioanne, qui passus non est; sic non impar meritum est continentiae in Ioanne, qui nullas 
expertus est nuptias, et in Abraham, qui filios generavit.  Et illius enim caelibatus et illius connubium pro 
temporum distributione Christo militaverunt.  Dicat ergo fidelis continens: ego quidem non sum melior 
Abraham; sed melior est castitas caelibum quam castitas nuptiarum; quarum Abraham unam habuit in usu, 
ambas in habitu: caste quippe coniugaliter vixit. 
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Means to Perfection: Hindrances to chastity 
 Thomas identifies three “hindrances to chastity,” that is, three aspects of human life 
which contribute to a person engaging in illicit behavior: “The first arises from the body.  
The second from the mind.  The third from external circumstances, whether they be of 
persons or of things.”286  For each of these issues, Thomas suggests exercises which can 
help to prevent the person’s falling into incontinence.   
In regard to the first of these, the body, it is important to once more emphasize 
that the body is not sinful for Aquinas, as sin is from the will.  Instead, the body can 
contribute to sinful behavior in that it is through the body’s interaction with the sensitive 
soul that separating pleasure is experienced.  Such pleasure increases one’s concupiscent 
desires for sense pleasures, an aspect which occurs in the soul.  Thomas takes Paul’s 
discussion of the flesh and the spirit as the basis for this first hindrance:  
The body is an obstacle to continence.  As Paul says, “the flesh lusteth against the 
spirit,” and “the works of the flesh are fornication, uncleanness, unchastity, and 
the like.”  Concupiscence is that law of the flesh, of which, in his epistle to the 
Romans, Paul says, “I see another law in my members fighting against the law of 
my mind.”287 
Again, what is being described is not an actual struggle of the mind against the body; 
using Thomas’s understanding of the human person, this is not possible.  Instead, the 
                                                 
286 De Perfectione 9 - Triplex autem esse impedimentum continentiae apparet.  Primum quidem ex parte 
corporis; secundum ex parte animae; tertium ex parte exteriorum personarum vel rerum. 
 
287 Ibid. - Ex parte quidem proprii corporis: quia sicut apostolus dicit ad Gal. V, 17: caro concupiscit 
adversus spiritum.  Cuius carnis opera ibidem esse dicuntur fornicatio, immunditia, impudicitia, et cetera 
huiusmodi.  Haec autem concupiscentia carnis est lex de qua dicit Rom. VII, 23; video aliam legem in 
membris meis repugnantem legi mentis meae. 
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struggle is between one aspect of the soul, namely the sensitive appetite, and another, 
namely the intellect.  The sensitive appetite does communicate actual bodily needs, like 
hunger or thirst, but it also communicates the enjoyment of pleasure which is then 
experienced in the sensitive aspect of the soul.  When a person enjoys this pleasure, the 
soul increases in its concupiscence for that pleasure, and ignores its rational aspect.   
 As part of this discussion, Thomas appears to make reference to the theory of the 
humors as found in classical and medieval medical thought.  He says: 
Now the more the flesh is pampered, by superabundance of food and by 
effeminacy of life, the more will its concupiscence increase.  For, as Jerome says, 
“A man heated with wine will quickly give rein to lust.”...He, then, who desires to 
undertake a life of continence must chastise his flesh, by abstention from pleasure, 
by fasts vigils, and such like exercises.288 
In his Commentary on Ephesians, Thomas provides further encouragement to avoid wine 
on the basis of “heating.”  He writes, “Yet you ought also be careful to abstain from 
superfluous wine since excessive food and drink is a cause of sensuality; and especially 
wine which warms and excites a man.”289  Thomas then cites two stories from the 
scriptures, pointing to one found in the book of Esther, and the other the story of Lot, 
each of which portrays the drunkenness resulting from wine in a negative light. 
                                                 
288 Ibid. - Quanto autem caro magis fovetur per ciborum affluentiam et deliciarum mollitiem, tanto 
huiusmodi concupiscentia magis crescit: unde Hieronymus dicit: venter mero aestuans cito despumat in 
libidinem…Oportet igitur continentiae viam assumentibus, carnem propriam, abstractis deliciis, vigiliis et 
ieiuniis, et huiusmodi exercitiis castigare. 
289 Commentary on Ephesians ch. 5 lec. 7 - Dicit ergo: dixi quod fornicatio et omnis immunditia non 
nominetur in vobis; sed ad hoc cavendum debetis a vino superfluo abstinere, quia cibus et potus superfluus 
est causa luxuriae, et praecipue vinum, quod calefacit et movet. 
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 Thomas is rather moderate on wine, and details Paul’s encouragement to Timothy to 
take some wine for his “infirmities” in his Commentary on 1 Timothy.  He thus 
encourages moderation, as he writes: 
...after his warning against “chambering and impurities,” he concludes, “make not 
provision for the flesh in its concupiscences.” (Romans 13:14)  He rightly lays 
stress upon the concupiscences of the flesh, i.e. its desire for pleasure; for it is 
incumbent on us to make provision for what is necessary for our body, and Paul 
himself says, “No man ever hated his own flesh, but nourisheth it and cherisheth 
it.” (Ephesians 5:29)290 
The task, therefore, is to find the proper balance of food and drink for the person, such 
that by their eating they are able to maintain health, but not inspired to sensual behavior.  
This is a somewhat modest spiritual practice, in the sense that it does not view any 
particular quality to be gained from the practice of excessive fasting or abstinence; 
instead, the proper form of abstaining from most things (except sexual activity and 
thoughts) is to approach them in a way which avoids their becoming a matter of import or 
distraction.  This principle is well illustrated in Paul’s comments to Timothy, advising 
him not to be overly abstinent in his life such as to cause himself bodily harm.  Thomas 
picks up on this recommendation, and writes: 
And since on this account he [Timothy] was completely weak, he says, “do not still,” 
that is after you are so weak, “drink water.”  And why?  Because, as it says in Lev. 
                                                 
290 Commentary on Romans, ch. 13, lec. 3 - Sed notandum quod non dicit simpliciter carnis curam ne 
feceritis, quia quilibet tenetur ut carnis curam gerat ad sustentandam naturam, secundum illud Eph. V, 29: 




2:13: Whatsoever sacrifice thou offerest, thou shalt season it with salt, that is, the salt 
of discretion.  Rom. 12:1: Your reasonable service.  And so he says, “but use a little 
wine,” that is, not unto drunkenness.  Eccles. 31:36: wine drunken with moderation 
is the joy of the soul and the heart.  “For thy stomach’s sake, and thy frequent 
infirmities” which have come upon you because of your abstinence.  The Gloss says: 
“Take pains so that, if possible, a duty begun may be gradually increased rather than 
lessened through thoughtlessness.”291 
Thomas, therefore, recommends the meeting of bodily necessities, albeit in a limited way 
only to meet the basic requirements of health.  There remains a significant risk inherent in 
food and wine, which can overly “heat” a person and incline them to luxury or other 
material pleasures.  But food and wine, in and of themselves, are not to be avoided as part 
of the spiritual life for Thomas.   
 The second hindrance comes from the mind, in particular from the consideration of 
illicit thoughts.  In this situation, as opposed to the moderation of food intake, the 
recommendation is that the person seeks to curb all inappropriate thoughts as soon as 
they arise.  He writes: 
An obstacle to continence arises also from the mind, if we dwell on unchaste 
thoughts.  The Lord says by his Prophet, “Take away the evil of your devices 
from my eyes” (Isaiah 1:16).  For evil thoughts often lead to evil 
                                                 
291 Commentary on 1 Timothy ch. 4 lec. 3 - Et quia propter hoc fuit infirmus totaliter, ideo dicit noli adhuc, 
postquam es infirmus, aquam bibere.  Et quare? Quia Lev. II, 13: quicquid obtuleris sacrificii, sale, scilicet 
discretiones, condies.  Rom. XII, 1: rationabilie obsequium vestrum. Et ideo dicit utere vino, sed modico.  
Non ad ebrietatem. Eccli. XXXI, 36: exultatio animae et cordis, vinum moderate potatum.  Propter 
stomachum tuum, et frequentes infirmitates tuas, scilicet quae tibi ex abstinentia provenerunt.  Glossa: 




deeds....Amongst all evil thoughts, those which most powerfully incline unto sin 
are thoughts concerning carnal gratification. Philosophers assign two reasons for 
this fact.  First, they say, that as concupiscence is innate in man and grows with 
him from his youth upwards, he is easily carried away by it when his imagination 
sets it before him....The second reason is given by the same philosopher (Book 3 
of the Nicomachean Ethics), “Pleasure is more voluntary in particular cases than 
in general.”  It is clear that by dallying with a thought we descend to particulars; 
hence, by daily thoughts we are incited to lust.292 
There are several important points in this passage for facing the problem of sexual desire 
in Thomas.  First, concupiscence is innate, that is, natural, and in living a celibate life one 
must counter that inclination.  Because it is always present, as Thomas will mention 
elsewhere, the celibate person cannot at any point “dally” with thoughts about such 
matters.  This leads to the conclusion, namely that unchaste thoughts must be curbed at 
every moment.  Thomas finishes this passage with a conclusion from the Gloss:  “On this 
account, Paul (1 Corinthians 6:18) warns us to ‘Fly fornication;’ for, as the Gloss says, ‘It 
is permissible to await a conflict with other vices; but this one must be shunned; for in no 
other means can it be overcome.’”293  The desire for sensual pleasures, because it is 
innate in humans, is always to be curbed, according to Thomas.  This principle explains 
                                                 
292 De perfectione  9- Ex parte autem animae propositum continentiae impeditur, dum lascivis 
cogitationibus aliquis immoratur; unde dominus per prophetam dicit, Isai. I, 16: auferte malum 
cogitationum vestrarum ab oculis meis.  Malae enim cogitationes plerumque ad male faciendum 
inducunt…Inter ceteras tamen cogitationes malas magis ad peccandum inclinant cogitationes de 
delectationibus carnis.  Cuius ratio etiam secundum philosophorum doctrinam duplex assignari potest.  Una 
quidem quia, cum talis delectatio sit homini connaturalis, et a iuventute connutrita, facile in ipsam appetitus 
fertur, cum eam cogitatio proponit….Secunda ratio est, quia, ut idem dicit in 3 Ethic., delectabilia in 
particulari sunt magis voluntaria quam in universali.  Manifestum est autem quod per moram cogitationis 




several of the aids that follow, in that they are particularly oriented towards occupying 
the mind, and preventing it from engaging in illicit thought. 
 The third hindrance, which Thomas identifies as arising from “external 
circumstances, whether they be of persons or things,” is not explained in any detail in this 
piece.  Nonetheless, it is possible to understand that Thomas is referring to the 
importance of avoiding social situations which may incline a person to illicit behavior. 
The means of perfection: Aids to the preservation of chastity 
In one of the more interesting sections of the De perfectione, Thomas provides a 
list of spiritual exercises which help the person to observe chastity.  As mentioned in the 
previous discussion, Thomas believes that though chastity is a grace, the person must do 
all they can to help in its observance.  Thomas, therefore, provides several exercises 
which help a person maintain physical and mental celibacy as part of the religious life.   
These exercises are given in response to the “hindrances to continence,” and each 
exercise relates to a specific hindrance. 
Thomas presents these “aids” in the form of an extended list, providing a short 
explanation for each of them, usually with a citation from scripture to support their role.  
By way of introducing these exercises, he writes: “But, as there are many obstacles in the 
way of chastity, there are also many remedies against such obstacles.”  Thomas identifies 
several aids explicitly, but also includes a number of other exercises in the conversation.  
The aids identified include: 
1. Prayer and contemplation of divine things 
2. The study of scripture 
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3. Occupying the mind with good thoughts 
4. Bodily toil 
5. Mental disquietude 
6. Avoiding certain extrinsic circumstances 
7. Fasting, vigils, and  labor, scant clothing and reading 
Aid 1: Prayer, contemplation, and meditation 
The first of these aids, that of prayer and contemplation, appears rather 
unremarkable at first glance.  That Thomas considers contemplation important has been 
well established through the course of this dissertation.  Still, it is intriguing to find 
contemplation explicitly linked with the avoidance of sexual contact.  For Thomas, this 
relates explicitly to his explanation of the hindrance to continence resulting from the 
mind.  In that explanation, Thomas emphasizes that any thought of carnal gratification 
causes a person to move from universals to particulars, and leads to the mind’s distraction 
and pursuit of these illicit thoughts.  As a means of countering this tendency, Thomas 
encourages the person to always occupy the mind with good things, such that it cannot be 
occupied by illicit thoughts.  Thomas explains: 
The first and chief remedy is to keep the mind busied in prayer and in the 
contemplation of divine things.  This lesson is taught us in Paul’s epistle to the 
Ephesians (5:18), wherein he says, “Be ye not drunk with wine wherein is luxury; 
but be ye filled with the Holy Spirit, speaking to yourselves in psalms, hymns and 
spiritual canticles” (which pertain to contemplation) “singing and making melody 
in your hearts to the Lord” (whereby prayer is implied).  Hence, in Isaiah (48:9), 
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the Lord says, “For by my praise I will bridle thee, lest thou shouldst perish.”  For 
the divine praise is, as it were, a bridle on the soul, checking it from sin.294 
In citing the passage from Paul, Thomas makes two of his own interpretations, relating 
“hymns and spiritual canticles” to contemplation and internal melodies to prayer. In 
Thomas’s Commentary on Ephesians, he explains this passage in more detail.  He writes: 
He then touches on the subject matter of meditative prayer when he says in 
“psalms and hymns and spiritual canticles.”  To sing is to make use of the 
psaltery; and thus in “psalms,” that is, in good works....And “hymns,” that is, by 
divine praises: “A hymn to all his saints,” (Psalm 148:14)...And “spiritual 
canticles” concerning the hope of eternal realities...Hence, we meditate on honest 
actions and what we should do; on the divine praise, and what we should imitate; 
and on the joy of heaven we should render homage to, and how.295 
In this passage, Thomas describes the subject of meditation for Christians, and offers an 
account that includes much in the way of ethical material.  In his interpretation, 
meditation on the Psalms refers to meditation on “good works,” while hymns are sung in 
praise to God for the saints and their exemplary behavior, our imitation of them 
becoming the subject matter of our thoughts.  Furthermore, even the meditation of 
“eternal realities” leads to the practical matter of how we can render proper homage to 
                                                 
294 De perfectione 9 - Quorum primum et praecipuum est ut mens circa contemplationem divinorum et 
orationem occupetur; unde apostolus dicit ad Ephes. V, 18: nolite inebriari vino, in quo est luxuria; sed 
impleamini spiritu sancto, loquentes vobismet ipsis in Psalmis et hymnis et canticis spiritualibus: quod ad 
contemplationem pertinere videtur: cantantes et psallentes in cordibus vestris domino: quod ad orationem 
videtur pertinere. Hinc dominus per prophetam dicit, Isai. XLVIII, 9: laude mea infrenabo te, ne intereas. 
Est enim quoddam frenum animam ab interitu peccati retrahens laus divina. 
295 Commentary on Ephesians, ch. 5 lec. 7. – Materiam vero meditations tangit, cum dicit in Psalmis, et 
cetera. Psallere est uti Psalterio.  Et sic in Psalmis, id est bonis operationibus....Et hymnis, id est laudibus 
divinis....Et canticis spiritualibus, scilicet de spe aeternorum...Meditemur ergo de recta operatione quid 
faciendum, de divina laudatione quid imitandum, de caelesti iucundatione quid et quomodo serviendum. 
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the source of all good things.  Meditation, in this understanding, is intimately connected 
with the practice of living a life devoted to good actions, and requires our consideration 
of them.   
 The practice of meditation is a product of the Holy Spirit, given to us by God.  The 
presence of the Holy Spirit grants a few effects to the person.   
The first effect of the Holy Spirit is a holy meditation, and the second is a spiritual 
exultation; from frequent meditation, the fire of charity is enkindled in the heart.  
“My heart grew hot within me: and in my meditation a fire shall flame out” 
(Psalm 38:4).  And from this a spiritual joy is born within the heart; thus he 
mentions “singing and making melody” so that our will would be stirred by 
spiritual joys to undertake good works. “I will sing with the spirit, I will also sing 
with the understanding” (1 Cor. 14:15).296 
Meditation, therefore, is not solely an activity concerned with the mind, but one that 
inspires the will to perform good works.   
The logic for the activity of praising God in contemplation, meditation, and song, 
in addition, of course, to praising God, is that the practice of praise serves as a “bridle” on 
the soul, preventing it from going astray.  The language of “bridling” and “curbing,” 
which are present throughout the discussion of chastity are central to Aquinas’s 
discussion of the virtue of temperance, which will be analyzed in detail in the next 
                                                 
296 Ephesians ch. 5 lec. 7 - Ibid. - Sic ergo effectus spiritus sancti primus est sacra meditatio, secundus 
spiritualis exultatio, quia ex frequenti meditatione ignis charitatis in corde accenditur. Ps. XXXVIII, 4: 
concaluit cor meum intra me, et in meditatione mea exardescet ignis, et cetera.  Et hinc generatur laetitia 
spiritualis in corde.  Et ideo dicit cantantes et psallentes, id est ut affectus nostri afficiantur gaudio spirituali 




chapter.  In the De perfectione, the bridling of the soul is accomplished by using prayer 
and contemplation as a means of occupying the mind, preventing it from moving astray 
into illicit thoughts.  Furthermore, the practice of prayer and contemplation can be 
employed in response to unchaste thoughts; that is, a person upon realizing that they were 
engaging in thoughts of a questionable nature would turn to prayer or contemplation, 
thereby occupying the mind with divine things instead of physical pleasures.   
Aid 2: Study of the Scriptures 
The second aid to chastity is found in the study of scriptures.  As in the above 
case with prayer, the preservation of chastity is not accomplished as an immediate result 
of the practice of reading, but instead comes about because the reading of scripture 
occupies the person’s mind with a concentrated activity.  Thomas explains:  
The second remedy is the study of the scriptures.  “Love the study of Holy writ” 
says Jerome to the monk Rusticus, “and thou wilt not love the vices of the flesh.”  
And Paul says in his exhortation to Timothy (1 Tim 4:12-13), “Be thou an 
example of the faithful in word, in conversation, in charity, in faith, in chastity,” 
immediately adding, “Till I come, attend unto reading.”297 
There are, of course, further salutary effects of reading the scriptures beyond that of 
occupying the mind, one of which Thomas also describes in this passage, namely the 
redirection of the affections away from carnal things.  But the reading of scripture is also 
aligned explicitly with the general goal of the study of theology or sacra doctrina.  In a 
                                                 
297 De perfectione 9 - Secundum remedium est studium Scripturarum, secundum illud Hieronymi ad 
rusticum monachum: ama Scripturarum studia, et carnis vitia non amabis. Unde apostolus cum dixisset 
Timotheo, I Tim. IV 12: exemplum esto fidelium in verbo, in conversatione, in caritate, in fide, in castitate; 
statim subdit: dum venio, attende lectioni. 
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passage from his commentary on 2 Timothy, Thomas explains the twofold effect of 
scripture as referring to the distinction between practical and speculative reason.  He 
writes: 
The effect of sacred scripture is twofold: it teaches man to know the truth and 
persuades him to work justice.  John 14:26: But the paraclete, the Holy 
Ghost...will teach you all things to be known, and bring all things to be done to 
your mind.  And therefore it is profitable to know the truth and direct it into 
action. 
For there is the speculative reason and the practical reason.  And in each two 
things are necessary: that it know the truth and refute errors.  For this work is the 
work of the wise man, namely not to lie and to refute the liar.298 
Within this comment, one can understand a reference to the work of the Dominican order 
in its efforts to refute the heresies active in Europe at that time.  It is not enough for a 
person to know the truth; one must also be able to explain to others (including oneself, 
presumably) the reason why alternatives to the truth are in fact false.   
 The study of scripture is also related to the goal of perfection, which is the specific 
concern of those in the religious life.  Thomas explains: 
The effects of scripture are fourfold: regarding the speculative reason, to teach the 
truth and to reprove falsity; regarding the practical reason, to free one from evil 
                                                 
298 Aquinas, Thomas, Commentaries on St. Paul's Epistles to Timothy, Titus, and Philemon, (South Bend, 
Ind.: St. Augustine's Press, 2007). 2 Timothy ch. 3 lec. 3 n.127 - Effectus huius Scripturae est duplex, 
scilicet quia docet cognoscere veritatem, et suadet operari iustitiam.  Io. XIV, 26: Paracletus autem spiritus 
sanctus docebit, scilicet cognoscenda, et suggeret operanda.  Et ideo utilis est ad cognoscendam veritatem, 
et utilis est ad dirigendum in operatione.  Est enim ratio speculativa, et est etiam ratio practica.  Et in 
utroque sunt duo necessaria, scilicet quod veritatem cognoscat, et errorem refellat.  Hoc enim opus est opus 
sapientis, scilicet non mentiri, et mentientem refellere. 
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and lead him to the good.  Its ultimate effect is that it leads men to perfection.  For 
it does good not in whatever manner, but it perfects.  Hebrews 6:1: Let us go on to 
things more perfect. And so he says, that the man of God may be perfect, since a 
man cannot be perfect unless he is a man of God.299   
The effects of scripture, therefore, are 1. Teach the truth 2. Disprove falsehood 3. Free 
from evil 4. Lead to the good.  The result of all these things, as Thomas suggests, is that a 
person is lead to perfection through God.   
Thomas expands slightly upon the importance of the study of scripture in the 
Summa.300  Study of the scriptures is required not only to improve contemplation, as a 
person who is too simple may fall into error through excessively grasping in 
contemplation, but also is necessary for the practice of preaching to the people in general.  
Finally, Thomas returns to the point provided in the De Perfectione: “It helps us to avoid 
the lusts of the flesh….For it turns the mind away from lustful thoughts, and tames the 
flesh on account of the toil that study entails.”301  By busying the mind principally, but 
also the body through the exertion of long hours of study, a person will theoretically have 
less energy to devote to illicit thoughts that might contribute to sinful activity.   
Aid 3: Occupying the mind with good thoughts 
                                                 
299 Ibid. - Sic ergo quadruplex est effectus sacrae scripturae, scilicet docere veritatem, arguere falsitatem; 
quantum ad speculativam; eripere a malo, et inducere ad bonum: quantum ad practicam. Ultimus eius 
effectus est, ut perducat homines ad perfectum.  Non enim qualitercumque bonum facit, sed perficit.  Hebr. 
VI, 1: ad perfectionem feramur.  Et ideo dicit ut perfectus sit homo Dei, quia non potest homo esse 
perfectus, nisi sit homo Dei. 
300 ST II-II 188.5  
301 Ibid. - Valet enim ad vitandum carnis lasciviam.  Unde Hieronymus dicit, ad Rusticum Monachum, ama 
Scripturarum studia, et carnis vitia non amabis.  Avertit enim animum a cogitatione lasciviae, et carnem 
macerat, propter studii laborem, secundum illud Eccli. XXXI, vigilia honestatis tabefaciet carnes. 
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 The third aid is one of the most interesting in the De perfectione, but also one of the 
most challenging to interpret.  Thomas gives only a brief explanation of what he means, 
and his two points are accomplished through quotations.  The first quotation is from 
Chrysostom, and has been cited previously, while the second is from Philippians.  He 
writes: 
The third preservative against concupiscence is to occupy the mind with good 
thoughts.  Chrysostom, in his commentary on Matthew, says that, “physical 
mutilation is not such a curb to temptation, and such a source of peace to the 
mind, as is a habit of bridling the thoughts.”  Paul also says to the Philippians 
(4:8), “For the rest brethren, whatsoever things are true, whatsoever modest, 
whatsoever just, whatsoever holy, whatsoever lovely, whatsoever of good fame, if 
there be any virtue, if any praise of discipline, think on these things.”302 
The two quotations suggest two aspects of occupying the mind with good thoughts: first, 
illicit thoughts must be brought to a close, something which is accomplished by curbing 
them with an alternative thought.  This leads to the second aspect, which is to maintain 
thoughts of good things as much as is possible.  A person, therefore, is aided in their 
pursuit of chastity if they are able to think good thoughts as a means of cutting off further 
pursuit of illicit thoughts.   
                                                 
302 De perfectione 9 - Tertium remedium est quibuscumque bonis cogitationibus animum occupare: unde 
Chrysostomus dicit super Matthaeum quod abscissio membri non ita comprimit tentationes et 
tranquillitatem facit, ut cogitationis frenum: unde apostolus ad Philipp. IV, 8, dicit: de cetero, fratres, 
quaecumque sunt vera, quaecumque pudica, quaecumque iusta, quaecumque sancta, quaecumque 
amabilia, quaecumque bonae famae; si qua virtus, si qua laus disciplinae, haec cogitate. 
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This suggestion is provided further explanation if we turn to the Summa 
Theologiae.  In his questions on charity, Thomas writes about the importance of proper 
self-love.  He explains: 
On this way the good love themselves, as to the inward man, because they wish 
the preservation thereof in its integrity, they desire good things for him, namely 
spiritual goods, indeed they do their best to obtain them, and they take pleasure in 
entering into their own hearts, because they find there good thoughts in the 
present, the memory of past good, and the hope of future good, all of which are 
sources of pleasure.  Likewise they experience no clashing of wills, since their 
whole soul tends to one thing.303 
The thinking of good thoughts, therefore, is the hallmark of the person perfected in 
charity.  In addition to good thoughts, the person will have memory of past goods and 
hope of future goods, all of course in reasonable measure.  Additionally, the soul is 
unified; because there are no illicit thoughts present which would lead the sensitive 
appetite astray, or at least any which hold power of distraction, there is no internal strife 
between internal powers.   
 The question of what, precisely, those good thoughts are, is a more difficult question.  
It is, however, treated in the commentary on the passage from Philippians 4:7-9 which 
recommends consideration of those good things.  In commenting on verse 7, Thomas 
                                                 
303 ST II-II.25.7: namely, God - Et secundum hoc boni diligunt seipsos quantum ad interiorem hominem, 
quia etiam volunt ipsum servari in sua integritate; et optant ei bona eius, quae sunt bona spiritualia; et etiam 
ad assequenda operam impedunt; et delectabiliter ad cor proprium redeunt, quia ibi inveniunt et bonas 
cogitationes in praesenti, et memoriam bonorum praeteritorum, et spem futororum bonorum, ex quibus 
delectatio causatur; similiter etiam non patiuntur in seipsis voluntatis dissensionem, quia tota anima eorum 
tendit in unum. 
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provides some further ground for understanding what a “good thought” is.  Thomas is 
commenting on the passage, “And the peace of God, which surpasses all understanding, 
will guard your hearts and your minds in Christ Jesus.” In doing so, he expounds on the 
nature of the peace which humans are granted by God.  He writes: 
Peace, according to Augustine, is the tranquility of order...From that profound 
source in which peace exists it flows first into the beatified, in whom there is no 
disturbance either of guilt or of punishment; then it flows into saintly men: the 
holier he is, the less his mind is disturbed: “Great peace have those who love thy 
law” (Psalm 119:165)....Now because God alone can deliver the heart from all 
disturbance, it is necessary that it come from Him: hence he says, of God: and 
this, inasmuch as peace considered in that source passes all created 
understanding...304 
In this passage, Thomas establishes that those who are “saintly” experience the peace of 
God, given by God directly.  This peace delivers the heart from disturbance.  It is 
important to note that this passage, which is commenting on purity of heart, is indebted to 
a number of earlier thinkers.  First, Thomas receives his understanding of “pure of heart” 
from Cassian’s Conferences, who also defines this characteristic as one who is free from 
mental or emotional disturbance.  Cassian’s term “pure of heart” is actually his 
                                                 
304 Commentary on Philippians ch. 4 lec. 1- Pax, secundum Augustinum, est tranquillitas ordinis, 
perturbatio enim ordinis destructio pacis...Ab isto profundo, in quo est pax, derivatur primo et perfectius in 
beatos, in quibus nulla est perturbatio, et nec culpae, nec poenae, et consequenter derivatur ad sanctos viros.  
Et quanto est magis sanctus, tanto minus patitur perturbationem mentis.  Ps. CXVIII, 165: pax multa 
diligentibus legem tuam, et non est illis scandalum....Quia vero cor nostrum ab omni perturbatione non 
potest esse alienum nisi per Deum, oportet quod per ipsum fiat.  Unde dicit Dei.  Et hoc secundum quod 
consideratur in ipso principio, exuperat omnem sensum creatum, quia, ut dicitur. 
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translation of Evagrius’ apatheia, which, of course, finds its origins in Stoic thought on 
the perfect human, the wise man.   
 To be occupied with “good thoughts,” therefore, means that the mind is free from the 
disturbance of misguided thoughts and affections.  To be a person who received the gift 
of peace is, much as the description of perfection seen above, is to be one whose 
affections never stray from the good and whose mind never strays from the truth.  
Thomas explains further: 
And the peace, therefore, will keep your hearts, i.e. your affections, so that you 
will never depart from the good in anything: “keep your heart with all vigilance; 
for from it flow the springs of life” (Proverbs 4:23); and your minds, so that they 
not deviate from the truth in anything.  And this, in Christ Jesus, by whose love 
your affections are kept from evil and by whose faith your mind continues in the 
truth. 
For the object of a good act is either the object of the intellect or of the affections: 
the object of the intellect is the true; the object of the affections is the 
good....Hence he says, finally brethren, i.e. since you are so minded, think of 
whatever is true through faith: “Love truth and peace” (Zech. 8:19).305 
                                                 
305 Comentary on Philippians ch. 4 lec. 1 – Haec ergo pax custodiat corda vestra, id est affectus vestros, ut 
in nullo declinetis a bono.  Prov. IV, 23: omni custodia serva cor tuum, quia ex ipso vita procedit.  Item 
intelligentias vestras, scilicet ut in nullo devietis a vero.  Et hoc in Christo Iesu.  Per cuius scilicet 
charitatem conservatur affectus a malo, et per cuius fidem intellectus perseverat in vero.  Deinde cum dicit 
de caetero, etc., ordinat actu, et primo inducit eos ad bene agendum, ubi ponit actionis obiectum, scilicet 
bonum quod agitur, secundo motivum actus, tertio actum, quarto fructum actus.  Haec quatuor sunct hic.  
Obiectum autem boni actus, vel est obiectum cognitionis, vel affectionis.  Quantum ad intellectum est 
verum, quantum ad affectum est bonum.  Et ideo dicit de caetero, id est ex quo sic estis firmati, cogitate 
quae sunt vera per fidem. Zach VIII, 19: pacem et veritatem diligite, et cetera. 
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Thomas approaches this passage from the two core aspects of the person, namely the 
affections and the mind.  The affections are peaceful when they desire only the good, 
particularly the highest good, while the mind is peaceful when it never “deviates” from 
the truth.  This distinction leads into his Commentary on Philippians 4:8-9; to experience 
that peace of mind and heart is to constantly think of whatever is true, whatever is 
honorable, whatever is just, and whatever is pure.   
 In commenting on Philippians 4:8, Thomas interprets this passage as providing an 
encouragement to correct action.  As Thomas explains, “the object of a good act is either 
the object of the intellect or of the affections: the object of the intellect is the true; the 
object of the affections is the good.”  These “objects” refer to the aspects mentioned in 
Paul: true, honorable, just, pure, lovely, in Thomas’ translation.  Having already 
mentioned truth, Thomas then describes the objects of the affections.  In order for the 
object to be directed towards a good act, there are certain qualifications, as Thomas 
explains: 
Of necessity are three things: first, that it be good in itself; hence he says, 
whatever is honorable [chaste]: “but the wisdom from above is first pure” (James 
3:17); secondly, that it be directed to one’s neighbor; hence he says, whatever is 
just: “blessed are those who hunger and thirst for righteousness [justice], for they 
shall be satisfied” (Matt. 5:6); thirdly, ordained to God; hence he says, whatever is 
pure [holy]: “That we might serve him without fear, in holiness and righteousness 
before him all the days of our life” (Luke 1:74).306 
                                                 
306 Ibid. - Primo ut integer sit in se; et quantum ad hoc dicit quaecumque pudica, id est casta. Iac. III, 17: 
quae desursum est sapientia, primum quidem pudica est, et cetera. Item quod sit directus ad proximum; 
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Thomas encourages people, therefore, to “think on these things,” that is, to use them as a 
means of determining the rightness of a given action.  Thomas thus recommends a 
process of thinking through actions to determine their relative morality, one that can be 
seen to form a sort of checklist of prudential decision making.  If, in deciding a proper 
course of action, a person routinely analyzes their options in terms of honor, 
righteousness, and purity, this mode of determining proper action can become habitual, 
and help to avoid the thinking of illicit thoughts in decision making.   
 On the other side of this, this aid can perhaps be interpreted as an encouragement to 
avoid the thinking of illicit thoughts in general.  Thomas may have something in mind 
similar to the encouragement provided by the doctor/philosopher Galen, who encouraged 
those seeking abstinence to “refrain completely from spectacles, not to tell stories, or 
recall memories which could stimulate his desire.”307  In occupying the mind with good 
thoughts, a person must avoid all those things which incline one towards carnal pleasures, 
and thus be selective in their memory and in their discourse. 
Aid 4: Toil 
 The exercise of the body as a means of avoiding sin is as old, at least, as the scriptures 
themselves, so it is no surprise to find it included on this list.  It is, however, interesting to 
see how expansive an understanding of bodily toil Thomas will allow for, a result of his 
work in the university and the Dominican order.  Thomas writes: 
                                                                                                                                                             
unde dicit quaecumque iusta, et cetera.  Matthew V, 6: beati qui esuriunt et sitiunt iustitiam, et cetera.  Item 
ordinatus ad deum; unde dicit sancta. Lc. I, 75: serviamus illi in sanctitate et iustitia coram ipso, omnibus 
diebus nostris, et cetera. 
307 Foucault, The Care of the Self, 136-37 
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The fourth help to chastity is to shun idleness, and to engage in bodily toil.  We 
read in the book of Sirach (33:29), “Idleness hath taught much evil.”  Idleness is 
preeminently an incentive to sins of the flesh.  ...Jerome likewise writes, in his 
letter to the monk Rusticus, “Do some work, so that the devil may always find 
thee employed.”308 
He does not say much more on this topic in the De perfectione, so turning to the Summa 
Theologiae on this subject will be helpful.  In the ST, in his questions on the religious life, 
Thomas asks whether or not religious orders are bound to manual labor.  Thomas first 
explains the purpose of manual labor: 
I answer that manual labor is directed to four things.  First and principally to 
obtain food; wherefore it was said to the first man (Genesis 3:19): “In the sweat of 
thy face shalt thou eat bread,” and it is written (Psalm 127:2): “For thou shalt eat 
the labors of thy hands.”  Secondly, it is directed to the removal of idleness 
whence arise many evils; hence it is written (Sirach 33:28-29): “Send” thy slave 
“to work, that he be not idle, for idleness hath taught much evil.  Thirdly, it is 
directed to the curbing of concupiscence, inasmuch as it is a means of afflicting 
the body; hence it is written (2 Corinthians 6:5-6): “In labors, in watchings, in 
fastings, in chastity.”  Fourthly it is directed to almsgiving...309 
                                                 
308 De perfectione 9 - Quartum remedium est ut homo ab otio desistens et in corporalibus laboribus se 
ipsum exerceat: dicitur enim Eccli. XXXIII, 29: multam malitiam docuit otiositas. Et specialiter otium est 
vitiorum carnalium incentivum: unde dicitur Ez. XVI, 49: haec fuit iniquitas Sodomae sororis tuae, 
superbia, saturitas panis et abundantia et otium ipsius.  Et ideo Hieronymus ad rusticum monachum 
scribens dicit: fac aliquid operis, ut semper te Diabolus inveniat occupatum. 
309 ST II-II.187.3 - Respondeo dicendum quod labor manualis ad quatuor ordinatur.  Primo quidem, et 
principaliter, ad victum quarendum.  Unde primo homini dictum est, in sudore vultus tui vesceris pane tuo.  
Et in psalmo, labores manuum tuarum quia manducabis, et cetera.  Secundo, ordinatur ad tollendum otium, 
ex quo multa mala oriuntur.  Unde dicitur Eccli. XXXIII, mittes servum in operationem, ne vacet, multam 
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Of these four reasons, the middle two are of the greatest significance in this discussion.  
For the second, Thomas repeats the quotation found in the De perfectione taken from 
Sirach, “For idleness hath taught much evil.”  As in the De perfectione, idleness 
particularly inclines to “sins of the flesh,” thus leading to the rationale for the third thing 
which manual labor is directed to, namely the “curbing of concupiscence.”  Thomas thus 
repeats the reasoning for manual labor in the ST found previously in the De perfectione. 
 Though Thomas has established the reasoning for manual labor, the discussion of 
what manual labor is has not yet finished.  Instead, focusing on the intended end of 
manual labor, Thomas provides an alternative means of arriving at that end.  He writes: 
Insofar as manual labor is directed to the removal of idleness, or the affliction of 
the body, it does not come under a necessity of precept if we consider it in itself, 
since there are many other means besides manual labor of afflicting the body or of 
removing idleness: for the flesh is afflicted by fastings and watchings, and 
idleness is removed by meditation on the Holy Scriptures and by the divine 
praises.  Hence a gloss on Psalm 118:82, “My eyes have failed for Thy word,” 
says: “He is not idle who meditates only on God’s word; nor is he who works 
abroad any better than he who devotes himself to the study of knowing the truth.”  
Consequently for these reasons religious are not bound to manual labor, as neither 
are seculars, except when they are so bound by the statutes of their order.310 
                                                                                                                                                             
enim malitiam docuit otiositas.  Tertio, ordinatur ad concupiscentiae refrenationem, inquantum per hoc 
maceratur corpus.  Unde II ad Cor VI, dicitur, in laboribus, in ieiuniis, in vigiliis, in castitae. Quarto autem, 
ordinatur ad eleemosynas faciendas. 
310 Ibid. - Secundum autem quod opus manuale ordinatur ad otium tollendum, vel ad corporis 
macerationem, non cadit sub necessitate praecepti secundum se consideratum, quia multis aliis modis 
potest vel caro macerari, vel etiam otium tolli, quam per opus manuale.  Maceratur enim caro per ieiunia et 
vigilias.  Et otium tollitur per meditationes sanctarum Scripturarum et laudes divinas, unde super illud 
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Thomas thus excludes some members of the religious orders from manual labor in itself, 
but not from toil in general.  As his description of the fourth aid indicates, the exercise is 
to “shun idleness” and engage in “bodily toil.”  As Thomas here explains, the effects of 
manual labor to remove idleness and curb concupiscence are equally accomplished by 
fastings and watchings and by meditation on Holy Scripture. 
 The importance of the meditation on the scriptures is especially important for 
Thomas, as it provides part of the justification for the orientation of the religious orders 
dedicated to the life of learning and the university.  In a general question on whether or 
not religious orders are permitted to engage in study of any kind of knowledge, Thomas 
answers in the affirmative, and then provides an explanation of the reasons for study.  
The first is the goal of enlightening the intellect, by which one is led to moral action, 
while the second is for an increase in knowledge in order to combat heretics.  The final 
purpose is again related to chastity and abstinence: 
For it helps us to avoid the lusts of the flesh; wherefore Jerome says, (Epistle 125 
to the monk Rusticus): “Love the science of the Scriptures and thou shalt have no 
love for carnal vice.”  For it turns the mind away from lustful thoughts and tames 
the flesh on account of the toil that study entails according to Sirach 31:1, 
“Watching for riches [honestas] consumeth the flesh.”  It also helps to remove the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Psalmi, defecerunt oculi mei in eloquium tuum, dicit Glossa, non est otiosus qui verbo Dei tantum studet, 
nec pluris est qui extra operatur quam qui studium cognoscendae veritatis exercet. Et ideo propter has 




desire of riches, wheretofore it is written (Wisdom 7:8): “I...esteemed riches 
nothing in comparison with her.”311 
In conclusion of this question, Thomas also mentions the help that scripture provides by 
inclining persons to be better suited to obedience, thus referencing all three of the vows 
of the religious life in this section on the effect of study.  More importantly, study is 
identified with toil, with the difficult work of the mind engaging in study of knowledge.  
The passage above cites from one of Jerome’s letters, the full passage reading: 
Always have a book in your hand and before your eyes; learn the psalms word by 
word, pray without ceasing, keep your senses on alert and closed against vain 
imaginings.  Let your mind and body both strain towards the Lord, overcome 
wrath by patience; love the knowledge of the scriptures and you will not love the 
sins of the flesh.  Do not let your mind offer a lodging to disturbing thoughts, for 
if they once find a home in your breast they will become your masters and lead 
you on into fatal sin.  Engage in some occupation so that the devil may always 
find you busy.312 
The need for constant work is clearly stated in this passage, with Jerome recommending a 
variety of activities to occupy oneself and one’s mind to avoid sinful thoughts and 
actions.   
Aid 5: Mental disquietude  
                                                 
311 ST II-II.188.5 - Unde hieronymus dicit, ad rusticum monachum, ama Scripturarum studia, et carnis 
vitia non amabis.  Avertit enim animum a cogitatione lasciviae, et carnem macerat, propter studii laborem, 
secundum illud Eccli. XXXI, vigilia honestatis tabefaciet carnes.  Valet etiam ad auferendum cupiditatem 
divitiarum.  Unde Sap. VII dicitur, divitias nihil esse dixi in comparatione illius. 
312 Jerome, Epistles, CXXV.11 
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 The next two aids are taken directly from Jerome’s letter to the monk Rusticus, and 
are given in response to a question posed by Rusticus to Jerome.  The question is now 
that Rusticus has decided to take up the monastic lifestyle, where he should be living.  
Jerome, writing in a time which predates the formal organization of the religious orders, 
runs through the options and arrives at an eventual conclusion.  The three options for 
living are as follows: 1. At home 2. Alone, in a remote place 3. In a monastery-school 
(ludo monasteriorum).  Jerome concludes the third is the best option for the young monk. 
 For the fifth aid, Thomas tells us of Jerome’s recommendation of constant 
mistreatment and abuse as a means of helping a person to chaste living: 
A fifth remedy for concupiscence lies in certain kinds of mental disquietude.  
Jerome relates, in the epistle quoted above, that in a congregation of cenobites 
there dwelt a young man who could not, by means of fasting or any laborious 
work, free himself from yielding to the temptations of the flesh.  The superior of 
the monastery, seeing that the youth was on the point of yielding, adopted the 
following means for his relief.  He commanded one of the most discreet among 
the fathers to constantly upbraid the young man, to load him with insults and 
reproach, and after treating him thus, to lodge complaints against him with the 
Superior.  Witnesses were called, who all took the senior father’s part.  This 
treatment was continued for a year.  At the end of that time, the superior 
questioned the youth about his old train of thought.  “Father” was the reply, “I am 
scarcely permitted to live.  How in such straits shall I be inclined to sin?”313 
                                                 
313 De perfectione 9 - Quintum remedium adhibetur contra carnis concupiscentiam etiam per aliquas animi 
perturbationes: unde Hieronymus refert in eadem Epist., quod in quodam coenobio quidam adolescens 
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Though the methodology is different from the previous four aids, the rationale is the 
same.  The greatest danger to chastity is the mind wandering from carnal thoughts to the 
enacting of carnal pleasures.  In order to avoid this, the young man in this story is 
prevented from thinking about much of anything by the creation of false accusations and 
charges against him.  The young man, presumably, would become so consumed with 
defending himself, avoiding the mistreatment, and facing punishment, that he would have 
no time for his former habits of thought to lead to the enactment of an inappropriate 
activity. 
In Jerome’s letter, the point is provided by the final line, which answers a 
question put forth by Rusticus as to whether or not he should live in solitude.  Jerome’s 
response, at the end of this story, is “If he had been alone, by whose help could he have 
overcome temptation?”  In the story immediately preceding this one, Jerome describes 
how he, when living alone in the desert, had consistently given in to the “heat of his 
nature.”  His solution was to take up the study of Hebrew with someone living nearby, 
and to toil in that effort, in part as a means of distraction.   
The context for Dominicans was rather different, in that they would not have had 
the option of living an anchoritic way of life.  Nonetheless, the solution, presumably, is 
rather similar.  The specter of having someone else watching over you, which results 
from living in a community, is a great aid to the observance of chaste living.  Though 
                                                                                                                                                             
nulla operis magnitudine flammam poterat carnis extinguere; eum periclitantem pater monasterii hac arte 
servavit.  Impositio cuidam viro gravi ut iurgiis atque conviciis insectaretur hominem, et post irrogatam 
inuiriam primus veniret ad quaerimonias, vocati testes pro eo loquebantur qui contumeliam fecerat.  Solus 
pater monasterii defensionem suam opponebat, ne abundanti tristitia frater absoreberetur.  Ita annus ductus 
est, quo expleto interrogatus adoloscens super cogitationibus pristinis, respondit: Papae, vivere me non 
licet, et fornicari libet? 
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Thomas rarely, if ever, mentions the immediate sort of master-student relationship as one 
finds in Jerome or Seneca,314 he will, as seen in the previous chapter, consistently 
indicate the importance of those in community watching out for the spiritual health of 
their neighbor.   
Aid 6: Extrinsic circumstances 
 This aid is perhaps the most simple help to the observance of chastity provided by 
Thomas in the De perfectione.  Based on the recognition that if one has no opportunity 
for physical or visual interaction with those who serve as the objects of carnal desire then 
there is no possibility of illicit behavior, Thomas recommends avoiding the company of 
those who might incline to such thoughts or actions.  Again, this recommendation is 
rooted in passages from Jerome’s letter.  In one section, he writes, “For the reasons then 
which I have given above, I wish you not to live with your mother.”  One of these reasons 
is that in that household, there are a number of servant girls, and “in a house full of girls 
you would see things in the daytime that you would think about in the night.”315  A bit 
earlier, Jerome also says, “See your mother often, but do not be forced to see other 
women when you visit her.  Their faces may dwell in your heart and so ‘a secret wound 
may fester in your breast.’”316  The aid, therefore, is to simply avoid situations which may 
lead to unchaste thoughts or actions, and the main source of these thoughts is interaction 
with women.  Thomas explains: 
A great obstacle to continence arises from extrinsic circumstances, such as 
constant intercourse with women.  We read in Ecclesiasticus (Sirach 9:9), “Many 
                                                 
314 Describe by Jerome in his Epistle 125 to the monk Rusticus, and in Seneca’s Epistles to Lucilius.   
315 Jerome, Epistle CXXV.11 
316 Ibid., CXXV.7, with reference to Virgil, Aeneid IV.67. 
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have perished by the beauty of a woman, and hereby lust is enkindled as a 
fire...for her conversation burneth as fire.”  And, in the same chapter, the 
following safeguard is proposed against these dangers: “Look not upon a woman 
that a mind for many, lest thou fall into her snares.  Use not much the company of 
her that is a dancer, and hearken not to her lest thou perish by the force of her 
charms.”...Jerome, in his book against Vigilantius, writes that a monk, knowing 
his own frailty, and how fragile is the vessel which he carries, will fear to slip or 
stumble, lest he fall and be broken.  Hence, he will chiefly avoid gazing at 
women, and especially at young ones, lest he be caught in the eyes of a harlot, and 
lest beauty of form lead him on to unlawful embraces.317   
The fear in this explanation is, like the one above, that the “train of thought” requires 
only a simple spark for the progression from illicit thought to illicit action.  As soon as a 
person, especially a young man, receives any sort of visual stimuli, there is a substantial 
risk of being inclined to sinful action.   
Aid 7: Fasting, vigils, and bodily labor 
 Thomas repeatedly returns to the same quotation ascribed to Abbot Moses and found 
in Cassian’s Conferences.  Thomas writes:  
                                                 
317 De perfectione 9 - Ex parte autem exteriorum rerum propositum continentiae impeditur per aspectum et 
frequentia colloquia mulierum et earum consortia: unde dicitur Eccli. IX, 9: propter speciem mulieris multi 
perierunt: et ex hoc concupiscentia quasi ignis exardescit: et postea subditur; colloquium illius quasi ignis 
exardescit.  Et ideo contra hoc est adhibendum remedium quod ibidem dicitur; ne respicias mulierem 
multivolam ne forte incidas in laqueos illius: cum saltatrice ne assiduus sis, nec audias illam, ne forte 
pereas in efficacia illius…Unde Hieronymus contra Vigilantium scribens dicit, quod monachus sciens 
imbecillitatem suam, et vas fragile quod portat, timet offendere ne impingat et corruat, atque frangatur; 
unde et mulierum, et maxime adolescentularum, vitat aspectum, ne eum capiat oculus meretricis, ne forma 
pulcherrima ad illicitos ducat amplexus. 
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Abbot Moses, in his Conferences to the Fathers, says that in order to preserve 
purity of heart, “we ought to seek solitude and to practice fasting, watching, and 
bodily labour: to wear scant clothing; and to attend to reading…”  It is for this 
reason that such exercises are practiced in the religious life.  Perfection does not 
consist in them; but they are, so to speak, instruments whereby perfection is 
acquired.  Abbot Moses therefore, continues, “Fasting, vigils, hunger, meditation 
on the scriptures, nakedness, and the privation of all possessions, are not 
themselves perfection; but they are the instruments of perfection.”318 
This quotation from Abbot Moses appears frequently in the Summa, especially when 
Thomas is writing about the religious orders.  For Thomas, this quotation does well to 
describe the essential aspects of the religious life for him.  It is interesting to note, 
however, that some of these things are not necessarily practices Thomas himself would 
have shared.  If we were to draw a conclusion from his purportedly enormous physical 
size, it seems unlikely that we would be able to claim that he fasted regularly.319  
Furthermore, his definition of “bodily labor” and “toil” for Dominicans centered on 
intellectual exercises, like the study of scripture, and not manual labor.  This is not to take 
                                                 
318 De perfectione 9 - Ex quo patet quod, sicut abbas Moyses dicit in collationibus patrum, pro puritate 
cordis servanda, solitudo sectanda est, ac ieiuniorum inediam, vigilias, labores corporis, nuditatem, 
lectionem, ceterasque virtues debere nos suscipere noverimus; ut scilicet per illas ab universis passionibus 
noxiis illaesum parare cor nostrum, et conservare possimus, et ad perfectionem caritatis istis gradibus 
innitendo conscendere.  Ob hoc igitur in religionibus sunt huiusmodi opera instituta; non quia in ipsis 
principaliter consistat perfectio; sed quia his quasi quibusdam instrumentis ad perfectionem pervenitur.  
Unde post pauca ibidem subditur: igitur ieiunia, vigiliae, meditatio Scripturarum nuditas ac privatio 
omnium facultatum, non perfectio, sed perfectionis instrumenta sunt. 
319 Thomas’ size is widely debated (hence, “dumb ox”).  Also suggested is the fact that he ate only once a 
day, as was common practice within the religious orders.  This can be considered a practice of fasting, and 
depending on the size of the meal, may also have allowed him to maintain a robust figure.   
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anything away from Thomas’ spiritual practice, but only to suggest that his spirituality is 
of a qualitatively different sort than that found in the Desert Fathers.   
The Means of Perfection: Obedience 
 The final means of perfection identified by Thomas is obedience.  Once more, it is 
given an expansive definition, one which is not limited to the religious life, though it 
properly finds its home there.  Thomas explains: 
The vow which, of all the three religious vows, belongs most peculiarly to the 
religious life is that of obedience.  This is clear for several reasons.  First, 
because, by obedience man sacrifices to God his own will; by chastity, on the 
other hand, he offers his body, and by poverty his external possessions.  Now, 
since the body is worth more than the material goods, the vow of chastity is 
superior in merit to that of poverty, but the vow of obedience is of more value 
than either of the two.  Secondly, because it is by his own will that a man makes 
use either of his body of his goods: therefore, he who sacrifices his own will, 
sacrifices everything else that he has.  Again, the vow of obedience is more 
universal than that of either poverty or chastity, and hence it includes them 
both.320  
As Thomas remarks, obedience is more “universal” than the other vows, in that it relates 
to the sacrifice of oneself, specifically one’s will.  The intent of the vow of obedience is 
                                                 
320 De perfectione 11 - Inter haec autem tria quae ad religionis statum diximus pertinere, praecipuum est 
obedientiae votum: quod quidem multiplicter apparet.  Primo quidem, quia per obedientiae votum homo 
Deo propriam voluntatem offert; per votum autem continentiae offer ei sacrificum de proprio corpore; per 
votum autem paupertatis de exterioribus rebus.  Sicut ergo inter hominis bona corpus praefertur 
exterioribus rebus, et anima corpori; ita votum continentiae voto paupertatis praefertur, votum autem 
obedientiae utrique.  Secundo quia per propriam voluntatem homo et exterioribus rebus utitur et proprio 
corpore.  Sic igitur qui propriam voluntatem dat, totum dedisse videtur.  Universalius igitur est obedientiae 
votum quam continentiae et paupertatis; et quodammodo includit utrumque. 
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not necessarily obedience to one’s superiors, however.  Instead, obedience is 
recommended because it is the final offering that a person can present to God.  As 
explained in the above passage, a person offers those things immediate to their body by 
poverty, their body itself through chastity, and their will through obedience.   
 This understanding is repeated in the Summa Contra Gentiles in its explanation of the 
counsels of the religious life.  Thomas writes: 
Now, the perfection to which these three counsels give a disposition consists in 
detachment of the mind for God. Hence, those who profess the aforesaid vows are 
called religious, in the sense that they offer themselves and their goods to God, as 
a special kind of sacrifice: as far as goods are concerned, by poverty; in regard to 
their body, by continence; and in regard to their will, by obedience. For religion 
consists in a divine cult, as was said above.321 
One is likely to notice in each of these explanations, however, that the one thing which is 
not given up is the mind.  As is stated in this passage, the counsels lead towards 
“detachment of the mind for God” (in vacatione mentis circa Deum consistit).  For one, 
this illustrates the role the mind continues to play in the activity of perfection, especially 
contemplation, but also in the work of watching oneself.  As will be argued below, 
obedience to a superior does not allow for thoughtless action; instead, the same vigilance 
of mind in determining moral action is required.  Further, the goal of obedience, and the 
other vows for that matter, is the freedom of the mind for God.   
                                                 
321 SCG 3.130.6 - Perfectio autem ad quam praedicta disponunt, in vacatione mentis circa Deum consistit.  
Unde et praedictorum professores religiosi dicuntur, quasi se Deo et sua in modum cuiusdam sacrificii 
dicantes: et quantum ad res, per paupertatem; et quantum ad corpus, per continentiam; et quantum ad 
voluntatem, per obedientiam.  Religio enim in cultu divino consistit, ut supra dictum est. 
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 As in the above vows, the vow of obedience as described by Thomas provides a clear 
example of the reflexive relationship of self to self in his work.  The human can look on 
all things except his mind as extrinsic, as possible to renounce, as outside the immediate 
domain of concern, and in fact should do so in order to best contemplate God.  There are 
many layers to this reflexivity and to Thomas’s understanding of the self; as is clear from 
the remainder of his work, especially on the virtues, the person does not actually lose all 
concern for exterior possessions, body, social connections, and individual will.  Rather, 
there is recognition that these things do not hold the ultimate concern for us.  Thus we are 
willing to give all of our possessions to the poor in poverty; we are willing to give up our 
bodies to the service of God in chastity; and we are willing to give up our lives in 
martyrdom through the abnegation of our own will.  Everything must be held, so to 
speak, at arm’s length, such that we are willing to part with it if the situation calls for it.   
 In this way, the Christological background to Thomas’s explanation of perfection is 
made clear.  In Thomas’s understanding, Christ gave up material possessions to better 
serve God.  Likewise, Christ was chaste, and kept himself from social connections, even 
separating ties to his family if they tried to prevent him from preaching.  And, finally, 
Christ was obedient to God’s will even unto his death.   
Obedience in the De perfectione 
 Thomas’s teaching on obedience is dependent on several different influences.  Most 
significantly are these three sources: the Rule of Benedict, Dionysius, and Gregory the 
Great.  In introducing obedience, Thomas writes: “It is not only necessary for the 
perfection of charity that a man should sacrifice his exterior possessions: he must also, in 
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a certain sense, relinquish himself.”322  The term relinquish, in Thomas derelinquat or 
relinquat, is reminiscent of the language used in the Rule of Benedict in his discussion of 
obedience.  One passage reads: 
Such as these, therefore, immediately leaving their own affairs and forsaking their 
own will (relinquentes statim quae sua sunt et voluntatem propriam deserentes), 
dropping the work they were engaged in and leaving it unfinished (et quod 
agebant imperfectum reliquentes), with the ready step of obedience follow up 
with their deeds the voice who commands them.323  
A connection is further seen in the emphasis on obedience as a matter of the abandoning 
one’s will.  The title of the chapter in the De perfectione on obedience is “Of the third 
means of perfection, namely, the abnegation of our own will.”  This connection serves as 
a foundation for Thomas’s explanation of obedience, but he will go well beyond this by 
including the other two thinkers mentioned above. 
 Dionysius is perhaps the most intriguing appearance.  Though his influence on 
Thomas’s thought is well established, his presence in a spiritual treatise of this sort is 
notable, especially in that he is providing what some might consider a radical doctrine.  
Thomas writes: 
Dionysius, in chapter IV of The Divine Names says that “divine love causes a man 
to be out of himself, meaning thereby, that this love suffers him no longer to 
belong to himself but to Him whom he loves.”  Paul, writing to the Galatians 
                                                 
322 De perfectione 10 - Non solum autem necessarium est ad perfectionem caritatis consequendam, quod 
homo exetiora abiciat, sed etiam quodammodo se ipsum derelinquat. 




(2:20), illustrates this state by his own example, saying, “I live, now not I, but 
Christ liveth in me,” as if he did not count his life as his own, but as belonging to 
Christ, and as if he spurned all that he possessed, in order to cleave to him.324  
Thomas employs the concept found in Dionysius and Galatians to confirm what he had 
already been teaching, namely that a person caught up in divine love renounces 
attachment to all things that impede that love.  And one of the possible impediments is 
the identification of the self as a certain thing, that is, a certain person with desires and 
interests and a history existing outside of God.  As Thomas explains of Paul, “he did not 
count his life as his own, but as belonging to Christ.” 
 In this teaching, the “self” is one of the possessions which it is possible to renounce.  
This self is identified with the will specifically, but appears also to refer to the sum of 
actions and desires a person holds.  This self renunciation and identification of the “true” 
self with Christ is an essential aspect of our spiritual life, according to Thomas.  He 
writes: 
This practice of salutary self-abnegation and charitable self-hatred, is, in part, 
necessary for all men in order to salvation, and is, partly, a point of perfection.  As 
we have already seen from the words of Dionysius quoted above, it is in the 
nature of divine love that he who loves should belong, not to himself, but to the 
one beloved.  It is necessary, therefore, that self-abnegation and self-hatred be 
proportionate to the degree of divine love existing in an individual soul.  It is 
                                                 
324 De perfectione 10 - Dicit enim Dionysius, 4 cap. De divinis nominibus, quod divinus amor est extasim 
faciens, id est hominem extra se ipsum ponens, non sinens hominem sui ipsius esse, sed eius quod amatur: 
cuius rei exemplum in se ipso demonstravit apostolus dicens ad Gal. II, 20: vivo ego, iam non ego, vivit 
vero in me Christus, quasi suam vitam non suam aestimans, sed Christi: quia quod proprium sibi erat 
contemnens, totus Christo inhaerebat. 
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essential to salvation that a man should love God to such a degree, as to make 
Him his end, and to do nothing which he believes to be opposed to the Divine 
love.  Consequently, self-hatred and self-denial are necessary for salvation.325   
In these last two clauses, we have a further explanation of what Thomas intends in the 
idea of “self.”  If salvation requires that humans do nothing which is opposed to divine 
love, and if the accomplishment of such things requires hatred and denial of self, then it is 
clear that Thomas understands the self to be something inclined towards sin.  This is 
confirmed in his use of a passage from Gregory the Great.  He writes: 
Hence Gregory says in his Homily, “We relinquish and deny ourselves when we 
avoid what we were wont (through the old man dwelling in us) to be, and when 
we strive after that to which (by the new man) we are called.”  In another homily 
he likewise says, “We hate our own life when we do not condescend to carnal 
desires, but resist the appetites and pleasures of the flesh.”326 
We thus return to Paul’s concept of the Old and New man, discussed in the previous 
chapter.  The self which one renounces is the will, yes, but it is specifically our own self 
willing that we are called to renounce, not the faculty itself.  Thomas intends to 
emphasize that what we are renouncing is sinful self-will, the willing that insists on itself.   
                                                 
325 De perfectione 10 - Huius autem salubris abenegationis et caritavi odii observatio partim quidem 
necessaria est ad salutem et omnibus qui salvantur communis: partim autem ad perfectionis pertinet 
complementum.  Ut enim ex supraposita Dionysii auctoritate apparet, de ratione divini amoris est ut amans 
non sui ipsius remaneat, sed amati.  Secundum ergo divini amoris gradum necesse est et odium et 
abnegationem praedictam distingui.  Est autem necessarium ad salutem ut homo sic Deum diligat ut in eo 
finem suae intentionis ponat, nihilque admittat quod contrarium divinae dilectioni existat; et ideo 
consequenter et odium et abnegatio sui ipsius est de necessitate salutis. 
326 Ibid., Cum, ut Gregorius dicit in omelia, vitamus quod per vetustatem fuimus, et ad hoc nitimur quod per 
novitatem vocamur; et sic nosmet ipsos relinquimus et abnegamus.  Et sicut in alia omelia dicit: tunc bene 
animam nostram odimus, cum eius carnalibus desideriis non acquiescimus, cum eius appetitum frangimus 
et eius voluptatibus reluctamur. 
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 The renunciation of our will is a particularly difficult thing, as Thomas emphasizes, 
precisely because it is one of our most cherished possessions.  With reference to 
Aristotelian teachings on the matter,327 Thomas explains the significance of the practice 
of renouncing our own will, and how it follows consequently on the other two means of 
perfection, poverty and chastity: 
Now the more dearly a thing is loved according to nature, the more perfect it is to 
despise it, for the sake of Christ.  Nothing is dearer to any man than the freedom 
of his will, whereby he is the Lord of others, can use what he pleases, enjoy what 
he wills, and is master of his own actions.  Just, therefore, as a person who 
relinquishes his wealth, and leaves those to whom he is bound by natural ties, 
denies these things and persons; so, he who renounces his own will, which makes 
him master, does truly deny himself.  Nothing is so repugnant to human nature as 
slavery; and, therefore, there is no greater sacrifice (except that of life), which one 
can make for another than to give himself up to bondage for the sake of that 
other.328 
The will is still treated here as something which can be sacrificed, something suitably 
extrinsic to the person.   
 It should be noted that, up to this point, Thomas has yet to mention anything related 
to the traditional domain of obedience, namely the religious being bound to obey the 
                                                 
327 Aristotle’s discussion of slavery suggests that nothing is more repugnant to a human than the loss of his 
own will, because freedom of will is held by us according to our nature.  
328 De perfectione 10 - Nihil autem est homini amabilius libertate propriae voluntatis.  Per hanc enim homo 
est et aliorum dominus, per hanc aliis uti vel frui potest, per hanc etiam suis actibus dominatur.  Unde, sicut 
homo dimittens divitias, vel personas coniunctas, eas abnegat; ita deserens propriae voluntatis arbitrium, 
per quod ipse sui dominus est, se ipsum abnegare invenitur.  Nihilque est quod homo naturali affectu magis 
refugiat quam servitutem: unde et nihil posset homo pro alio amplius impendere post hoc quod se ipsum in 
mortem pro eo traderet, quam quod se servituti eius subiugaret. 
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direction of his superior.  It is clear that this is not the primary intent of the vow for 
Thomas; instead, obedience is about doing the will of God, the example of which comes 
from the life of Christ.  Nonetheless, Thomas does acknowledge in passing the 
submission of one to another: 
Others there are who make a complete sacrifice of their own will, for the love of 
God, submitting themselves to another by the vow of obedience, of which virtue 
Christ has given us a sublime example. Abnegation of our own will, as Christ did, 
“but not my will, but yours be done.”329 
Even in this passage, however, it is possible to understand the reference to submission to 
another as referring to submission to God, as this is precisely the nature of the obedience 
taken on by Christ in the passage cited.  In the De perfectione, therefore, Thomas 
considers obedience in regard to perfection to be primarily about our direct obedience to 
God, which is accomplished by loving God to such a degree that we hold ourselves in a 
secondary position to the divine. 
Obedience in the Summae 
 This understanding of obedience can be contrasted with that found in the Summae, 
provide a more traditional treatment of the subject.  For example, in the brief discussion 
of obedience in the Summa Contra Gentiles, Thomas explains obedience as follows: 
Finally, to cut of man’s solicitude even for himself, there is given the counsel of 
obedience, through which man hands over the control of his own acts to a 
superior.  Concerning which it is said: “Obey your prelates and be subject to 
                                                 
329 Ibid. - Aliqui vero libertati propriae voluntatis totaliter abrenuntiant, se propter Deum aliis subiicientes 
per obedientae votum.  Cuius quidem obedientiae exemplum praecipuum in Christo habemus. 
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them.  For they watch as being ready to render an account of your souls” (Heb. 
13:17).330 
In this passage, obedience is considered only in the limited manner of being a 
relationship of lower to superior.  The logic for the vow of obedience is the same as for 
the previous two, in that it is especially ordained to the freedom of the mind from 
solicitude for the purposes of contemplation.  As is clear, however, the treatment found in 
the De perfectione emphasizes none of these aspects of obedience, focusing as it does 
only on self-denial as a pursuit of divine love. 
 The treatment seen in the Summa Theologiae includes elements found in both the 
Summa contra Gentiles and the De perfectione.  In II-II.104 on obedience, Thomas asks 
whether subjects (speaking generally) are bound to obey their superiors in all matters.  In 
a reply to the third objection, he writes: 
Religious profess obedience as to the regular mode of life, in respect of which 
they are subject to their superiors: wherefore they are bound to obey in those 
matters only which may belong to the regular mode of life, and this obedience 
suffices for salvation.  If they be willing to obey even in other matters, this will 
belong to the superabundance of perfection; provided, however, such things be 
not contrary to God or to the rule they profess, for obedience in this case would be 
unlawful.   
                                                 
330 SCG 3.130.2 - Ad amputandam autem sollicitudinem hominis etiam circa seipsum, datur consilium 
obedientiae, per quam homo dispositionem suorum actum superiori committit.  Propter quod dicitur Hebr. 
Ult.: obedite praepositis vestris et subiacete eis: ipsi enim pervigilant, quasi rationem reddituri pro 
animabus vestris.  As Thomas mentions soon after this passage, “The highest perfection of human life 
consists the mind of man being detached (vacet) from care, for the sake of God.” 3.130.3 
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Accordingly, we may distinguish a threefold obedience; one, sufficient for 
salvation and consisting in obeying when one is bound to obey: secondly, perfect 
obedience, which obeys in all things lawful: thirdly, indiscreet obedience, which 
obeys even in matters unlawful.331   
The answer to the question, therefore, is yes, but with a very important caveat.  The 
person ought to obey in those instances pertaining virtue, and can also go beyond what is 
necessary in obeying in “all things lawful.”  Thomas is careful to note that the religious 
only obey when the order is lawful, and thus, though the human is freed from some 
degree of solicitude concerning their actions, they are still tasked with the analysis of 
right and wrong. 
 Thomas continues this thought in a different question of the Summa Theologiae by 
appealing, in a restrained manner, to the description of obedience seen in the De 
perfectione.  In question II-II.186, “Things in which the religious state properly consists,” 
Thomas asks in article 5 “is obedience necessary?”  The answer, as established from the 
general discussion provided above in question 104 is “yes,” and in a special way for 
religious.  First, “religious need to be placed under the instruction and command of 
someone as regards things pertaining to the religious life.”  Second, the domain of 
obedience in the religious life is different in kind from that of persons who live in the 
world.  Thomas explains: 
                                                 
331 ST II-II.104.5 ad 3 - Ad tertium dicendum quod religiosi obedientiam profitentur quantum ad regularem 
conversationem, secundum quam suis praelatis subduntur.  Et ideo quantum ad illa sola obedire tenentur 
quae possunt ad regularem conversationem pertinere.  Et haec est obedientia sufficiens ad salutem.  Si 
autem etiam in aliis obedire voluerint, hoc pertinebit ad cumulum perfectionis, dum tamen illa non sint 
contra Deum, aut contra professionem regulae; quia talis obedientia esset illicita. Sic ergo potest triplex 
obedientia distingui, una sufficiens ad salutem, quae scilicet obedit in his ad quae obligatur; alia perfecta 
quae obedit in omnibus licitis; alia indiscreta, quae etiam in illicitis obedit. 
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To obey one’s superiors in matters that are essential to virtue is not a work of 
supererogation, but is common to all: whereas to obey in matters pertaining to the 
practice of perfection belongs properly to religious.  This latter obedience is 
compared to the former as the universal to the particular.  For those who live in 
the world, keep something for themselves and offer something to God; and in the 
latter respect, they are under obedience to their superiors: whereas those who live 
in religion give themselves wholly and their possessions to God, as stated above 
(1 and 3).  Hence, their obedience is universal.332 
As Thomas writes, the obedience of religious requires that they “give themselves wholly” 
to God.  Obedience in this understanding is not a question of always obeying, but a 
readiness to obey even at the cost of one’s individual concerns and interests.   
Conclusion 
 This chapter aimed to provide an overview of the concept of perfection in relation to 
spiritual exercises and reflexive relationship to self as found in the De perfectione, and 
through that text to others in Thomas’s corpus.  It is clear that the concept of the freedom 
of the mind plays a central role in what Thomas intends by these exercises and practices, 
and in his recommendation of the ideal relationship of self to self.  In the vows, one sees 
a gradual refinement of the conception of self: the person is not their possessions, nor 
their relationships or responsibilities, nor their sexual desires, nor their own intentions or 
                                                 
332 ST II-II.186.5 ad 1 - Ad primum ergo dicendum quod obedire praelatis in his quae pertinent ad 
necessitatem virtutis, non est supererogationis, sed omnibus commune, sed obedire in his quae pertinent ad 
exercitium perfectionis, pertinet proprie ad religiosos.  Et comparatur ista obedientia ad aliam sicut 
universale ad particulare.  Illi enim qui in saeculo vivunt, aliquid sibi retinent et aliquid Deo largiuntur, et 
secundum hoc obedientiae praelatorum, subduntur.  Illi vero qui vivunt in religione, totaliter se et sua 
tribuunt Deo, ut ex supra dictis patet.  Unde obedientia eorum est universalis. 
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wishes.  Instead, they are, properly speaking, to be identified with the mind renewed by 




Chapter 5 - Virtues, Exercises, and Reflexivity 
 In this final chapter, the discussion will now turn to the cardinal virtues.  The goal of 
this discussion is twofold: first, to highlight the importance of preserving the direction of 
the intellect in each of the virtues, and second, to emphasize the recurrence of exercises 
throughout the Summa Theologiae and its treatment of the moral virtues.  As has been 
argued in previous chapters, the centerpiece of living an ethical life for Thomas is the 
ability of the mind to watch itself and the soul, evaluate its thoughts and actions, and act 
in accordance with what is deemed correct.  This is, first of all, a reflection of his 
understanding of the relationship of self to self, one which suggests that a person should 
identify as that aspect which is best in themselves, namely the mind.  This understanding 
is expressed in a variety of ways in Thomas, but most significantly in the difference 
between the New and Old Man, a Pauline distinction, where the New Man is identified as 
the mind renewed by Grace in Christ, and the Old Man is the sensitive nature of the 
human.  In addition to this perspective on the self, Thomas recommends a variety of 
exercises or practices which seek to uphold the beneficial power of the mind, and to 
separate it from inordinate influence of the other aspects of the human person.   
 This is, in fact, one of the specific goals of the virtues, each of which occupies a 
position in the relationship between sensitive nature and the rational nature.  The four 
cardinal virtues, Prudence, Justice, Temperance, and Fortitude, play an intermediary role, 
where they seek to preserve the power of reason and avoid the undue influence from 
things extrinsic to the reason.  As Thomas writes:  
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The proper end of each moral virtue consists precisely in conformity with right 
reason.  For temperance intends that man should not stray from reason for the 
sake of his concupiscences; fortitude, that he should not stray from the right 
judgment of reason through fear or daring.333   
The same is true for prudence, which chooses the mean of reason in relation to actions, 
and justice, which is acting in accordance with reason in dealings with other persons.  
Each of these virtues upholds reason as the primary principle of right action in the moral 
life.   
 To that end, this chapter will cover each of the four cardinal virtues, and describe two 
aspects of each, namely their relation to the reflexive understanding of self offered by 
Thomas and described one of the exercises recommended for the upholding of reason.  
Before discussing the virtues in detail, however, I will first discuss the difference 
between virtues and perfecting virtues, before going into more detail on the relation of 
the virtues to the passions.  In particular, this chapter will argue that Thomas provides 
several different methods for reducing the impulse and power of the passions, and 
redirecting them away from having an undue effect on the intellect.  There are some 
examples of where the passions play a “positive” role, but it is always limited to proper 
alignment with the judgment of reason.  In addition to the moderation of the passions by 
reason, Thomas provides a few other methods of controlling passions.  This chapter will 
                                                 
333 ST II-II.47.7 - Respondeo dicendum quod hoc ipsum quod est conformari rationi rectae est finis proprius 
cuiuslibet moralis virtutis, temperantia enim hoc intendit, ne propter concupiscentias homo divertat a 
ratione; et similiter fortitudo ne a recto iudicio rationis divertat a ratione; et similiter fortitudo ne a recto 
iudicio rationis divertat propter timorem vel audaciam. 
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discuss some of these briefly, including the practices of contemplation, tears, and the 
moderation of anger by love. 
 The discussion will then move to the cardinal virtues, and provide a brief account of 
each in relation to reflexivity and a practice.  The first, prudence, emphasizes the form of 
reflexivity described in this dissertation.  The relationship of self to self, the mind turned 
to watch over the whole soul and body, is precisely what occurs in the virtue of prudence.  
It is also the virtue which enacts the identity of the human with the better part of 
themselves, namely their reason.  This understanding of prudence is consonant with many 
classical treatments, including Plato and Aristotle, as well as others in the Platonic 
tradition.334  In the virtue of prudence, Thomas describes the process whereby one 
accomplishes moral reasoning, a process which begins with memory.  In the act of 
memory, a person recalls previous experiences or references which serve as guides in 
determining the proper course of moral action in the current event.   
 The virtue of justice is slightly different from the other three under discussion.  It is 
found in the will, instead of the intellect as in the case of prudence, or the sensitive 
appetite, as in the case of fortitude and temperance.  For Thomas, this means that justice 
is not about the passions, but is rather an inclination towards the rendering of each person 
their due.  Furthermore, justice is not essentially about the internal relations of the person, 
as in the other virtues, but only about dealings with others.  This understanding alters 
slightly, however, when the discussion turns to the just relationship of the human to God, 
                                                 
334 See, for example Shadi Bartsch, The Mirror of the Self, p. 11.  N.b., Bartsch appears to use a different 
understanding of the term “reflexivity,” limiting it those thinkers who believe that there is a privileged 




which in fact results in a certain orientation of the person towards God.  The Christian, 
therefore, as an act of justice, offers their mind to God in faith, as an act of offering the 
best of what each person has to offer, which is the offering due to God. 
 In the virtue of fortitude, the secondary place of the body is once more emphasized by 
Thomas.  As established in previous chapters, Thomas has a moderate approach to the 
role of the human body, especially in comparison with thinkers contemporary to him.  
Nonetheless, as is apparent in his discussion of the fear of death, the body is 
appropriately sacrificed or otherwise restrained at certain times for the sake of virtuous 
actions.  Thomas also recommends the practice of the premeditatione malorum, the 
meditation on evil events before they happen, as a supplement to the virtue of fortitude 
and a means of reducing fear. 
 Finally, the virtue of temperance serves as a direct mediator between the pleasures 
and desires of the sensitive appetite and the work of the intellect.  In describing the virtue 
of temperance and its role, Thomas repeatedly employs terms found in the raising of 
children and in the taming of wild animals.  The role of temperance, therefore, is to 
provide a “bridle” for the soul, a means of restraining and redirecting the soul to its 
proper end, one in alignment with reason.   
Virtues and Perfecting Virtues 
  The connection of the virtues with reason is made repeatedly in Thomas, and is not 
really a point of contention.  A problem arises, however, when the power of reason is 
emphasized to the point of suggesting a hegemonic authority over the rest of the human 
person.  For Thomas, this is decidedly not the case; he recognizes three possible sources 
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for human action.  These three are the reason, the will, and the sensitive faculty.  For 
Thomas, each of these three can, at different points, present an impetus or suggestion for 
action to a person.  For example, when a person is hungry, the sensitive faculty will 
communicate a bodily feeling of hunger.  There is nothing inherently wrong with the 
sensitive faculty communicating this bodily need, nor is there anything wrong with the 
person following the bodily need and providing food for his own body.  In fact, to avoid 
food to the extent that it causes bodily harm is roundly condemned by Thomas.  As is the 
alternative, the vice of gluttony, where one eats more food than is necessary for the sake 
of enjoying the pleasure of food.  This is where the rational faculty comes in; it is tasked 
with moderating the movements of the appetitive aspects of the human person.  The 
reason evaluates the desires, moderates them, and approves a course of action in 
alignment with its judgment.  Nonetheless, despite the central role of reason, Thomas 
does not locate the moral virtues (justice, fortitude, temperance) in the mind, but in the 
respective appetitive aspects which they help to moderate.   
 The importance of this distinction is found in the differing conception of the human 
person between Thomas and the “opinion of Socrates.”  Thomas writes that Socrates 
believed that “every virtue is a kind of prudence,” meaning that it is primarily intellectual 
or rational in nature.  For Socrates, in this description, all that the human needs is 
knowledge in order to act morally.  If a person is aware of the proper course of action, 
they then follow through on that course.  Thomas understands this to be false, because of 
the nature of the appetitive faculty.  He writes, “The appetitive faculty obeys the reason, 
not blindly, but with a certain power of opposition.”  He then proceeds to describe the 
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control of the reason in Aristotelian terms as a “political power,” where individual 
subjects are free to maintain their opposition.  In Thomas, as has been discussed more 
extensively in previous chapters, these subjects represent a choice of identity for each 
person, and are also characterized as the New Man and the Old Man.  The question of 
identity solves the matter to a certain extent, as it selects the source of action to be held as 
primary.  At the same time, however, it does not solve the problem of internal dissent.   
 Harmony within a person is instead accomplished with the help of the moral virtues.  
Though the “habits or passions of the appetitive faculty cause the use of reason to be 
impeded in some particular action” at various points, this is not necessarily the case.  
Thomas explains:  
Accordingly for a man to do a good deed, it is requisite not only that his reason be 
well disposed by means of a habit of intellectual virtue; but also that his appetite 
be well disposed by means of a habit of moral virtue.  And so moral differs from 
intellectual virtue, even as the appetite differs from the reason.  Hence, just as the 
appetite is the principle of human acts, in so far as it partakes of reason, so are the 
moral habits to be considered virtues in so far as they are in conformity with 
reason.335   
The virtues, therefore, serve a number of important purposes, not least the accomplishing 
of right action.  But in order for this right action to be accomplished, the person needs to 
have the virtues moderating their passions and desires.  Without this moderation, a person 
                                                 
335 ST I-II.58.2 - Sic igitur ad hoc quod homo bene agat, requiritur quod non solum ratio sit bene disposita 
per habitum virtutis intellectualis; sed etiam quod vis appetitiva sit bene disposita per habitum virtutis 
moralis.  Sicut igitur appetitus distinguitur a ratione, ita virtus moralis distinguitur ab intellectuali.  Unde 
sicut appetitus est principium humani actus secundum quod participat aliqualiter rationem, ita habitus 
moralis habet rationem virtutis humanae, inquantum rationi conformatur. 
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remains in internal conflict, and reason is affected by passions and desires which should 
not be allowed to influence it.   
 The moral virtues, therefore, stand in direct relations to the passions and desires of the 
appetitive aspect of the person.  In fact, in a passage from his Commentary on 1 Timothy, 
Thomas suggests that the virtues stand in relation to the concept of purity of heart.  As 
was suggested in the previous chapters, Thomas’s use of the term “pure of heart” is 
consistent with Cassian’s use of the term, where Cassian used it as a translation of 
Evagrius Pontus’ apatheia, taken again from the Stoics.  Thomas writes:  
For the precepts of virtue are given for this, that a heart may be pure.  Of these 
virtues whose matter is the passions, some are ordered to the mode of regulating 
these passions, just as it is temperance which orders concupiscence, meekness 
anger, fortitude fear and foolhardiness.  Now by these passions is purity of heart 
disturbed, and so these virtues make a heart pure.336 
The virtues, therefore, contribute to the command of reason by maintaining purity of 
heart or the operation of the reason without undue influence from the passions.   
There is also the further distinction found in the moral virtues between acquired and 
infused.  In his discussion of the cardinal virtues, however, this distinction is not 
precisely made.  In ST I-II.61.5, Thomas asks how the cardinal virtues can be divided.  
He names four categories, according to the English translation: social, perfecting, perfect, 
and exemplar virtues.  It is important to note those virtues given as “perfect” and 
                                                 
336 1 Timothy ch. 1 l. 2 - Ad hoc enim quod cor sit purum, dantur praecepta virtutum, quarum quaedam 
ordinantur ad modum rectificandi passiones quarum, scilicet virtutum, materiae sunt passiones sicut 
temperantia quae ordinat concupiscentiam, mansuetudo iras, fortitudo timores et audacias.  Per has autem 
passiones turbatur purtas cordis. 
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“perfect” are translations of the “purgatoriae” and “purgati animi,” that is, purifying 
virtues, and virtues of the purified soul.  Thomas will, as will be suggested below, 
identify these virtues with the pursuit of perfection (hence the translation as given). As 
has been shown in this dissertation, Thomas has a particular interest in the pursuit of 
perfection, so it would seem that the description of “perfecting” virtues would hold 
special interest.   
In this question, Thomas responds to four objections, where each objection refers to 
a passage from Macrobius which is then rebuffed in the same objection.  The rebuttal in 
three out of four objections originates from a non-Christian philosopher, while the fourth 
is Thomas’s own objection referring to a technical matter.  The first refers to the 
exemplar virtues, the virtues which exist in the prime exemplar (God).  As Aristotle 
points out, it is absurd to describe God as virtuous when God has no passions to 
moderate.  Thomas, however suggests it is appropriate to do so analogously.  Second are 
the perfect virtues, virtues which exist in a person who is so perfected that the virtues no 
longer have the same operations.  Third are the perfecting virtues, which exist in the 
person who is on their way to having perfect virtue.  The perfecting virtues are of 
particular interest, in that they refer to the person who “flies from human affairs and 
devotes himself exclusively to the things of God.”  The rebuttal is from Cicero, and is in 
the form of a condemnation of any sort of renunciation of social practices.  Finally, 
Thomas arrives at the social virtues, which are denied their existence on the grounds that 
only justice deals with the particulars of others.   
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Of particular interest in this dissertation are the perfect and perfecting virtues.  
Thomas affirms their existence—after first confirming the accurate distinction of 
exemplar and social virtues, writing that humans must have an end in God, and that the 
virtues always govern appropriate behavior in regards to social interaction.  The 
perfecting virtues, on the other hand, are described as something “between” the social 
virtues and the exemplar virtues.  Thomas writes: 
But since it behooves a man to do his utmost to strive onward even to Divine 
things, as even the Philosopher declares in Ethics X, 7, and as scripture often 
admonishes us—for instance: “Be ye...perfect as your heavenly father is perfect” 
(Matt. 5:48), we must needs place some virtues between the social or human 
virtues and the exemplar virtues which are divine.337 
Here the justification for the translation of these virtues as “perfecting,” is given, in the 
connection with the passage from the Sermon on the Mount.  The perfecting virtues seem 
to refer to what readers of Thomas call the “supernatural end” for humans, and it would 
seem possible to map the difference between acquired and infused onto these distinctions.  
And yet, the citation from Aristotle should raise some concern in this interpretation.  If 
even Aristotle, a pagan, believes that devotion to God calls for an alteration in the 
understanding of the virtues, this complicates the original interpretation.  Instead, it 
seems likely that the “perfecting” virtues gesture towards the practices associated with 
                                                 
337 ST I-II.61.5 - Sed quia ad hominem pertinet ut etiam ad divina se trahat quantum potest, ut etiam 
philosophys dicit, in X Ethic.; et hoc nobis in sacra Scriptura multiplicter commendatur, ut est illud Matth. 
V, estote perfecti, sicut et pater vester caelestis perfectus est, necesse est ponere quasdam virtutes medias 
inter politicas, quae sunt virtutes humanae, et exemplares, quae sunt virtutes divinae. 
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the philosophical life in the earlier era, and with the practices of Christian perfectionism 
found in Thomas’s own time.   
 This identification with the practices of perfection is rather straightforward to make, 
especially when one reads the De perfectione spiritualis vitae.  The content of the 
perfecting virtues follows immediately upon many of the key principles described in that 
text.  Thomas writes: 
Now these virtues differ by reason of a difference of movement and term: so that 
some are virtues of men who are on their way and tending towards the Divine 
similitude; and these are called “perfecting” virtues.  Thus prudence, by 
contemplating the things of God, counts as nothing all the things of the world and 
directs all the thoughts of the soul to God alone: temperance, so far as nature 
allows, neglects the needs of the body; fortitude prevents the soul from being 
afraid of neglecting the body and rising to heavenly things; and justice consists in 
the soul giving a whole hearted consent to follow the way thus proposed.338 
As was suggested in the previous chapters, the practice of the spiritual life in Thomas is 
concerned precisely with each of the habits suggested by these reinterpreted cardinal 
virtues.  There are also the virtues of the perfect, which Thomas describes as follows: 
Besides these are the virtues of those who have already attained to the divine 
similitude: these are called the “perfect virtues.”  Thus prudence sees naught else 
                                                 
338 Ibid. - Quae quidem virtutes distinguuntur secundum diversitatem motus et termini.  Ita scilicet quod 
quaedam sunt virtutes transeuntium et in divinam similitudinem tendentium, et hae vocantur virtutes 
purgatoriae.  Ita scilicet quod prudentia omnia mundana divinorum contemplatione despiciat, omnemque 
animae cogitationem in divina sola dirigat; temperentia vero relinquat, inquantum natura patitur, quae 
corporis usus requirit; fortitudinis autem est ut anima non terreatur propter excessum a corpore, et 
accessum ad superna; iustitia vero est ut tota anima consentiat ad huius propositi viam. 
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but the things of God; temperance knows no earthly desires; fortitude has no 
knowledge of passion; and justice, by imitating the divine mind, is united thereto 
by an everlasting covenant.  Such are the virtues attributed to the blessed, or, in 
this life, to some who are at the summit of perfection.339   
Thomas thus considers it not only possible for a person to live unaffected by passions in 
this life; he considers this to be a sign of living a blessed life.340  Once more, though this 
perhaps sounds like a Stoic interpretation of Christianity, there is more nuance to this 
presentation.  In his reply to the second objection, Thomas provides a more detailed 
explanation of the relation of the passions to the virtues: 
Human virtues, that is to say, virtues of men living together in this world, are 
about the passions.  But the virtues of those men who have attained to perfect 
bliss are without passions.  Hence Plotinus says that the “social virtues check the 
passions,” i.e. they bring them to the relative mean; “the second kind,” viz. the 
perfecting virtues, “uproot them”; “the third kind,” viz. the perfect virtues, “forget 
them; while it is impious to mention them in connection with virtues of the fourth 
kind,” viz. the exemplar virtues.  It may also be said that here he is speaking of 
passions as denoting inordinate emotions.341 
                                                 
339 Ibid. - Quaedam vero sunt virtutes iam assequentium divinam similitudinem, quae vocantur virtutes iam 
purgati animi.  Ita scilicet quod prudentia sola divina intueatur; temperantia terrenas cupiditates nesciat; 
fortitudo passiones ignoret; iustitia cum divina mente perpetuo foedere societur, eam scilicet imitando.  
Quas quidem virtutes dicimus esse beatorum, vel aliquorum in hac vita perfectissimorum. 
340 Thomas uses the term “passions” in a variety of ways; he is presumably using the term in this instance 
only to refer to the negative form of the passions, those which negatively alter a person’s judgment.  
Additionally, he is likely referring only to Jesus who, as Thomas explains in his question on the defects 
assumed by the soul of Christ, only experienced “propassions,” and not full-fledged passions. ST III.15 
341 Ibid., ad 2. - Ad secundum dicendum quod virtutes humanae sunt circa passiones, scilicet virtutes 
hominum in hoc mundo conversantium.  Sed virtutes eorum qui plenam beatitudinem assequuntur, sunt 
absque passionibus.  Unde Plotinus dicit quod passiones politicae virtutes molliunt, idest ad medium 
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The last clause in this response is crucial to understanding the role of emotions in 
Thomas.  It is true, as many recent interpreters have emphasized, that Thomas has a 
positive role for certain emotions in his theology.  At the same time, however, it is quite 
clear that there are a number of emotions which are considered problematic, and that it is 
one of the primary responsibilities of the moral virtues to moderate or “uproot” these 
passions.   
The problematic passions  
The problematic passions are, for the most part, identified prima secunda in the 
section on the passions.  Thomas there discusses passions both positive and negative, and 
the nuances involved therein.  In this section, the manner in which passions can take a 
negative role will be discussed, as a way of providing a foundation to a discussion of the 
moderation of passions.  It is important to note once more that though passions require 
moderation by reason, they are not in and of themselves negative.  Anger, for example, 
can be good or bad; good when it proceeds from reason and does not impinge on reason, 
and bad when it proceeds incompletely from reason or alters the judgment of reason.  
Pleasure, likewise, is singled out by Thomas as having positive and negative qualities.  
Pleasure of all kinds is inevitable; for example, it is impossible to avoid feeling bodily 
pleasure after consuming a meal.  Nonetheless, the pleasure to be valued is that which 
results from right operation, and not from operations which detract from relationship with 
God.   
                                                                                                                                                             
reducunt; secundae, scilicet purgatoriae, auferunt; tertiae, quae sunt purgati animi, obliviscuntur; in quartis, 
scilicet exemplaribus, nefas est nominari.  Quamvis dici possit quod loquitur hic de passionibus secundum 
quod significant aliquos inordinatos motus. 
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To expand briefly on this subject, the passion of pleasure is treated in several 
different places by Thomas.  At one point, Thomas contends with the false opinion that 
all pleasures are evil, something which he (via Aristotle) attributes to early Greek 
thinkers.  He writes: 
Some have maintained that all pleasure is evil.  The reason seems to have been 
that they took account only of sensible and bodily pleasures which are more 
manifest; since, also in other respects, the ancient philosophers did not 
discriminate between the intelligible and the sensible, nor between intellect and 
sense (De anima iii, 3).  And they held that all bodily pleasures should be 
reckoned as bad, and thus that man being prone to immoderate pleasures, arrives 
at the mean of virtue by abstaining from pleasure.  But they were wrong to hold 
this opinion.342 
Those philosophers were wrong to hold that opinion because “none can live without 
some sensible and bodily pleasure.”  Instead of shunning all pleasure, therefore, Thomas 
instead emphasizes the goodness of the end which is desired by the appetitive drive.  As 
Thomas says in the reply to the third objection of the next article, “just as it happens that 
not every good which is desired, is of itself and verily good; so not every pleasure is of 
itself and verily good.”343  The relative goodness or worth of the pleasure is dependent 
                                                 
342 ST I-II.34.1 - Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in X Ethic., aliqui posuerunt omnes delectationes 
esse malas.  Cuius ratio videtur fuisse, quia intentionem suam referebant ad solas delectationes sensibiles et 
corporales, quae sunt magis manifestae, nam et in ceteris intelligibilia a sensibilius antiqui philosophi non 
distinguebant, nec intellectum a sensu, ut dicitur in libro de anima.  Delectationes autem corporales 
arbitrabantur dicendum omnes esse malas, ut sic homines, qui ad delectationes immoderatas sunt proni, a 
delectationibus se retrahentes, ad medium virtutis perveniant.  Sed haec existimatio non fuit conveniens. 
343 ST I-II.34.2 ad 3  
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upon the end which is fulfilled.  This is confirmed in the final article of this question.  
Thomas writes:  
On the other hand, the pleasures of the sensitive appetite are not the rule of moral 
goodness and malice; since food is universally pleasurable to the sensitive 
appetite both of good and of evil men.  But the will of the good man takes 
pleasure in them in accordance reason, to which the will of the evil man gives no 
heed.344 
Thomas here suggests that the pleasures experienced by a person do not necessarily have 
a moral value in themselves.  Instead, the crux of the matter in determining the morality 
of pleasure is in its relation to reason.  The good person will eat and take pleasure in food 
in alignment with reason; that is, they will eat a sufficient amount for their bodily health, 
and not eat simply for the pleasure of eating (the vice of gluttony).  The evil person, 
according to Thomas, measures the worth of the pleasure derived from the situation 
without regard for the judgment of reason. 
 Thomas also acknowledges that certain pleasures are beneficial to reason, while 
others lack this characteristic.  The line Thomas draws appears to be a traditional one, in 
that he distinguishes between the pleasure which accompanies the actions of the intellect 
and bodily pleasures.  Thomas writes: 
As is stated in Nicomachean Ethics X,5, “appropriate pleasures increase 
activity...whereas pleasures arising from other sources are impediments to 
activity.”  Accordingly there is a certain pleasure that is taken in the very act of 
                                                 
344 ST I-II.34.4 - Delectationes autem appetitus sensitivi non sunt regula bonitatis vel malitiae moralis, nam 
cibus communiter delectabilis est secundum appetitum sensitivum, bonis et malis.  Sed voluntas bonorum 
delectatur in eis secundum convenientiam rationis, quam non curat voluntas malorum. 
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reason, as when one takes pleasure in contemplating or in reasoning: and such 
pleasure does not hinder the act of reason, but helps it; because we are more 
attentive in doing that which gives us pleasure, and attention fosters activity.  On 
the other hand bodily pleasures hinder the use of reason in three ways.345 
The three ways in which pleasures hinder bodily activity are as follows: 1. By distracting 
the reason 2. By being contrary to reason 3. By fettering the reason.  A pleasure can 
distract the rational faculty by causing the person to focus on the pleasure and ignore 
their reason.   Additionally, a pleasure, by being contrary to reason, can “destroy the 
estimate of prudence,” that is, negatively affect someone’s judgment of the proper course 
of action and implementation thereof.  Finally, reason is fettered by certain pleasures.  In 
this case, Thomas cites the example of the drunkard, who is presumably so immersed in 
the bodily pleasure of drunkenness that the mind is considered in some sense “absent” 
due to the overwhelming presence of pleasure. 
Thomas does single out another form of bodily pleasure as being of particular 
danger to the judgment of reason: sexual pleasure.  This is not surprising given his 
emphasis on the importance of chastity.  As Thomas writes, “For man to be much given 
to sexual pleasure contributes to the dissolution of good moral behavior; because, since 
this pleasure greatly occupies the mind, reason is withdrawn from things which should be 
done rightly.”346 
                                                 
345 ST I-II.33.3 - Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in X Ethic., delectationes propriae adaugent 
operationes, extraneae vero impediunt.  Est ergo quaedam delectatio quae habetur de ipso actu rationis, 
sicut cum aliquis delectatur in contemplando vel ratiocinando.  Et talis delectatio non impedit usum 
rationis, sed ipsum adiuvat, quia illud attentius operamur in quo delectamur; attentio autem adiuvat 
operationem.  Sed delectationes corporales impediunt usum rationis triplici ratione. 
346 SCG 3.125.4 
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 A similar principle is applied in Thomas’s discussion of anger.  Though Thomas will 
repeatedly acknowledge anger as having certain valid characteristics, he also offers 
certain cautions.  This is because the nature of anger is often to overcome the efforts of 
reason, though proceeding from a judgment of reason.  Thomas suggests that anger is the 
product of a judgment of reason based on the analysis of circumstances.  A person 
realizes that from some interaction they were wronged, and they then feel a desire for 
vengeance.  This is, in fact, a rational process, and would seem to meet the criteria for 
being a valid emotion, in that it proceeds in alignment with reason.  Thomas, however, 
does not find this to be the full story with anger.  He writes:  
As stated in Nicomachean Ethics VII.6, “anger listens somewhat to reason” in so 
far as reason denounces the injury inflicted, “but listens not perfectly,” because it 
does not observe the rule of reason as to the measure of vengeance.  Anger, 
therefore, requires an act of reason; and yet proves a hindrance to reason.347 
Anger, therefore, starts with a judgment of reason.  But from this judgment of reason 
comes a bodily response, which can hinder reason.  In fact, Thomas writes:   
Now it has been stated that anger, above all, causes a bodily disturbance in the 
region of the heart, so much as to effect even the outward members.  
Consequently, of all the passions, anger is the most manifest obstacle to the 
                                                 
347 ST I-II.46.4 ad 3 - Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in VII Ethic., ira audit aliqualiter rationem, 
sicut nuntiantem quod iniuritatum est ei, sed non perfecte audit, quia non observat regulam rationis in 
rependendo vindictam.  Ad iram ergo requiritur aliquis actus rationis; et additur impedimentum rationis.  
Unde philosophus dicit, in libro de Problemat., quod illi qui sunt multum ebrii, tanquam nihil habentes de 




judgment of reason, according to Psalm 30:30: “My eye is troubled with 
wrath.”348 
Thomas, however, finds that anger is in fact so essential an accompaniment to the 
judgment of reason, that the accompanying hindrance to the processes of reason is 
acceptable, provided it not be too great.  In fact, Thomas assigns an essential role to anger 
in the virtue of fortitude.349  He also states that a lack of due anger is in fact a vice, and 
represents a failure to pursue punishment following judgment.350   
 The method of keeping passions like anger and pleasure moderated remains in the 
activity of reason.  This is a heavy burden for rational faculty to maintain, and Thomas 
will at other times suggest alternative aids to virtues other simply a correct judgment, 
such as certain of those aids discussed in the previous chapter as aids to chastity.   
Moderation of passions by means other than Reason 
 Though reason is suggested as the primary means of moderating passions, Thomas 
does recommend other practices.  These practices, for the most part, include the activity 
of the intellect, in particular in the forms of contemplation and prayer as means of 
reducing the force of passions.  Thomas does suggest the power of love as a means of 
reducing a desire for vengeance or punishment, as well.  A person can, at a moment when 
determining the course of action after being wronged, remember the love they ought to 
feel for all humanity and reduce their desire for undue punishment.  Thomas also, 
                                                 
348 ST I-II.48.3 - Dictum est autem quod ira maxime facit perturbationem corporalem circa cor, ita ut etiam 
usque ad exteriora membra derivetur.  Unde ira, inter ceteras passiones, manifestius impedit iudicium 
rationis; secundum illud Psalmi XXX, conturbatus est in ira oculus meus. 
349 ST II-II.123.10  
350 ST II-II.158.3 and ibid., ad 1 (“he that is entirely without anger when he ought to be angry, imitates God 
as to lack of passion, but not as to God’s punishing by judgment.”) 
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interestingly enough, recommends tears or groans as a means of overcoming sorrow, as 
well.351   
Prudence – memory and command 
 In this section, I will describe two aspects of the virtue of prudence.  In one aspect, 
that of memory, I will describe the set of exercises associated with the practice, and 
describe their relation to the form of reflexivity suggested by Thomas.  In the other, that 
of “constancy” I will describe a virtue which aids in the performance of the virtue of 
prudence, and describe how this virtue further demonstrates the relationship of self to self 
in Aquinas.  Before moving further, I will first provide a brief overview of the virtue of 
prudence in relation to the passions and its function in a virtuous person.   
The virtue of prudence holds a central role in the moral life for Aquinas.  
Occupying a hybrid role as an intellectual and moral virtue, prudence takes on the role of 
applying “right reason to action.”352  It is acquired in the same way as other virtues, 
whether acquired through exercise of the virtue or divinely infused.  Thomas explains: 
Acquired prudence is caused by the exercise of acts, wherefore “its acquisition 
demands experience and time” (Nicomachean Ethics II, 1), hence it cannot be in 
the young, neither in habit nor in act.  On the other hand gratuitous prudence is 
caused by divine infusion…This by practice merits increase, until it becomes 
perfect, even as the other virtues.353   
                                                 
351 Thomas was said to have the “gift of tears,” as a number of accounts of his life attest. 
352 ST II-II.47.4 
353 ST II-II.47.14 ad 3 - Ad tertium dicendum quod prudentia acquisita causatur ex exercitio actuum, unde 
indiget ad sui generationem experimento et tempore, ut dicitur in II Ethic.  Unde non potest esse in 
iuvenibus nec secundum habitum nec secundum actum.  Sed prudentia gratuita causatur ex infusione 
divina….sed per exercitium meretur augmentum quousque perficiatur, sicut et ceterae virtutes. 
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This passage points to several important aspects of Thomas’s account of the virtues.  
First, the distinction between acquired and infused is suggested here.  Thomas adds the 
caveat that infused prudence is in “regards to acts necessary for salvation.”  This is a 
rather limited purview for infused prudence, and suggests that the virtue in fact has two 
separate virtues, functionally speaking, with different areas of concern (acts for salvation, 
and acts for human society).  This seems like an untidy solution, and Thomas would 
assuredly not want to make an actual distinction and have two virtues.  In dealing with 
the problem of how to describe the connection between an acquired and an infused virtue, 
a solution offered by Rene Mirkes holds great appeal.   
He writes: 
The comprehensive or inclusive view of virtue proposed by Aquinas and 
supposed in the thesis of this study, namely, that perfect virtue for the Christians 
who also possess the acquired virtues is a composite but single entity, dictates that 
every Christian virtue, adequately considered, is an ordered reality in which the 
component parts are related as matter to form.  A moral virtue, in its absolutely 
perfect state, is formally speaking supernatural or an infused virtue and materially 
speaking natural or an acquired moral virtue.354 
Mirkes here suggests, using the concept of form and matter, that the infused virtue 
provides the form and the acquired virtue provides the material.  This connection allows 
us to speak of a composite virtue where divine infusion of a virtue can still play a role in 
areas of human concern.  He explains further: “A moral virtue of diligence or prudence 
                                                 
354 Mirkes, R., “Aquinas on the Unity of Perfect Moral Virtue”. American Catholic Philosophical 
Quarterly. 71/4 (1997) 589–605. 204. 
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that lacks a material component only aids the individual to make decisions regarding 
supernatural life; it does not also help him to decide well in human affairs.”355 As 
suggested above, therefore, a person who only has the infused virtue of prudence decides 
prudently only in relation to areas of supernatural concern.  A fully formed “perfect” 
virtue includes both aspects. 
 This is important for how the virtue of prudence is discussed.  By accepting the 
concept of composite virtues, this should allow us to discuss prudence in all the senses 
described in the above passage on the four varieties of virtues.  Thus, when the virtue of 
prudence in Christians is described , it can be considered to include the definition of the 
virtue in the “perfecting virtues,” where prudence “counts as nothing all the things of the 
world and directs all the thoughts of the soul to God alone;” and, it includes, further the 
social virtues of right reason about things to be done in areas of human concern. 
 Prudence in the Christian is, therefore, partially a product of experience and partially 
a matter of divine infusion.  The factor of experience is especially important; it is why 
prudence is not in the youngest persons, and is typically seen in the old.  Being old and 
experienced is not enough for prudence, however; it also requires a commitment to 
memorizing one’s experiences through repeated consideration of them.  The practice of 
memory will be described more below.   
Prudence is also found in older persons because of the nature of human passions.  
Thomas explains: “Prudence is rather in the old, not only because their natural disposition 
calms the movement of the sensitive passions, but also because of their long 
                                                 
355 Ibid., 205. 
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experience.”356  This is because, like the faculty of reason in general, the virtue of 
prudence is also susceptible to the negative influence of passions.  In fact, it is the 
passions which are the primary area of concern in maintaining an upright virtue of 
prudence.  In a question on whether prudence is taken away by forgetfulness, Thomas 
answers affirmatively, but adds that “prudence is not taken away directly by 
forgetfulness, but rather is corrupted by the passions.”357  As mentioned above, the 
primary opponent of reason are the passions associated with sexual relations.  Thomas 
singles these out as being particularly problematic for prudence, writing that “the 
enjoyment of sexual relations ‘greatly corrupts the judgment of prudence.’”358 
 One of the roles of prudence, therefore, is to moderate passions.  The moderation of 
passions is not the primary role of prudence, but it is a connected aspect, in that selecting 
the proper course of action also includes feeling a certain way about those actions.  
Thomas writes: “Just as a natural agent makes form to be in matter, yet does not make 
that which is essential to the form to belong to it, so too, prudence appoints the mean in 
passions and operations, and yet does not make the searching of the mean to belong to 
virtue.”359  For the proper operation of prudence, therefore, the passions must be kept 
from having an undue influence on the functioning of the intellect, and then must proceed 
according to the mean appointed by reason.   
Prudence and Reflexivity 
                                                 
356 ST II-II.47.15 ad 2 
357 ST II-II.47.16 
358 SCG 3.125.5 
359 ST II-II.47.7 ad 2 
5-249 
 
 In a subjective form of reflexivity such as found in the work of Thomas Aquinas, the 
virtue of prudence takes on a central role.  Self-knowledge is predicated primarily as the 
moderation of actions, as there is no other knowledge of self that can be held or is a true 
matter of concern.  Instead, the mind is turned to consider itself in the form of its mental 
processes as they are enacted in the stages of decision making.  For Thomas, as well, the 
virtue of prudence is connected with the essential split in the person between New Self 
and Old Self.  The distinction between these two is the classical distinction between the 
intellectual and the sensitive aspects of the person, and as thinkers since Plato and 
Aristotle have emphasized, one should direct the other.   
Prudence and Memory 
 Thomas’s description of the virtue of prudence is extensive and detailed, and it will 
be impossible to cover any fair portion of it in this treatment.  But one of its most 
important parts is memory, which plays an important role in the decision making process.  
In describing “precipitation,” the movement of impulse in soul and body, Thomas also 
indicates the proper process of reasoning in determining action.  He writes: 
Now the summit of the soul is the reason, and the base is reaching in the action 
performed by the body; while the steps that intervene by which one ought to 
descend in orderly fashion are “memory” of the past, “intelligence” of the present, 
“shrewdness” in considering the future outcome, “reasoning” which compares one 
thing to another, “docility” in accepting the opinions of others.  He that takes 
counsel descends by these steps in due order, whereas if a man is rushed into 
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action by the impulse of his will or of a passion, without taking these steps, it will 
be a case of precipitation.360 
The qualities Thomas mentions are found in the question on the “quasi-integral” parts of 
prudence, though not all of them are included.361  Memory is the first step in determining 
a proper action, as in the memory a person draws from the dictates of experience to help 
in determining a proper course of action.  The problem with having a virtue dependent on 
experience is that there are an infinite number of events and variations with those events 
which are possible. This makes it less likely that a person will have experienced an event 
with same singulars in the past.  Experience and memory, however, provide the person 
with knowledge which enables them to derive provisional guidelines or generalizations 
about the proper course of action.  Thomas writes: “Nevertheless experience reduces the 
infinity of singulars to a certain finite number which occur as a general rule, and the 
knowledge of these suffices for human prudence.”362  Because a person cannot know 
every singular they encounter in their life, it is necessary, based on past experience, to 
derive guidelines for action from the memory of past events. 
 Memory, therefore, plays a foundational role in human prudence, dependent as it is 
on experience and the derivation of general rules.  It is, of course, also central to the 
                                                 
360 ST II-II.53.3 - Summum autem animae est ipsa ratio.  Imum autem est operatio per corpus exercita.  
Gradus autem medii, per quos oportet ordinate descendere, sunt memoria praeteritorum, intelligentia 
praesentium, solertia in considerandis futuris eventibus, ratiocinatio conferens unum alteri, docilitas, per 
quam aliquis acquiescit senstentiis maiorum, per quos quidem gradus aliquis ordinate descendit recte 
consiliando.  Si quis autem feratur ad agendum per impetum voluntatis vel passionis, pertransitis huiusmodi 
gradibus, erit praecipatio. 
361 In question ST II-II.49, those parts are given as memory, understanding or intelligence, docility, 
shrewdness, reason, foresight, circumspection, caution.  The reason for the difference in the placement of 
docility in the order, and for the absence of foresight, circumspection, and caution, is not explained in that 
article by Thomas.   
362 ST II-II.47.3 ad 2 
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intellectual project, so Thomas will provide some teaching on the practices associated 
with an effective memory.  In his article on memory in the quasi-integral parts, Thomas 
provides a set of practices to aid in memory.   
1. Create an unwonted illustration of the thing 
2. Consider the memory and place it in relation to others 
3. Be “anxious and earnest” in order to keep the memory close by 
4. Reflect on the memory often 
The first practice of memory, creating an unwonted illustration of a thing, is connected 
with the limits of the human mind.  Though it is possible for humans to think in terms of 
things which are “spiritual” in the sense of non-material, the mind, according to Thomas, 
has a further grasp on things which are material.  For this reason, he says, the memory is 
typically placed in the sensitive aspect of the soul.363  By taking a conceptual idea and 
giving it a material image in the mind, it is easier to remember. 
 The second practice of memory concerns the way in which the mind works in its 
flowing from one image to the next.  Thomas explains:  
Whatever a man wishes to retain in his memory he must carefully consider and set 
in order, so that he may pass easily from one memory to another.  Hence the 
philosopher says (De memor. et remin. II): “sometimes a place brings memories 
back to us: the reason being that we pass quickly from the one to the other.”364 
                                                 
363 ST II-II.49.1 ad 2 
364 Ibid. - Secundo, oportet ut homo ea quae memoriter vult tenere sua consideratione ordinate disponat, ut 
ex uno memorato facile ad aliud procedatur.  Unde philosophus dicit, in libro de Mem., a locis videntur 
reminisci aliquando, causa autem est quia velociter ab alio in aliud veniunt. 
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In this explanation, Thomas appears to suggest a practice of considering the connections 
between memories in a repeated manner, such that connections are clear and the memory 
sought for can quickly be brought to mind.  If we work to associate our memories with 
whatever triggers them, then the memory can be more easily brought to mind.  For 
prudence, this means that if faced with a particular circumstance related to what one has 
previously experienced, the memory of the past actions are quickly brought to mind and 
help guide in the present action.   
 The third and fourth practices of memory are related to emotional and mental 
repetition.  The third, as indicated above, is accomplished by a person’s being “anxious 
and earnest” about the memory to be kept.  By being anxious about a given thing, the 
memory’s importance is “impressed on the mind.”  Finally, a person can better retain a 
memory by constantly revisiting that memory.  Thomas again associates this with the 
“natural order” of passing from one memory to another.  By revisiting a given memory, it 
is more likely that a person will come to that memory when thinking through a given 
thing.   
 These practices of association are helpful, but the question still remains as to what 
specific content the person should be committing to memory.  The answer, for Thomas, is 
likely to be as expansive as the entirety of his corpus; but there are certain points which 
are especially important in relation to the spiritual life.  In his Commentary on Ephesians, 
Thomas points to the example of Christ’s response to the devil during his temptation in 
the wilderness.  He writes: 
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Thus the Lord brought forward authoritative texts of the Holy Scripture to oppose 
the devil’s temptations.  We ought to do the same; if tempted to gluttony, “Not in 
bread alone doth man live” (Deut. 8:3), or “the kingdom of God is not meat and 
drink” (Rom. 14:17).  If tempted to sensuality, “Thou shalt not commit adultery” 
(Ex. 20:14); if to theft, “thou shalt not steal” (Ex. 20:15)—and so on with any 
others.365 
Thomas offers these words in the context of a discussion of the theological virtue of faith, 
suggesting that this practice transcends the human practice of the moral virtues.  
Nonetheless, the connection between prudence and memory can be seen in the 
connection of scripture with moral restraint.  By repeatedly remembering and following 
the authority of scripture on a given moral issue, a person is provided with sound 
guidance and is able to act virtuously. 
Justice 
 In arriving at the next virtue, justice, it is a bit more of a challenge to continue with 
the present mode of interpretation.  This is a result of the nature of justice for Thomas, 
which he suggests is fundamentally about the relationship and interaction of one person 
with others.  Thus, unlike prudence, temperance and fortitude, each of which involves the 
moderation of passions and the emphasis on identity with reason, justice is less an 
internal virtue and more an external one.  This is certainly true, but as in the case of the 
other virtues, justice requires an internal orientation in order to produce the ideal 
                                                 
365 Commentary on Ephesians ch. 6 lec. 4 - Unde dominus Diabolo tentanti producebat et opponebat 
auctoritates sacrae scripturae.  Et sic debemus facere, si tentat de gula, secundum illud Deut. VIII, 3: non in 
solo pane vivit homo, vel illud: non est regnum Dei, esca et potus.  Si de luxuria: non moechaberis. Si de 
furto: non furtum facies; et sic de aliis. 
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behaviors for a human on the way to perfection.  For Thomas, justice as a virtue is 
intimately connected with justification, and as a prerequisite for this, calls for the 
commitment of the mind to God.  Justice in this sense still retains its original definition of 
rendering to each one what is due; in this case, however, what is due to God is everything 
a person has, especially the best part of themselves, which is their intellectual aspect.   
Justice as Orientation 
 As mentioned above, justice has a rather straightforward definition in Thomas, taken 
in part from Aristotle.  Thomas writes, “And if anyone would reduce it to the proper form 
of a definition, he might say that “justice is a habit whereby a man renders to each one his 
due by a constant and perpetual will.”366  Most importantly, this definition mentions the 
“constant and perpetual will”—justice being a moral virtue, it is found in the will, not in 
the intellect, as was the case with prudence.  In addition, the virtue of justice is connected 
with the matter of judgment, whereby a person decides what the right thing is to be 
rendered to that other.  Though judgment is an aspect of justice, it specifically inclines 
the person towards the following through of the judgment, which originates from a 
different virtue.  As Thomas explains: 
The spiritual man, by reason of the habit of charity, has an inclination to judge 
aright of things according to the divine rules; and it is conformity with these that 
he pronounces judgment through the gift of wisdom: even as the just man 
                                                 
366 ST II-II.58.1 
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pronounces judgment through the virtue of prudence conformably with the ruling 
of the law.367 
Justice, therefore, is about in the inclination of the will towards the performance of 
actions in conformity with reason and wisdom.  It does not, however, govern the arrival 
at those judgments, something accomplished in the higher parts of the soul.  Nor does 
justice deal with the lower parts of the soul, as mentioned above.  Thomas writes, in 
response to the question of “whether justice is about the passions?”:  
The true answer to this question may be gathered from a twofold source.  First 
from the subject of justice, i.e. from the will, whose movements or acts are not 
passions, as stated above (ST I-II.22.3, ST I-II.59.4), for it is only the sensitive 
appetite whose movements are called passions.  Hence justice is not about the 
passions as are temperance and fortitude, which are in the irascible and 
concupiscible parts.  Secondly, on the part of the matter, because justice is about 
man’s relations with another, and we are not directed immediately to another by 
the internal passions.  Therefore justice is not about the passions.368 
Justice, in this specific sense, would appear to be a rather restricted virtue, in that it does 
not judge on its own and does not moderate passions.  Instead, the virtue of justice is 
about the will in its ability to ensure that the way proposed is followed through.  This is, 
                                                 
367 ST II-II.60.1 ad 2 - Ad secundum dicendum quod homo spiritualis ex habitu caritatis habet 
inclinationem ad recte iudicandum de omnibus secundum regulas divinas, ex quibus iudicium per donum 
sapientiae pronuntiat, sicut iustus per virtutem prudentiae pronuntiat iudicium ex regulis iuris. 
368 ST II-II.58.9 - Respondeo dicendum quod huius quaestionis veritas ex duobus apparet.  Primo quidem, 
ex ipso subiecto iustitiae, quod est voluntas cuius motus vel actus non sunt passiones, ut supra habitum est; 
sed solum motus appetitus sensitivi passiones dicuntur.  Et ideo iustitia non est circa passiones, sicut 
temperantia et fortitudo, quae sunt irascibilis et concupiscibilis, sunt circa passiones.  Alio modo, ex parte 
materiae.  Quia iustitia est circa ea quae sunt ad alterum.  Non autem per passiones interiores immediate ad 
alterum ordinamur.  Et ideo iustitia circa passiones non est. 
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in fact, precisely the definition of justice offered in the description of the perfecting 
virtues, where Thomas writes that “justice consists in the soul giving a whole hearted 
consent to follow the way thus proposed.”369  Perfect justice, on the other hand, is 
described this way: “justice, by imitating the divine mind, is united thereto by an 
everlasting covenant.”370 
 The question remains how a person might actually give that whole hearted consent, or 
even imitate the divine mind, in the pursuit of justice.  Thomas’s Commentary on 
Galatians provides a bit of insight for this matter.  In a discussion of the justice of 
Abraham, Thomas first notes that “justice consists in paying a debt,” a definition similar 
to the one provided above.  Furthermore, he indicates that “man is indebted to God and to 
himself and to his neighbor,” and this indebtedness is because of God.  Because this 
indebtedness is from God (i.e., God is the source of all things, thus the source of 
indebtedness), “the highest form of justice is to render to God what is God’s.”  For 
humans, this takes the form of rendering to God what is highest internally, as Thomas 
explains: 
Now whatever is in man is from God, namely intellect and will and the body 
itself, albeit according to a certain order; because the lower is ordained to the 
higher, and external things to internal, namely, to the good of the soul.  
Furthermore, the highest thing in man is his mind.  Therefore the first element of 
justice in a man is that man’s mind be subjected to God, and this is done by faith: 
                                                 




“Bringing into captivity every understanding unto the obedience of Christ” (2 
Cor. 10:5).371 
Fortitude – premeditatione malorum and the fear of bodily death  
 Moving on to the virtue of fortitude marks a shift in the variety of virtues under 
discussion.  The next two, fortitude and temperance, are concerned with parts of the 
appetite, and thus deal directly with the moderation of emotions.  As Thomas explains:   
Wherefore it belongs to human virtue to make man good, to make his work 
accord with reason.  This happens in three ways: first, by rectifying reason itself, 
and this is done by the intellectual virtues; secondly, by establishing the rectitude 
of reason in human affairs, and this belongs to justice; thirdly by removing the 
obstacles to the establishment of this rectitude in human affairs.372 
The virtues of temperance and fortitude, therefore, are particularly concerned with 
removing obstacles.  The obstacles to the rectitude of reason are, as previously 
established, inordinate passions, as Thomas explains once more: 
Now the human will is hindered in two ways from following the rectitude of 
reason.  First, through being drawn by some object of pleasure to something other 
than what the rectitude of reason requires; and this obstacle is removed by the 
virtue of temperance.  Secondly, through the will being disinclined to follow that 
                                                 
371 Commentary on Galatians ch.3 lec. 3 - Dei autem est quidquid est in homine, et intellectus et voluntas et 
ipsum corpus; sed tamen quodam ordine, quia inferiora ordinantur ad superiora, et exteriora ad interiora, 
scilicet ad bonum animae; supremum autem in homine est mens.  Et ideo primum in iustitia hominis est, 
quod mens hominis Deo subdatur, et hoc fit per fidem.  II Cor. X, 3 (5): in captivitatem redigentes omnem 
intellectum in obsequium Christi. 
372 ST II-II.123.1 - Et ideo ad virtutem humanam pertinet ut faciat hominem et opus eius secundum 
rationem esse.  Quod quidem tripliciter contingit.  Uno modo, secundum quod ipsa ratio rectificatur, quod 
fit per virtutes intellectuales.  Alio modo, secundum quod ipsa rectitudo rationis in rebus humanis 
instituitur, quod pertinet ad iustitiam.  Tertio, secundum quod tolluntur impedimenta huius rectitudinis in 
rebus humanis ponendae. 
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which is in accordance with reason, on account of some difficulty that presents 
itself.  In order to remove this obstacle, fortitude of the mind is requisite, whereby 
to resist the aforesaid difficulty even as a man, by fortitude of body, overcomes 
and removes bodily obstacles.  Hence it is evident that fortitude is a virtue, in so 
far as it conforms man to reason.373 
The virtue of temperance will be discussed in the next section, in order to detail its role in 
the moderation of pleasure and desire.  Fortitude, on the other hand, is located in the 
irascible appetite, and concerns primarily the moderation of fear and daring.374  The 
virtue of fortitude is intimately connected with the ability to remain constant in 
conviction and to follow through on the command of reason.   
 In this section, I will discuss the virtue of fortitude in relation to its moderation of fear 
and, in particular, the fear of death.  The fear of death is one of the prime matters of 
concern for the virtue of fortitude, as humans have a strong natural impulse to preserve 
their life.  For the Christian, however, the fear of death is different.  This is because, 
through Christ and the teachings of the scriptures, there is no longer a need to fear bodily 
death because of the assurance of Christ’s victory over death.  The overcoming of the fear 
of death, and alternatively, fear of other great evils, is accomplished in two ways.  First, it 
is accomplished by the recognition of what Christ’s death on the cross means for all 
                                                 
373 Ibid. - Dupliciter autem impeditur voluntas humana ne rectitudinem rationis sequatur.  Uno modo, per 
hoc quod attrahitur ab aliquo delectabili ad aliud quam rectitudo rationis requirat, et hoc impedimentum 
tollit virtus temperantiae.  Alio modo, per hoc quod voluntatem repellit ab eo quod est secundum rationem, 
propter aliquid difficile quod incumbit.  Et ad hoc impedimentum tollendum requiritur fortitudo mentis, qua 
scilicet huiusmodi difficultatibus resistat, sicut et homo per fortitudinem corporalem impedimenta 
corporalia superat et repellit.  Unde manifestum est quod fortitudo est virtus, inquantum facit hominem 
secundum rationem esse. 
374 ST II-II.123.3 “therefore fortitude is about fear and daring, as curbing fear and moderating daring.” 
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humanity; and second, the praemeditatione malorum, the foreseeing and experiencing of 
evils. 
 In regard to the reflexive relation to self as presented by the virtue of fortitude, the 
same pattern is seen.  The role of fortitude in its moderation of fear is to preserve the 
reason; in fact, it is called to follow this to such an extent that, at least for the Christian, 
the death of the body is secondary to the violation of reason.  An example of this, of 
course, would be found in the act of martyrdom, whereby a person requires fortitude to 
overcome the fear of death and to face death for the sake of “truth and justice.”375  The 
body, in this situation, is but one more thing external to the self of reason, one which in 
extreme situations is rightly sacrificed for the sake of charity.   
Fortitude and the fear of death 
 As Thomas indicates, fortitude is not about just any fear, but the fear of death.376  
This understanding of fortitude is consistent in most treatments, and receives its greatest 
specificity in Aristotle, where he identifies fortitude with the fear of death in battle.  In 
that situation, the fortitude of the brave is commended, since they are willing to endure 
the risk of death in order to preserve the good of their country or city.  For Thomas, while 
he admits this is the case, the virtue of fortitude is given a more expansive treatment, as it 
is apparent that a person encounters the risk of death in a number of situations.   
 In Thomas’s Commentary on Hebrews, he provides an extensive treatment on the fear 
of death, and the reason why Christians need not possess it.  The verses under 
commentary are 2:14-15, in the translation from the Vulgate: 
                                                 
375 ST II-II.124.1 
376 ST II-II.123.4 “Therefore the virtue of fortitude is about the fear of dangers of death.” 
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Therefore, because the children are partakers of flesh and blood, he also himself 
in like manner hath been partaker of the same: that, through death, he might 
destroy him who had the empire of death, that is to say, the devil: and might 
deliver them, who through the fear of death were all their lifetime subject to 
servitude. 
The importance of Christ’s death is remarked upon several times in Thomas’s work, and 
many times referring back to this passage.  In the tertia pars of the Summa Theologiae, 
for example, Thomas writes of the reasons for Christ’s death, that “Thirdly, that by dying 
he might deliver us from fearing death: hence it is written (Hebrews 2:14-15) [the 
passage quoted above].”377  In the commentary, Thomas provides more nuance to this 
explanation.  He writes:  
Among all fears, however, the fear of death is the greatest.  For it is the end of 
terrible things.  Hence, if a man overcomes this fear, he overcomes all; and when 
fear is overcome, all disordered love of the world is overcome.  Thus Christ by his 
death broke this fear, because he removed the fear of death, and consequently the 
love of the present life.  For when a person considers that the Son of God, the 
Lord of death, willed to die, he no longer fears death.  That is why before the 
death of Christ it was said: O death, how bitter is the remembrance of you (Sir. 
41:1); but after Christ’s death the Apostle expresses a desire to be dissolved and 
                                                 
377 ST III.50.1  
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be with Christ (Phil. 1:23): Hence, we are told: fear not those who kill the body 
(Matt. 10:28).378 
There are several important points contained in this quotation.  Thomas first identifies the 
significance of the fear of death, something which is also seen in his discussion of 
fortitude in the Summa Theologiae.  But second, and perhaps more importantly, Thomas 
attributes to the overcoming of the fear of death the power of overcoming “all disordered 
love of the world.”  This is a rather significant suggestion, especially given the discussion 
found in the De perfectione which established as a primary end the redirection of the 
affections away from the world.  Thomas suggests in this passage that the inordinate 
affection for the world is the result of the fear of death; that by fearing the end of our 
time, we as a result cling to the material things around us in hopes of avoiding our end.   
 Thomas then explains how one can overcome the fear of death, namely through the 
consideration of Christ’s death.  By understanding that Christ “willed to die,” this should 
lessen or remove our fear of death.  Though Thomas does not immediately explain what 
he means by this, or why this should have an impact on our own approach to death, in the 
following section he explains in greater detail.  He writes: 
It should be noted that he freed us from the fear of death, first of all, by showing 
the immortality that awaited us.  As a result, man could scorn temporal death: 
Christ is risen from the dead, the first-fruits of those who sleep (1 Cor 15:20); 
                                                 
378 Commentary on Hebrews Ch. 2 lec. 4 sec. 144 - Inter omnes autem, timor mortis est maximus.  Est enim 
finis terribilium.  Unde si homo timorem istum superat, superat omnes; et hoc superato, superatur omnis 
amor mundi inordinatus.  Et ideo Christus per mortem suam fregit hoc ligamen, quia abstultit timorem 
mortis, et per consequens amorem vitae praesentis.  Quando enim considerat homo, quod filius Dei, vitae 
praesentis.  Quando enim considerat homo, quod filius Dei, dominus mortis, mori voluit, non timet mori.  
Et inde est quod ante mortem Christi dicebat ille in Eccl. XLI, 1; o mors, quam amara est memoria tua.  
Sed post mortem Christi clamat apostolus, Phil. I, 23: desiderium habens dissolvi et esse cum Christo.  
Unde Matth. X, 28: nolite timere eos qui occidunt corpus, et cetera. 
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second, by giving us a foretaste of death, he made us more ready to undergo death 
for Christ: Christ suffered for us, leaving you an example (1 Pet 2:2).  Third, by 
opening the gate to glory, which was closed before his death; as a result, we not 
only do not fear death, but we desire it: having a desire to be dissolved and to be 
with Christ, which is much better (Phil. 1:23).379 
Humans, therefore, should not fear death because immortality is offered to them, because 
Christ endured death previous to us, and because it is heaven which awaits us.  And, in 
Thomas’s mind, this should serve to cut us off from inordinate worldly desires which 
distract us from the love of God.  This would also seem to remove the need for the virtue 
of fortitude, being as it is about the fear of death.   
 This is, of course, not entirely the case, as fortitude covers more than the fear of 
death, although the root cause of fear is found in the possibility of death.  Nonetheless, a 
person still needs fortitude.  As Thomas explains in the perfecting and perfect virtues, 
“fortitude prevents the soul from being afraid of neglecting the body and rising to 
heavenly things,” and “fortitude has no knowledge of passion.”380 
Fortitude and premeditatione malorum 
 One of the practices identified in the first chapter as appearing in the work of 
Foucault and Hadot is the premeditatione malorum, the practice of considering and 
experiencing evils before they occur as a form of preparation.  This exercise is mentioned 
                                                 
379 Ibid., sec. 146 - Et notandum quod liberavit nos a timore mortis, primo ostendendo futuram 
immortalitatem, et ex hoc homo parvipendit mortem temporalem.  I Cor. XV, 20; Christus resurgens 
primitiae dormientium, et cetera.  Secundo praegustando voluntariae mortem, ex quo promptiores efficimur 
ad subeundum mortem pro Christo.  I Pet. II, 21: Christus passus est pro nobis, vobis relinquens exemplum, 
et cetera.  Tertio aperiendo aditum ad gloriam, qui ante mortem suam non patebat, et ex hoc non solum non 
timemus mortem, sed desideramus eam.  Phil. I, 23: desiderium habens dissolvi et esse cum Christo, et 
cetera. 
380 ST I-II.61.5 
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in multiple places in the Summa Theologiae, and in Thomas’s corpus in general.  It 
appears in the discussion of the passion of fear, where Thomas writes: 
As stated above (I-II.42.3, I-II.41.2), the object of fear is an imminent evil, which 
can be repelled, but with difficulty.  Now this is due to one of two causes: to the 
greatness of the evil, or to the weakness of him that fears; while unwontedness 
and suddenness conduce to both of these causes.  First, it helps an imminent evil 
seem greater.  Because all material things, whether good or evil, the more we 
consider them, the smaller they seem.  Consequently, just as sorrow for a present 
evil is mitigated in the course of time, as Cicero states (Tusculan Disputations 
III.30); so, too, fear of a future evil is diminished by thinking about it 
beforehand.381 
This practice works, theoretically, for all fears, insofar as one of the main factors in fear 
is that a thing be “unwonted.”  The extent to which we are unfamiliar with a given thing 
increases our fear of it, as we are not accustomed to it and the reactions it engenders.  
Thus, by thinking dangers before they occur, we reduce our unfamiliarity with a given 
thing, and thus reduce our fear. 
 This practice is identified as an aid to fortitude, though it is not a necessarily and 
indication of the virtue.  In a question on whether fortitude is about sudden occurrences, 
Thomas discusses the practice of premeditatione: 
                                                 
381 ST I-II.42.5 - Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, obiectum timoris est malum imminens 
quod non de facili repelli potest.  Hoc autem ex duobus contingit, scilicet ex magnitudine mali, et ex 
debilitate timentis.  Ad utrumque autem horum operatur quod aliquid sit insolitum et repentinum.  Primo 
quidem, facit ad hoc quod malum imminens maius appareat.  Omnia enim corporalia, et bona et mala, 
quanto magis considerantur, minora apparent.  Et ideo sicut propter diuturnitatem dolor praesentis mali 




Two things must be considered in the operation of fortitude.  One is in regard to 
its choice: and thus fortitude is not about sudden occurrences: because the brave 
man chooses to think beforehand of the dangers that may arise, in order to be able 
to withstand them, or to bear them more easily: since according to Gregory (Hom. 
XXV in Evang.), “the blow that is foreseen strikes with less force, and we are able 
more easily to bear earthly wrongs, if we are forearmed with the shield of 
foreknowledge.”382 
Thomas goes on to explain that a person without the virtue of fortitude may likewise 
practice the premeditation, without themselves holding the virtue of fortitude.  This 
practice can also be connected with the death of Jesus, as seen in the passage quoted in 
the previous section.  By thinking about the death of Christ on the cross, we can be 
strengthened to face our own death, seeing as Christ went through it previous to us.   
Temperance – Bridle of the soul  
 The final of the cardinal virtues, temperance, plays a central role in the moderation of 
pleasures and desires.  It is located specifically in the concupiscible appetite, but 
nonetheless moderates all the passions that a person can experience.  As is the case with 
the other virtues, temperance also demonstrates key aspects of Thomas’s reflexive 
understanding of the self.  This difference is especially important in regards to the virtue 
of temperance, or more precisely, to the desires and pleasures associated with his virtue.  
As established in the third chapter on reflexivity, the human person is comprised with a 
                                                 
382 ST II-II.123.9 - Respondeo dicendum quod in operatione fortitudinis duo sunt consideranda.  Unum 
quidem, quantum ad electionem ipsius.  Et sic fortitudo non est circa repentina.  Eligit enim fortis 
praemeditari pericula quae possunt imminere, ut eis resistere possit, aut facilius ea ferre, quia, ut Gregorius 
dicit, in quadam homilia, iacula quae praevidentur minus feriunt , et nos mala mundi facilius ferimus, si 
contra ea clipeo praescientiae praemunimur. 
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functional distinction between the intellectual and sensitive parts of a person.  This is 
expressed in a number of different ways in Thomas, including new and old self, interior 
and exterior man, rational nature and corporeal nature.  In a passage from his 
Commentary on Second Timothy, Thomas explains the distinction in response to a 
question on love of self.  He writes: 
I respond that in man there are two things: rational nature and corporeal nature.  
Regarding the intellectual or rational, which is called the interior man, as said in 2 
Cor. 4:16, a man ought to love himself more than all others because he would be 
stupid to will to sin so that he might withdraw others from sin.  But regarding the 
exterior man, it is praiseworthy that he loves others more than himself.  Hence, 
those who in this way love themselves so much are blameworthy.383 
This distinction in aspects of the person suggests a discussion found in Thomas’s 
Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics.  In this passage, Thomas comments on a 
section from book ten, where Aristotle writes: “For, though this is a small part of us, it far 
surpasses all else in power and value; it may seem even, to be the true self of each, being 
the principal and better part.  Consequently, it would be strange if a person were to 
choose to live not his own life but the life of some other.”384  Thomas writes: 
We have stated in the ninth book (1868, 1872) that each thing is thought to be 
especially that which constitutes its chief part, since all other parts are its tools, so 
                                                 
383 Commentary on 2 Timothy ch. 3 lec. 1 sec. 92 - Dicendum est quod in homine duo sunt, scilicet natura 
rationalis et corporalis.  Quantum ad intellecualem seu rationalem, quae interior homo appellatur, ut dicitur 
II Cor. IV, 16, homo debet plus se diligere quam omnes alios, quia stultus esset qui vellet peccare ut alios a 
peccatis retrahat; sed quantum ad exteriorem hominem, laudabile est ut alios plus diligat quam se.  Unde illi 
qui se sic tantum amant, sunt vituperabiles. 
384 Nicomachean Ethics 1177b31-1178a8 
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to speak.  And so when man lives in accordance with his intellect, he lives in 
accordance with the life most proper to him; for it would be strange if a person 
were to choose to live not his own life but the life of some other.385  
As Thomas again reiterates, the persons who lives according to desires and not according 
to reason does not live by his own command, but at the behest of “some other.”  This 
“other” is the non-rational aspect of the soul when it acts outside of alignment with 
reason.   
 It is at this point that the virtue of temperance finds its key significance.  Temperance 
is the hinge point between the sensitive aspect of the soul and the rational soul.  It is the 
preserver of the command of reason through its moderation of the passions of the lower 
soul.  It is, therefore, the virtue that best represents the divided self as found in Thomas.   
 Thomas emphasizes the importance of temperance especially for those who preach 
and teach.  In his Commentary on First Timothy, Thomas describes many of the qualities 
necessary for an effective minister, including the recommendation of chastity: 
Then when he says, “Keep thyself chaste,” he shows him he ought to comport 
himself.  And this is reasonable enough since it happens that someone is so 
concerned with others that he neglects himself.  Hence, he first exhorts him to 
chastity; second, he checks the immoderate use of abstinence, when he says, “Do 
not still drink water.”  He says, therefore: You, who ought to correct others, “keep 
thyself chaste.”  1 Cor. 9:27: But I chastise my body, and bring it into subjection: 
lest perhaps, when I have preached to others, I myself should become a castaway.  
Indeed, Timothy was a man of great abstinence, and he wore down his body to 
                                                 
385 Commentary on the NE 2109 
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avoid sins of the flesh.  Eccles. 2:3: I thought in my heart, to withdraw my flesh 
from wine.386 
In this passage, Thomas recommends that a person pay attention to their self, a theme 
repeated in the Commentary on First Timothy.387  The practice described in the above 
passage of chastity, where the abstinence of Timothy is commended (in a qualified 
manner), is that of a training through restraint.  This connects directly with the practices 
of temperance, as well as the verbal metaphors used to describe the practice.  In 
particular, the appearance of terms used in regards to animals, namely the term “bridle” 
(frenum) and the verb “to curb” (refreno),388 is indicative of the potential lack of control 
possible from an unrestrained appetite.  These terms appear consistently in the discussion 
of temperance in Thomas in describing the functioning of reason in relation to the 
passions.   
 As the previous chapter suggested, Thomas’s view of the religious life is not overly 
ascetic in its approach to pleasures.  Further, Thomas does not recommend the 
                                                 
386 Commentary on 1 Timothy ch. 5 lec. 3 - Deinde cum dicit, teipsum, etc., ostendit quomodo habeat se ad 
seipsum.  Et hoc satis rationabiliter, quia contingit quod aliquis ita fertur, ad alios quod se negligit, unde 
primo hortatur eum ad castitatem; secundo ex hoc reprimit immoderatam eius abstinentiam, ibi noli adhuc, 
et cetera.  Dicit ergo: tu, qui alios debes corrigere, teipsum castum, et cetera.  I Cor. IX, 27: castigo corpus 
meum, et in servitutem redigo, ne cum aliis praedicavero, ipse reprobus efficiar.  Iste siquidem Timotheus 
erat nimiae abstinentiae, et ad vitandum carnis peccata corpus macerabat.  Eccle. II, 3: cogitnas in corde 
meo abstrahere a vino carnem meam, et cetera.   
387 See also Commentary on 1 Timothy ch. 4 lec. 3, for a “cura sui” reference.  Also, it is worth noting that 
though Thomas encourages attention to oneself, he also thinks our ability to evaluate our actions is rather 
limited.  From his Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics:  We can have pleasure only in what we know.  
But we can examine our neighbors better than ourselves and their actions better than our own because 
every man is a bad judge of his own case on account of the private affection he has for himself.”  1896, 
commenting on Aristotle, NE “Now we can study our neighbors better than ourselves, and their actions 
better than our own.” 
388 Other terms include coerceo, retraho, cohibeo, reprimo, and deprimo, all of which have classical 
connotations relating to self-restraint.   
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consideration of all pleasures as evil,389 nor does he think all passions as necessarily 
wrong.390  The human desires by its very nature, and takes pleasure in having those 
desires filled, and this is an inevitable truth of human life for Thomas.  Nonetheless, there 
is a need to train these desires and restrain them, lest they cause the human to depart from 
the best part of themselves, their reason.   
Temperance and the inner child 
 Another repeated theme throughout the Summa Theologiae’s discussion of 
temperance is the reference to childish behavior.  This first appears in a discussion of the 
vice of intemperance.  Thomas explains: 
A thing is said to be childish for two reasons.  First, because it is becoming to 
children, and the Philosopher does not mean that the sin of intemperance is 
childish in this sense.  Secondly, by way of likeness, and it is in this sense that 
sins of intemperance are said to childish.  For the sin of intemperance is one of 
unchecked concupiscence, which is likened to a child in three ways.391   
The image suggested here is a powerful one, in that Thomas is suggesting that without 
training, human desires remain those of children.  The concupiscent appetite, desiring 
aspect of a person, therefore, must be examined and restrained, a description of moral 
development which aids in clarifying our picture of reflexive relationship.  The person 
                                                 
389 ST I-II.34.1 ad 2 
390 ST I.95.2 ad 3 
391 ST II-II.142.2 - Respondeo dicendum quod aliquid dicitur esse puerile dupliciter.  Uno modo, quia 
convenit pueris.  Et sic non intendit philosophus dicere quod peccatum intemperantiae sit puerile.  Alio 
modo secundum quandam similitudinem.  Et hoc modo peccata intemperantiae puerilia dicuntur.  Peccatum 
enim intemperantiae puerilia dicuntur.  Peccatum enim intemperantiae est peccatum superfluae 




watches their concupiscent appetite as something external to them, something to be 
restrained, disciplined and redirected, as if it were a child.   
 This leads to Thomas’s description of the three ways the sin of intemperance is 
“likened to a child.”  The first is found in their yearning for similar things.  As Thomas 
explains: 
First, as regards that which they both desire, for like a child concupiscence desires 
something disgraceful.  This is because in human affairs a thing is beautiful 
according as it harmonizes with reason.  Wherefore Tully says (De Officiis 1, 27) 
under the heading “Comeliness is twofold,” that “the beautiful is that is in keeping 
with man’s excellence in so far as his nature differs from other animals.”  Now a 
child does not attend to the order of reason; and in like manner “concupiscence 
does not listen to reason,” according to the Nicomachean Ethics VII, 6.392 
Though it is possible to bring the sensitive appetite into alignment with reason, there are 
still a number of desires which are internal and natural to the person which will always 
remain, regardless of the direction of reason.  These are especially the need for food and 
water, and sexual desires which, although they lessen in old age, remain throughout a 
person’s life.  This fact provides the need for the discipline of these desires, as Thomas 
explains: 
Secondly, they are alike as to the result.  For a child, if left to his own will, 
becomes more self-willed: hence it is written (Sirach 30:8): “A horse not broken 
                                                 
392 Ibid. - Sicut enim puer, ita et concupiscentia appetit aliquid turpe.  Cuius ratio est quia pulchrum in 
rebus humanis attenditur prout aliquid est ordinatum secundum rationem, unde Tullius dicit, in I de Offic., 
quod pulchrum est quod consentaneum est hominis excellentiae in eo in quo natura eius a reliquis 
animantibus differt.  Puer autem non attendit ad ordinem rationis.  Et similiter concupiscentia non audit 
rationem, ut dicitur in VII Ethic. 
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becometh stubborn, and a child left to himself will become headstrong.”  So, too, 
concupiscence, if indulged, gathers strength: wherefore Augustine says 
(Confessions VIII, 5): “Lust served became a custom, and custom not resisted 
became necessity.”393 
In order to prevent the power of concupiscence, as Augustine suggests, persons must not 
allow themselves to indulge without restraint, lest they create a permanent habit of 
indulgence.  This final aspect of training is made especially clear in the third correlation.  
Thomas writes: 
Thirdly, as to the remedy which is applied to both.  For a child is corrected by 
being restrained (coercetur); hence it is written (Proverbs 23:13-14): “Withhold 
not correction from a child...thou shalt beat him with a rod, and deliver his soul 
from Hell.”  In like manner by resisting concupiscence we moderate it according 
to the demands of virtue.  Augustine indicates this when he says (Music. VI, 11) 
that if the mind be lifted up to spiritual things, and remain fixed “thereon, the 
impulse of custom,” i.e. carnal concupiscence, “is broken, and being suppressed is 
gradually weakened: for it was stronger when we followed it, and though not 
wholly destroyed, it is certainly less strong when we curb it (refrenamus).”  
Hence the philosopher says (Nicomachean Ethics III, 12) that “as a child ought to 
                                                 
393 Ibid. - Secundo conveniunt quantum ad eventum.  Puer enim, si suae voluntati dimittatur, crescit in 
propria voluntate, unde dicitur Eccli. XXX, equus indomitus evadit durus, et filius remissus evadet 
praeceps. Ita etiam et concupiscentia, si ei satisfiat, maius robur accipit, unde Augustinus dicit, in VIII 




live according to the direction of his tutor, so ought the concupiscible to accord 
with reason.”394 
The appearance of the quotation from Proverbs in the above passage is rather striking, 
especially in that it appears to suggest serious physical discipline to restrain the body.  
For Thomas, however, as mentioned previously, the concupiscible appetite is located in 
the soul, not in the body.  Thus, though bodily discipline aids in the observance of 
temperance, the most important factor is in the control of the thoughts of the mind.  The 
quote from Augustine, therefore, is instructive, and is similar to the recommendations 
Thomas gives in his “aids to the observance of chastity” discussed in the previous 




                                                 
394 Ibid. - Tertio, quantum ad remedium quod utrique praebetur.  Puer enim emendatur per hoc quod 
coercetur, unde dicitur Prov. XXIII, noli subtrahere a puero disciplinam, tu virga percuties eum, et animam 
eius de Inferno liberabis. Et similiter, dum concupiscentiae resistitur, reducitur ad debitum honestatis 
modum.  Et hoc est quod Augustinus dicit, in VI musicae, quod mente in spiritulia suspensa atque ibi fixa 
et manente, consuetudinis, scilicet carnalis concupiscentiae.  Impetus frangitur et paulatim repressus 
extinguitur.  Maior enim erat cum sequeremur, non omnino nullus, sed certe minor, cum refrenamus.  Et 
ideo philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod quemadmodum puerum oportet secundum praeceptum paedagogi 
vivere, sic et concupiscibile consonare rationi. 
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Chapter 6 – Conclusion 
 
Though it is perhaps possible to speak generally of a few forms of reflexivity 
throughout history, it is clear that these forms take on far more specific characteristics 
when instantiated in particular persons, and that it is also possible for a diversity of forms 
to exist concurrently in history with one another.  For Thomas Aquinas, as this paper has 
argued, the form of self-understanding is heavily influenced by classical Greek and 
Roman texts, and the practices and writings of early Christian monks.  This form of 
reflexivity identifies the higher parts of the soul as the true source of what a person is, 
and attempts to bring the lower parts of the soul and body into alignment with this 
teaching.  Additionally, in distinction from some forms of Christian reflexivity, Thomas 
does not place an emphasis on the analysis and examination of one’s past sins, nor on the 
possibility of accessing “hidden” desires.395  Instead self-awareness and self-knowledge 
consist in moment to moment awareness of self, which is requirement for a person to be 
capable of acting morally.  This is exemplified first and foremost in the virtue of 
prudence, but also found in the other virtues, and found in the spiritual exercises which 
contribute to the spiritual life.   
 The goal of this dissertation was to describe the nature of reflexive self-relation and 
spiritual exercises in the work of Thomas Aquinas, looking to a broad range of his 
writings.  Also, by highlighting his understanding of these things, it suggested the 
specific form of person that Thomas thought humans on the way to perfection should 
                                                 
395 The extent to which those figures in the early church, including Cassian who was singled out by 
Foucault as particularly invested in this mode of thinking, actually practiced the rooting out of “hidden” 
sins, is not entirely clear.  It appears the term hidden is simply used for “not disclosed,” rather than any 




attempt to become, with the aid of grace.  I have suggested perhaps a more narrow 
understanding of the ideal person in Thomas’s mind than from that traditionally 
suggested, in that the focus of this work has been on the religious life.  It should be noted 
once more that Thomas accepted a wide variety of forms of life as effective, and that he 
did not insist on a single path.  As was demonstrated in the discussion of the professed 
religious life, however, Thomas found the surest means of living a life devoted to God 
and charity to be in the profession of the vows.  This argument is justified from Thomas’s 
own work, and in particular, from the De perfectione spiritualis vitae.  Thomas believes 
that the ideal life is found in the imitation of Christ, and, through grace, the reformation 
of the soul in the image and likeness of God.  To accomplish this requires not only grace, 
but a life where it is possible to avoid the temptations of sin.  And though it is possible to 
avoid sin and be a married, wealthy person, this end is more easily accomplished if one 
takes the vows of poverty, chastity and obedience.  Furthermore, to imitate Christ means 
to contemplate and then share the fruits of contemplation, something which the 
Dominican order in particular was committed to.  For this reason, Thomas quietly 
recommends the way of life practiced by the Dominicans as providing a more secure way 
on the path to perfection.   
 In this conclusion, I will briefly provide a summary of the findings of this 
dissertation, separated into the two main aspects of this work: reflexivity and spiritual 
exercises.  This section serves as a preamble to the discussion of the ethics of human 
formation in the contemporary world: given that, as others have shown, and I have 
outlined, alternative forms of reflexivity exist, each with their own techniques of self-
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knowledge, it might reasonably be asked which is currently most popular, and what role 
entities like the state or the education system have in continuing that form of self-relation.  
Given that Hadot and Foucault’s writings, as the introduction demonstrated, provide 
accounts of formation which are intended to serve as alternatives to the current modes of 
cultural formation, and, in fact, to offer techniques of resistance, it can be asked of what 
use or place might a Thomistic account of human formation be employed for.  By taking 
on the practices of these earlier figures, one could potentially live in a different way, and 
have a different relationship to the self, than that offered in popular concern. 
Thomas on Reflexivity 
 The reflexive relationship of self to self is expressed in numerous ways for Thomas 
Aquinas, but it holds one key point: the governance of the self is accomplished when it is 
the higher powers of the soul directing the lower aspects.  The use of the terms “old self” 
and “new self”—where the old self is identified with sin and the sensitive appetite of the 
human, and the new self is identified with Christ and the intellectual aspect of the 
person—serve as indicators of this difference in identity.  Though Thomas certainly 
affirms that a whole person is the whole person, body and soul, the person reformed by 
grace is one that identifies the self with the intellectual powers, and does not allow 
themselves to be directed in thought and action by the lower parts of that self, which are 
“extrinsic.”   
 This form of self-understanding is further expressed in the work of the cardinal 
virtues.  For Thomas, the virtues serve to moderate passions and align action with the 
higher part of the soul.  Even when these virtues are infused, the person is still called 
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upon to act in alignment with the intellect or the reason benefited by grace, and to deny 
the input from the lower aspect of the soul.  Prudence, therefore, exemplifies this identity, 
serving in its role as a hybrid of intellectual and moral virtue.  For Thomas, the person 
who will behave morally is the person who allows the direction of prudence to serve as 
guide at all times.  To be prudent requires self-knowledge in the limited classical sense—
that is, knowledge of one’s immediate thoughts and actions, a judgment of whether they 
are good or bad, and a suitable habit of bridling negative thoughts and engaging in 
positive ones.  Though Thomas will spend a fair amount of time discussing the structure 
of the soul, as Aristotle and others before him have done, this form of self-knowledge 
serves in the spiritual life only to supplement the understanding of the practices found 
therein.   
 Most importantly, the practices of self-knowledge do not include the discovery of 
“hidden” sins, nor the detailed categorization of evil thoughts as they arise.  Negative 
thoughts are to be dismissed in Thomas, replaced by contemplation of the divine, 
repetition of scripture, and the remembrance of good actions of others, especially Christ.  
Thomas, as he repeatedly mentions, does not approve of the practice of dabbling with a 
sinful thought, as he believes it likely to lead to other sins.  Self-knowledge is about 
determining a proper course of action, and preserving oneself from entertaining sinful 
thoughts which might lead to sinful behavior.  This would seem to exclude the practice of 
dwelling on past sins, and detailed analysis of the feelings which accompanied them.  For 
Thomas, to be a person on the way to perfection requires that the entirety of the sinful life 
be placed in the past, along with any sense of shame for those past sins.  To be perfect 
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means to approach God as a person redeemed from sin, as a person who is dead to sin, as 
a person who has destroyed the “old self.”  This requires a separation from sin in all 
forms, even and especially the recollection of our past sins, which should have been put 
behind us.  
This is one further implication of this dissertation which bears mentioning in this 
conclusion, though impossible to cover it in any detail without moving beyond the scope 
of this work.  It seems possible to read the work of Aquinas as a response to “culture” on 
two fronts: first, the culture of medieval society and its conception of the ideal person; 
and second, to the culture of popular religion contemporary to his writing.  This would 
provide his work with the same role as that assigned to “philosophy” by Foucault and 
Hadot, as a response to unproductive formation by outside influences.  In order to 
develop a full picture of the way in which Thomas’s work functions as a response, one 
would need to compile a picture of reflexive relation in medieval culture and reflexive 
relation within other church figures, a task which is a rather substantial challenge, which 
is why I only tentatively offer this particular argument.  Still, however, there is much in 
terms of spiritual exercises and understandings of the person that appears to be distinct in 
Thomas and other similarly minded scholastics, and these techniques can be understood 
as a resistance to alternative forms of self-understanding.  These alternative forms would 
have to be studied and established, but it seems likely that there are multiple alternative 
forms existing alongside dominant cultural modes.   
Thomas on Spiritual Exercises 
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 The second aspect of this dissertation is found in providing an account of the goal of 
the spiritual exercises contained in the work of Thomas Aquinas.  This is accomplished, 
first and foremost, in describing the nature of the spiritual life for Thomas, something 
which is found primarily in the religious orders.  Though non-professed persons can, of 
course, be in right relationship with God, as mentioned above, the surest way is found in 
the religious orders like Thomas’ own Order of Preachers.  Thomas views these religious 
orders as schools for spiritual exercise, where a person is trained and aided in the spiritual 
life, helping to ensure the preservation of grace, and leading to other opportunities for the 
reception of the same.  While Thomas, by the end of his career at least, clearly refutes 
any sort of Pelagian thinking, he does nonetheless recommend a host of activities 
designed to ensure the preservation of grace through the avoidance of sin.  The avoidance 
of sin is best accomplished by acting in accordance with the direction of the higher 
aspects of the person, and this is precisely what the spiritual exercises seek to ensure.   
 Many of the spiritual exercises present in Thomas’s work are ordered especially to 
ensuring the governance of reason.  This does not mean that reason is the only part of the 
human that plays a central role, nor does it mean that Thomas ignores the rest of the 
human person.  The governance of reason means that all human acts are approvable by 
the rational faculty, and thus can be considered moral.  In fact, a number of exercises 
which are not “rational” occur, including the practice of kneeling during prayer as a 
spiritual exercise, which trains the soul in humility before God.  Other exercises include 
the practice of taking a bath as a way of assuaging sorrow, or in the shedding of tears.  
These exercises, each in their own way, serve to preserve the governance of reason, 
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whether by the moderation of passions or other affects, or by strengthening its ability 
through education and meditation. 
 A more expansive description of the spiritual exercises recommended by Thomas was 
found in chapters four and five.  The most noteworthy of these exercises are those 
mentioned by Thomas in connection with the preservation of chastity, a series of 
exercises suggesting prayer, contemplation, reading, and moderate corporal discipline 
related mostly to intake of food and wine, as well as the avoidance of company with 
women.  These practices are connected with the importance of preserving the form of 
reflexive self-understanding found in Thomas: in order to avoid the negative influence of 
the lower aspects of the person, including those passions which impinge upon the proper 
functioning of reason, one must build the virtues which provide the capacity for moral 
action.   
Contemporary ethics and reflexivity 
 Though Foucault would likely balk at any suggestion that his work had a particular 
argument to be made for contemporary ethics, it is clear that it does offer a substantial 
critique.  The study of the reflexivity of the past is a way of critiquing the reflexivity of 
the present, and suggesting that perhaps the modern self is not a philosophical constant, 
nor a beneficial one.  It is perhaps possible, further, to suggest that in studying alternative 
forms of reflexivity, the alternatives suggested can inform practices for developing 
contemporary self-understanding.  This is a more dangerous assumption, as there is much 
to critique in the medieval perspective of the self and its practices.  Nonetheless, it is 
clear that thinkers like Thomas Aquinas offer a robust description of the difficulties 
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inherent in the moral life, and guidance on practices associated with strengthening 
oneself to meet those difficulties.   
 This line of questioning is especially relevant given the ascendance of virtue ethics as 
a modern category.  Given the description of the practices taken on by Thomas, it can 
fairly be asked whether this revival—as found in figures like Alistair MacIntyre, et al.—
actually represents a complete engagement with the practices of an ethic of virtue.  This 
dissertation has suggested that the system of virtue ethics found in Thomas is not 
considered an entity apart from the rest of his theology, including the question of self-
understanding and spiritual exercises.  Should this mean, therefore, that if a person wants 
to be a modern adherent of Thomas Aquinas’s thought, then they must take steps to alter 
their own relationship of self to self?  Does that person need to embrace a faculty 
psychology, identify with their intellect, and thus deny alternative accounts of human 
identity? 
 Though this might seem an insignificant change, there are tremendous implications.  
First, a person would have to deny many of the innovations made in self-understanding 
with the advent of modern psychology.  Self-examination (or self-knowledge) would not 
mean analysis of feelings and desires in order to understand what constitutes the “true 
self.”  Instead, examination is always of the present moment, with a person’s past used 
only as a source of experience to benefit future moral decision making through the work 
of prudence.  Base desires are not identified with the person, whose true self is 
constituted in reason. 
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 In contemporary thought, though we have begun a re-appropriation of the concept of 
virtue, a similar effort has not been made in adopting the spiritual exercises, worldview, 
and reflexive understanding of the self from that period.  There are, of course, a multitude 
of reasons why this has not occurred, not least of which is that the modern world 
emphasizes individual identity and self-expression.  If one were to ask Thomas Aquinas 
who he was—though this question would not have the same resonance to anyone in the 
medieval period—he might likely respond that he was a person on the way to perfection.  
That, or provide an explanation of the generic structure of the human person, and the 
explanation that a human with grace is directed by the higher aspects of their soul.  If, 
however, one asks this question of a contemporary virtue ethicist, what is the answer we 
receive?  In all likelihood, the answer would contain something different, including 
especially personal aspirations and achievements.  Kwame Anthony Appiah offers 
something of a description of what constitutes a person in his The Ethics of Identity: “As 
we come to maturity, the identities we make, our individualities, are interpretive 
responses to our talents and disabilities, and the changing social, semantic and material 
contexts we enter at birth.”396  That is, Appiah suggests, our identity is constructed out of 
a combination of our abilities, our social location, and the conceptual world we belong in.  
This stands in opposition to the form of “identity” found in the pre-modern world, which 
answers the question of who we are with a general definition of an ideal human.  This 
distinction has been detailed by Christopher Gill in his work on ancient Greek thought.  
Gill suggests that there are two fundamental patterns of reasoning, one modern and the 
other pre-modern, each which is dependent on fundamentally different conceptions of the 
                                                 
396 Appiah, Kwame Anthony.  The Ethics of Identity.  163 
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relationship to the self.  The first is the “subjective-individualist,” which is marked by 
five characteristics: 
1. “To be a ‘person’ is to be conscious of oneself as an ‘I’, a unified locus of thought 
and will. 
2. To be a ‘person’ is to be capable of grounding one’s moral life by a specifically 
individual stance (for instance, that of ‘autonomy’, in one of the possible senses 
of this term.)... 
3. To be a ‘person is to be capable of the disinterested kind of moral rationality that 
involves abstraction from localized interpersonal and communal attachments, and 
from the emotions and desires associated with these. 
4. To be a ‘person’ in the fullest sense, is to exercise one’s capacity for autonomy in 
establishing moral principles for oneself or in realizing one’s own (authentic) 
selfhood.  Those capacities, in turn, presuppose a special kind of absolute or 
‘transcendental’ freedom. 
5. To be a ‘person’ is to understand oneself as the possessor of a unique personal 
identity; this necessarily raises the question of the relationship between having 
personal identity and being human.”397 
The “subjective-individualist” model of the self is centered on the concept that a person is 
truly unique.  The core distinction, especially in distinguishing this model from classical 
thought, is in the idea of the realization of an “authentic selfhood.”  Whereas classical 
                                                 




thought does indicate the possibility of a “true self,” this self is a universal self, the 
rational human nature, not one defined by the flowering of one’s unique attributes. 
Gill, working from his reading of mainly Greek philosophy and poetry, suggests 
that the “objective-participant” model is the standard in pre-modern periods.  In contrast 
to the subjective-individualist model, the emphasis for the ethical systems with this 
model of personhood is in becoming person who reasons well and has their actions, 
emotions, and affections directed by reason.  Whereas in the modern era, as Gill suggests, 
the person seeks to retract from communal attachments and the accompanying emotions 
and desires in order to think autonomously,398 the classical model does not view 
affections and attachments proceeding from reason as inherently disruptive, and thus 
includes them in rational discourse.  Gill provides these five points: 
1. “To be a human being (or a rational animal) is to act on the basis of reasons, 
though these reasons may not be fully available to the consciousness of the agent. 
2. To be a human being is to participate in shared forms of human life and 
‘discourse’ about the nature and significance of those shared forms of life.  The 
ethical life of a human being is expressed in whole-hearted engagement with an 
interpersonal and communal role and in debate about the proper form that such a 
role should take.  The ultimate outcome of these two types of participation is both 
(a) objective knowledge of what constitutes the best human life and (b) a 
corresponding character and way of life. 
                                                 
398 This is perhaps a caricature of Kantian thinking, and there are always issues in making generalizations about 
broad periods of time, but there is certainly some foundation for this distinction.   
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3. To be human is to be the kind of animal whose psycho-ethical life (typically 
conceived as ‘dialogue’ between parts of the psyche) is capable, in principle, of 
being shaped so as to become fully ‘reason-ruled’ by (a) the action-guiding 
discourse of interpersonal and communal engagement and (b) reflective debate 
about the proper goals of a human life. 
4. To be human is to be capable, in principle again, of becoming fully ‘reason-
ruled.’  But the extent to which any given human being is able to develop in this 
way depends on the extent to which she is able to participate effectively in these 
types of interactive and reflective discourse. 
5. To be human is to understand oneself as, at the deepest level, a human being.  The 
fullest possible development of human rationality involves reflective 
understanding of what ‘being human’ means, and of how this relates to 
participation in other kinds of being, such as animal and divine.”399 
The distinction between these two types of thinking is essential to understanding both 
reflexivity in pre-modern thinkers in general, and the thought of Aquinas in particular.  
For Aquinas, self-understanding is predicated on the proper understanding of oneself as a 
rational soul made in the image of God, with the possibility, through grace, of recovering 
the original clarity of that image.  Aquinas’s model is not predicated on any form of 
unique self-realization; in fact, self-realization in Aquinas is to realize oneself as an 
intellectual soul that desires only God, and a denial of identity for those aspects of the 
person which desire proximate, sinful things. 
                                                 
399 Ibid., 12. 
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Thomas’s theology emphasizes the “freedom” of the mind for God, though by 
freedom he meant its unencumbrance, and with this emphasis come several practices and 
perspectives on our relation to ourselves.  There is, I believe, much to be said for 
following how this practice contributed to moral development in Thomas’s mind, and 
why he considered it a key component of the spiritual life.  There is, further, much in the 
work of Thomas Aquinas which can influence how we approach ourselves and our moral 
lives.  It is apparent that the observance of the virtues requires formation, and that the 
goal of becoming Christ-like requires more than devotion.  To this end, in modern 
treatments of the virtues, a greater emphasis on the exercises which accompany these 
virtues is warranted.  For, without the exercises and accompanying conception of the self, 
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